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PREFACE 
his book comes from a large research endeavour of the European 
Union’s 6th Framework Programme, called ‘Microcon’, standing for 
the micro-foundations of violent conflict. In its entirety, Microcon 
consists of 28 component projects undertaken by 22 research centres across 
Europe, under the coordination of Sussex University. The Microcon website 
(www.microconflict.eu) gives a full account of participants, objectives and 
results. The project runs from 2007 to 2011.  
The present collection of papers represents the first half of one 
component project, under the title ‘Ethno-Religious Conflict’, directed by 
Michael Emerson and Amel Boubekeur. Its second half will address issues 
of ‘Changing Models of Multiculturalism’, and will be initiated in 2009 
with approximately the same team of researchers who contributed to the 
present book.  
This sequence of working stages is deliberate, in that the present book 
analyses ethno-religious conflict in Europe as a problem, whereas the 
second will address the search for constructive solutions. 
The book also forms part of a wider set of studies on Islam-related 
issues undertaken by CEPS. Most relevant to the present work was a 
volume published in 2007, European Islam – The Challenge to Society and 
Public Policy, edited by Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael 
Emerson,  which dealt with the social, economic, cultural and political 
conditions affecting the new Muslim minorities within the EU. Another 
CEPS book published in 2007, Political Islam and EU Foreign Policy, edited by 
Michael Emerson and Richard Youngs, analysed the role and ideologies of 
democratic Islamist parties in the south Mediterranean states, followed by a 
further work, Travels among Europe’s Muslim Neighbours, on the same theme 
by two Members of the European Parliament, Joost Lagendyk and Jan 
Wiersma. 
Brussels, 16 February 2009 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
MICHAEL EMERSON  
his book addresses what is perhaps the greatest source of societal 
tensions and violent conflict in contemporary Europe: tensions and 
violence involving people from minority groups of Muslim culture. 
Six country studies are presented: on Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Russia and the United Kingdom. The societal tensions are flowing 
typically from two quite different sources: on the one hand, the broad and 
relatively soft issues of social and economic disadvantage and 
discrimination affecting Mulsim groups on an extensive scale, and, on the 
other hand, the narrowly concentrated but very hard issues of terrorist 
violence inspired by radical ideas. Both types are seen in the countries 
under study to some degree. The justification for addressing both together 
is that, while categorically different, they are nonetheless dynamically 
inter-connected, feeding on each other and leading, in some cases, to 
escalation.  
The selection of case studies is not comprehensive, but it does 
encompass a range of essential variables, notably as regards the length of 
time the Muslim minorities have been established in Europe and their 
countries of origin. A core West European group in the sample – Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands and the UK – all have immigrant Muslim 
communities that started coming in large numbers early in the second half 
of the 20th century. Thus the Maghrebians in Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands, and the Turks in Belgium and the Netherlands, and the South 
Asians in the UK are often now families with second or even third 
generations born in their new homelands. Spain, however, has a shorter 
experience of immigration, which became important only towards the end 
of the 20th century. At the other extreme one finds Russia’s Muslim 
minorities, who are mainly not immigrants at all, such as the Volga Tartars 
and the inhabitants of the Northern Caucasus, representing centuries of 
history from the early expansion of Islam and then of the Russia empire.  
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All these communities have been affected in some degree by the 
waves of radical Islamic influence building up in recent decades, 
intensified by the after-shocks of the iconic global terrorist act of September 
11th, 2001, and other subsequent acts that have been at least mentally filed 
under the same category by much of the population, irrespective of 
whether or not the terrorists had al-Qaeda connections. Five of the 
countries studied have experienced their own iconic events, which had 
massive media and political impact. Three countries witnessed horrific 
terrorist acts: the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004, the London 
bombings of 7 July 2005, and in Russia all too many events on an even 
bigger scale including the Beslan hostage-taking of 1 September 2004. In the 
Netherlands, it was the successive assassinations of Pim Fortuyn on 6 May 
2002 and Theo Van Gogh on 2 November 2004 and in France the 
categorically different riots of the Paris suburbs and other urban centres in 
November-December 2005.  
The incidence of terrorist violence has been highly variable from one 
country to another. Russia has seen the most numerous and deadly 
terrorist acts, but there the development of Islamic radicalisation has been 
grafted on top of the war of attempted secession by Chechnya in the 1990s. 
In Western Europe the UK has seen the most extensive series of terrorist 
acts; in Spain there has been just one major case; in France mostly foiled 
attempts; and in the Netherlands some individualised assassinations. 
Belgium, for reasons we shall explore later, has an immigrant community 
of the same order and origins as neighbouring France and the Netherlands, 
but it has so far escaped major violence. 
Irrespective of the frequency, or absence of terrorist acts, this book is 
concerned with the full range of tensions and trends towards violence 
involving the minorities of Muslim culture or faith. While the acts of terror 
are highly individualised, societal tensions between the Muslim 
communities and the majority populations are highly diffuse. In some 
cases, broader societal grievances and tensions have spilled over into 
collective violence, the most notable examples being the race riots that 
afflicted some northern English cities in the 1990s and the even more 
destructive riots in the Parisian suburbs in 2005. Here the ethnic aspect has 
been conspicuous while the religious aspect was largely absent.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY | 3 
 
1.  Typologies 
This variety in the nature of violent conflict led the team to adopt a formal 
analytical matrix on the typology of violence, formulated by Samir 
Amghar, and presented in Table 1.  
Table 1. Matrix-typology of radicalisation generating tensions through to violent conflict  
 Muslims  to 
non-Muslims 
Non-Muslims 
to Muslims 
Muslims to 
Muslims 
Politico-religious 
Jihad, Islamist terrorism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Religious, non-political  
Apolitical, neo-
fundamentalists 
(Salafism, Ahbashs, 
Tabligh…) 
Customary, pseudo-religious 
(honour killings, female 
mutilation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political, non-religious 
Banlieues riots/violence, rap, 
extreme left, and extreme 
right movements of native 
populations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three broad categories of tension and violence are distinguished. The 
first is what might be called politico-religious radicalisation, where the 
inspiration is grounded in Islamic texts or interpretations that can range 
from the scholarly to simplistic fantasies. This justifies the jihad,  which 
employs terrorist violence with a view to overthrowing the secular or non-
radical Islamic political regimes of Muslim states, or even in the most 
fantastic visions of installing Islam in non-Muslim states. 
The second category concerns religious but non-political movements. 
These are fundamentalist in theology and doctrine, but abstain from 
politics or societal integration. While these groups may themselves abstain 
from violence, it is sometimes argued that they serve as the breeding 
ground and stepping stone for individuals to pass in due course into 
violent action of the jihadist type. 4 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
A very different sub-category are ‘customary’ or ‘pseudo-religious’ 
traditions that involve violence, including so-called ‘honour killings’ and 
female mutilation, and which might be called ‘family terrorism’. While 
their incidence in Europe may be quite limited, this category is significant 
for its impact on the climate of relations between Muslim minorities and 
the majority populations, since these practises are widely mediatised, and 
create negative prejudices on a wider scale. 
Finally, the third category concerns radicalisation of attitudes and 
behaviour leading to collective violence of the types seen in recent years in 
some northern English cities, and the French suburbs. We here observe 
violent conflict that is not terrorism, nor does it have religious motivation. 
These are largely spontaneous movements that amount to political 
statements of grievance by loose collections of people with some ethnic 
identity in common. The grievances may concern housing and employment 
prospects, or perceptions of discrimination. 
In the other dimensions to the matrix there is place to register the 
violence that may be detonated or provoked not only by Muslims towards 
non-Muslims, but also by non-Muslims towards Muslims and between 
Muslims. The provocation of violence by non-Muslims towards Muslims 
concerns the actions of some extreme right political parties or groups. 
Instances of conflict between Muslims in Europe are also reported, for 
example between Kurds and Turks.  
In the next chapter, Olivier Roy presents hypotheses of interpretation 
of al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism as a deterritorialised and globalised 
phenomenon. He presents two main theses on the roots of terrorism, the 
first being a top-down ‘vertical’ approach where al-Qaeda acts as a 
revolutionary organisation indoctrinating its militants with the political 
objective of toppling corrupted regimes in the Middle East and replacing 
them with a caliphate based on sharia law. The strategy also includes 
attacks on the West itself in order to undermine the support it gives to 
current Arab regimes. The second line of analysis, termed ‘horizontal’, 
focuses on the role of individuals who perpetrate terrorist acts in Europe, 
and who are not so interested in either the Middle East or Islam as a faith, 
but rather in the struggle against the US global hegemon or more broadly 
radical anti-imperialist struggles of the types seen already several decades 
ago (for example Che Guevara, the Baader Meinhof gang, etc., which had 
nothing to do with Islam). This leads the author to reject the idea of a 
general theory of terrorism, because the very terminology confuses INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY | 5 
 
Muslims fighting for local political causes such as Palestine and Chechnya 
with those who have no concrete political agenda beyond the statement of 
protest and quest for heroic glory and matyrdom. The distinction is of 
strategic policy significance for Western Europe, whose experiences of 
terrorist acts at home best fit into the second category. Al-Qaeda in Western 
Europe is best understood as a youth movement, in which “young guys 
jump into violence”, after a short and thin period of radicalisation. The 
degree of success achieved by Bin Laden has been not so much to have 
spread theology or ideology, but to have “invented a narrative that could 
allow rebels without a cause to connect with a cause”.  
Roy’s major recommendation that follows from this logic is the need 
to destroy precisely this ‘narrative’ in the minds of the young populace, by 
integrating Islam as a normal religion, by de-Islamising perceptions of al-
Qaeda rather than branding it as ‘bad Islam’, and by portraying the 
radicalised terrorists as unsuccessful delinquents and ‘losers’ rather than 
heroes.  
The present project is about analysing the ‘micro’ foundations of 
conflict, hence its abbreviated name of ‘Microcon’. The thesis that emerges 
is that Eu rope’s ex perience with globalised terrorism turns out, perhaps 
paradoxically, to be indeed much more ‘micro’ than might have been 
supposed. Illustrating this ‘micro’ aspect of the globalised terrorism 
through the story of an individual, Roy cites the case of a Hindu from East 
Africa, who after settling in Great Britain went on to Kasmir where he 
married a Malay woman from Thailand, and then became involved in 
terrorist plots in London and New York. 
2.  Six case studies 
The ideological and theological foundations of the major Islamic groups in 
France serve as the major focus of the chapter by Samir Amghar, 
distinguishing in particular between radicalised religious movements that 
have no political agenda or involvement in violence, and those that 
combine religious inspiration with politically motivated violence. In the 
first category, the 1990s saw the arrival in France of militant Salafists, 
fleeing from the repression of the Algerian regime, whose original purpose 
was the violent overthrow of that regime. After some years this group has 
been changing its approach, and espouses a pious non-political Salfism 
with withdrawal from and rejection of French society. Further movements 
sharing these characteristics are the Ahbash, led originally by Lebanese 6 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
students in France, and the Tabligh which spread to the continent from its 
Indo-Pakistani base in the UK. Notwithstanding the peaceful ideology of 
these groups, the French authorities have viewed them as breeding 
grounds for individuals who may pass on to violent radicalisation. Of the 
jihadist groups devoted to politically motivated violence, the author traces 
the evolution of three tendencies. First are those aiming at the 
revolutionary overthrow of repressive regimes in their countries of origin, 
notably the Algerian Groupes Islamiques Armées (GIA), who turned to 
terrorist acts in France itself (the St Michel metro bombing in 1995) with the 
intention to dissuade the French government from supporting the Algerian 
and other Arab regimes. Its actions in France also involves small-scale 
criminal operations to collect funds and weapons to support operations in 
the home country. Second, and reflecting the failure of these first strategies, 
support develops for actions of al-Qaeda inspiration aimed at the US 
hegemon and Jewish state. The nature of their combat changes not only by 
its de-territorialisation, but also by its technique and ideological foundation 
– from guerilla warfare to suicidal martyrdom. Third, there develops a 
tendency for radicalized individuals to go and fight in support of fellow 
Muslims under attack elsewhere in the world, for example in Bosnia, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, etc. All these tendencies have been manifest in France, but 
without any major terrorist attack on French territory, attributable in part 
to the vigilance of the French security services. However France did have 
its own iconic event in 2005, with the massive riots in the suburbs of Paris 
and other French cities over a period of some weeks. These riots involved 
disillusioned youths of Muslim backgrounds, but without religious 
motivation, or precise political agenda; rather, they represented protest 
movements against social and employment conditions and perceived 
discrimination.  
Tinka Veldhuis and Edwin Bakker review the tensions and violent 
conflicts involving Muslims in the Netherlands. The first signs of Islamic 
radicalisation in the Netherlands are traced back to the 1980s, although it 
was only in 1996 that its security services spoke of possible terrorist attacks. 
There has developed a rich collection of Islamic movements or groups, 
many of which are Dutch branches of Islamic multinational organisations. 
The Netherlands has not experienced either major terrorist acts as in the 
UK, or violent confrontations in urban or suburban settings as in France. 
On the other hand, inter-ethnic tensions have been mounting in recent 
years, undermining the country’s image as a liberal, tolerant and pluralistic 
society. Two assassinations highlight this. In May 2002 came the murder of INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY | 7 
 
Pim Fortuyn, head of a populist party and outspoken critic of Islam and 
Muslims in the Netherlands. Even though the murderer was a native Dutch 
left-wing activist, it provoked deepening inter-ethnic tensions, and 
mounting racist and anti-Islam sentiments among right-wing youth 
groups. In spring 2004, the security services issued warnings of growing 
radicalisation among certain Muslim groups alongside growing anti-
Muslim sentiment in Dutch society. And then in November 2004, a young 
Dutch-born man of Moroccan descent, member of the Hofstadgroep, 
murdered the film-maker Theo van Gogh, whose works were blatantly 
provocative towards Muslims. This further inflamed inter-ethnic tensions, 
to the point that the spectre of escalating conflict was conceivable. But then 
a surprise occurred when Gerd Wilders, a Member of Parliament who is 
notorious for his anti-Muslim statements, released a film that many feared 
would trigger a replay of the Danish cartoon affair of 2005 and provoke 
violent reactions on a global scale. Contrary to expectations, this did not 
happen. The reactions of the Muslim community in the Netherlands were 
mild. In their conclusions, the authors wonder whether the tide may have 
turned; or more precisely whether the idea of a breakdown of traditional 
Dutch values has been exaggerated, and that its society has begun to 
rediscover its traditional values of tolerance and mutual respect.  
The least violent of the six cases studied is that of Belgium, analysed 
by Theo Koutroubas, Ward Vloeberghs and Zeynep Yanasmayan. In 
Belgium there have been no terrorist acts, no major riots, no assassinations. 
This must make the researcher ask why, since the Muslim ethno-religious 
minorities in Belgium are in their scale, origins and history typical of 
Western Europe, and most similar to neighbouring France and the 
Netherlands. Belgium, however, has not been without its tensions. Its Arab-
European League movement has been adamant in pushing for equal rights 
for Muslim people, in criticising Islamophobia in Europe, and in its support 
of the Palestinian cause. This has both provoked, and been provoked by, 
the extreme-right wing Vlaams Blok party (which after being banned in 
2004 reconfigure itself as Vlaams Belang), with clashes in Antwerp verging 
on the violent, involving patrols of quasi-militia Arab groups. In Brussels 
there have been serious tensions within the Turkish community, with 
rowdy demonstrations seeing nationalist Turks in verbal and physical 
conflict with Turkish Kurds, mixed up with protests at the heavy-handiness 
of the Belgian police. There have been reports of one or two terrorist attacks 
on the EU institutions being planned in Morocco, which were foiled at the 
preparatory stage. But there has been no real act of terrorism. Why? The 8 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
comparison with the Netherlands is particularly striking. One hypothesis is 
that Belgium’s linguistic-cultural-political divisions become an asset in the 
present context. If the nation’s divisions seem at times to make it 
ungovernable at the federal level, the corollary is that the immigrant 
groups face less of a monolithic ‘other’ in the shape of the domestic 
national identity, from which they may perceive exclusion. Living in a 
complex multi-cultural society, the Muslim immigrants may perceive 
discriminatory attitudes and practices less intensely than elsewhere in 
neighbouring countries, and this means a less fertile ground for 
radicalisation. This has to be a speculative interpretation, but not one to be 
dismissed. 
By contrast the United Kingdom has seen the most terrorist acts of 
West European countries, and perhaps the most pervasive set of radical 
Islamic networks, as analysed in the chapter by Rachel Briggs and Jonathan 
Birdwell. The British security service, MI5, believes there are 2,000 
individuals in the UK who pose a direct threat to national security, and 
since 2001 there have been more than 200 terrorist convictions. The London 
bombings of 7 July 2005, with multiple and simultaneous attacks on public 
transport, manifestly drew inspiration from New York’s 9/11, and became 
similarly engraved in public awareness as London’s 7/7. The authors 
wrestle with the question of ‘causes’ of these dreadful acts. They identify 
‘radicalising agents’, and in an interesting table place numerous terrorist 
acts into several such categories, including ‘key places’, ‘charismatic 
leaders’, ‘relationships’, ‘experiences’ and ‘grievances’. But it remains 
difficult to know which factors have been instrumental, rather than just 
present. The authors go on to discuss the huge number of Islamic groups or 
movements in the UK within the three categories set out in the matrix 
above – the religious and political, the religious and non-political and the 
non-religious but political. They confirm that these analytical categories 
have to be seen as a rough approximation, with many groups moving 
across these boundaries in practice. While the authors consider that the 
threat from radicalisation and violence will remain for a long time yet, they 
see nonetheless a positive side to the rich mosaic of political mobilisation of 
Muslims in the UK. This mosaic has to be better understood, for it may 
contain elements of solutions through offering alternative venues other 
than violent radicalisation for those who feel disillusioned and voiceless. 
Unlike the situation in all the other countries studied, the majority of 
Muslims over the age of 16 in Spain are first-generation immigrants, with 
57% of them coming from Morocco. Jose Manuel Lopez, Patricia INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY | 9 
 
Bezunartea and Laura Tedesco in their chapter show that on the whole this 
immigrant population retains relatively favourable views of their new 
home country, compared to the conditions in their countries of origin. The 
authors see this as an opportunity for Spain to avoid the mistakes made by 
other European countries as its immigrant communities become more 
deeply entrenched. However any complacency over this relatively benign 
situation was shattered by the multiple and coordinated bombings in 
Madrid of 11 March 2004, in which 191 people were killed and 1,755 
injured. The perpetrators of the Madrid bombings were found to be youths 
of Moroccan origin, some of whom were childhood friends from Tetouan. 
In the course of their trial it became evident that al-Qaeda certainly 
inspired them, but did not organise or control them. They were part of the 
virtual Jihad space fed by the Internet, where cells decide individually on 
their operations. Subsequently there have been several arrests of 
individuals forming part of international terrorist groups, such as the 
Algerian  and Moroccan  al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.  The Madrid 
bombings have created a new state of public awareness and opinions, in 
which the community of people earlier characterised by Spanish society as 
just ‘immigrants’ are now seen as ‘Muslims’, and this focuses attention on 
the quest for adequate methods of political representation and models of 
societal integration. 
The Muslim population of Russia is around 20 million, considerably 
more than in the EU as a whole, and the incidence of terrorist violence over 
the last decade has caused incomparably more fatalities than in the whole 
of Western Europe. Aleksei Malashenko and Akhmet Yarlykapov provide a 
detailed survey of radicalisation within the Muslim community in Russia, 
citing 24 terrorist acts over the last decade causing 1,566 deaths (this 
excludes the wars within Chechnya). While the large majority of Russian 
Muslims come from communities in the Northern Caucasus and the Volga 
basin, which were Muslim well before their incorporation into the Russian 
empire, there is also a sizeable new immigrant community of around 3.5 to 
4 million. Radical Islam is most strongly present in the Northern Caucasus, 
with elements from Chechnya moving into neighbouring districts. Radical 
elements have been detected in the Volga area on a much thinner scale. 
Radical tendencies developed seriously from the 1990s, especially among 
youth ‘jamaats’ in the Northern Caucasus, with Dagestan as the main 
breeding ground. In the second half of the 1990s, the leadership elements 
gradually changed, as young imams returned from studies in the Middle 
East, with the profile of young intellectuals. An apparently stable set of 10 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
young, radical Islamic leaders seems established, with support for them 
boosted in reaction to the growing Islamophobia in mainstream Russian 
society. In the view of the authors, violence inevitably follows from the 
ideology of radicalisation. The chapter records the long list of terrorist 
bombings in Russia in the decade from 1996 to 2006, with many minor acts 
in addition to major hostage-taking tragedies such as occurred at Beslan in 
2004. Looking ahead, however, the authors judge it unlikely that there will 
be a repetition of acts on this scale, quoting one North Caucasian separatist 
leader as saying that the ‘big terror’ acts were a tactical failure achieving 
nothing, since the Kremlin refused to negotiate at any cost. In addition no 
charismatic leader is likely to emerge since the killing of Shamil Basaev. On 
the other hand the Russian state policy has been too crudely repressive, 
and the authors plead for a more flexible and selective policy, combining 
contacts with relatively moderate elements with the suppression of 
extremists. The authors see a continuing Islamisation among Russia’s 
Muslim communities, with an increasing expansion of sharia law to be just 
a matter of time.  
So where does this leave Europe? The decade of the 2000s was indisputedly 
the decade of global terrorism, starting with the attacks of 9/11 of 2001, 
amplified by President Bush’s ‘war against terror’, and sustained in the 
rapid succession in 2004 and 2005 of the Madrid bombings, the London 
bombings, the Van Gogh murder and Beslan. Since those events, has the 
tide turned? This might be suggested by the absence of further spectacular 
terrorist events, and for example by the low-key response in 2008 to the 
Gerd Wilders film in the Netherlands. The turning–of-the-tide thesis might 
be based on the view that European civil society is trying to work harder at 
integrating its immigrant minorities, while the great majority of the Muslim 
communities have other preoccupations than the jihad, with the al-Qaeda 
‘narrative’ maybe indeed on the wane. Several of the country studies 
cautiously hint at this. To be sure the advent of the second decade of the 
21th century is now being marked by a different crisis, that of the global 
economy suffering a financial crash and recession on a scale not seen since 
the 1930s. Does this mean that this other story is taking over? There should 
be no betting on this. The truly remarkable failings of the Western 
economic model now on display may perhaps come just in time to give a 
renewed boost to Islamic radicalisation. 
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2.  AL-QAEDA IN THE WEST AS A YOUTH 
MOVEMENT: THE POWER OF A 
NARRATIVE 
OLIVIER ROY 
hy do we bother, in Europe, about ‘Islamic radicalisation’? The 
answer seems obvious. There are at least two good reasons: one 
is terrorism, with its security implications; the other is the issue 
of integrating second-generation migrants in Europe, apparently the most 
fertile ground for recruiting terrorists. For most observers, the link between 
terrorism and integration is a given fact. Al-Qaeda-type terrorist activities 
carried out either in Europe, or by European residents and citizens abroad, 
are seen as the extreme form, and hence as a logical consequence, of Islam-
related radicalisation. There is a teleological approach consisting of looking 
in retrospect at every form of radicalisation and violence associated with 
the Muslim population in Europe as a harbinger of terrorism.  
This approach is problematic, not so much because it casts a shadow 
of suspicion and opprobrium on Islam as a religion and on Muslims in 
general, but because it fails to understand the ‘roots of violence’ and it 
arbitrarily isolates ‘Muslim’ violence from the other levels of violence 
among European youth. This, in turn, has two negative consequences: it 
does not allow us to understand the motivations for violence among people 
joining al-Qaeda (who are far from being, as we shall see, devoted Muslims 
fighting for their Middle Eastern brothers), and it unduly concentrates on 
“what is the problem with Islam”, precisely playing on al-Qaeda’s own 
terms, and spawning a debate that will have little or no impact among the 
segments of the population who are susceptible to joining al-Qaeda. As we 
shall see, comparing good Islam to bad Islam does not make sense, not 
because Islam is all bad or all good, but because the process of violent 
radicalisation has little to do with religious practice, while radical theology, 
as salafisme, does not necessarily lead to violence. 
Any counter-terrorist policy has to be based on an analysis of the 
roots of terrorism. If not, such a policy could not only be ineffective, but 
W 12 | OLIVIER ROY 
 
also counter-productive, by inducing some of the phenomena it claims to 
combat. 
Roughly speaking, there are two approaches: one vertical, one 
horizontal. The vertical approach involves establishing a genealogy of 
radicalisation from the Koran and the first Islamic community to the 
present Islamist radicals, going through radical theology (Ibn Taymiyya), 
ideologisation (Hassan al Banna and the Muslim brothers) and the history 
of Middle Eastern conflicts, from Bonaparte’s campaign in Egypt to the 
present conflicts in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. This approach tends to 
lump together all kind of violence linked with Muslim populations, for 
example ethno-cultural tensions affecting migrants (crimes of honour), 
petty delinquency and terrorism. The horizontal approach, by contrast, 
consists of putting the ‘leap into terrorism’ into the context of the 
contemporary phenomena of violence affecting our societies in general, and 
specifically youth. The two approaches are not exclusive of course, but I 
will argue that the link between them is to be understood less in 
sociological and political terms than in terms of a narrative. The success of 
Osama Bin Laden is not to have established a modern and efficient Islamist 
political organisation, but to have invented a narrative that could allow 
rebels without a cause to connect with a cause. 
We examine the two views below. 
1.  The debate on the roots of terrorism 
1.1  The vertical approach 
Al-Qaeda is a revolutionary organisation in the continuation of the Middle 
Eastern Islamist movements (Muslim Brothers, Said Qotb, Ayman al 
Zawahiri). Its strategy is defined by a precise ideology: to topple the 
existing regimes in the Middle East and replace them with a caliphate 
based on sharia law. Hence the political radicalisation is part of a process of 
theological radicalisation, known as salafisme. Islam is at the core of al-
Qaeda legitimacy and thinking. It plays on the nostalgia of the Muslim 
community for a Golden Age. 
Ideology is the key: people join al-Qaeda because they share its 
ideology and political goals. Indoctrination is the basis of recruitment: 
militants do read books and leaflets, even if they use the internet more than 
the street corner bookshop. Conflicts in the Middle East are at the core of AL-QAEDA IN THE WEST AS A YOUTH MOVEMENT | 13 
 
the ‘Muslim wrath’; Muslims living in Europe do identify with their 
oppressed brothers of the greater Middle East. 
To counter al-Qaeda, one should address the political grievances of 
the sympathisers. Whatever different conceptions exist about a settlement 
of conflicts in the Middle East, there will be no de-radicalisation without 
improving the situation in the Middle East. A global war on terrorism 
makes sense because similar trends and ideas are at work among most of 
the Muslims involved in local as well as global conflicts.  
This vertical approach is at present largely dominant among 
politicians, journalists and experts of the Middle East. It can lead to two 
different conceptions, both based on the premises of the clash of 
civilisations theory. The first assumes that there is a definitive gap between 
Islam and the West, and the only policy is ‘authoritarian integration’ 
(banning the burqas and even the veil, enforcing acculturation, limiting 
religious freedom). Personalities as different as Daniel Pipes, Fadela 
Amara, Fritz Bolkenstein and far rightists are on this line. The second 
approach is to promote ‘good Islam’, through the so-called ‘dialogue of 
civilisation’, bringing together Western thinkers and Middle East religious 
authorities, as well as European authorities and Muslim community 
leaders, and promoting some sort of multi-culturalism or ‘reasonable 
accommodation’, in order to try to establish a common ground between 
East and West. The ‘Alliance of civilisations’ project and the interfaith 
conferences recently promoted by the Saudi government are along these 
lines. 
1.2  The horizontal approach 
This approach is based on the analysis of the individual biographies and 
trajectories of people who have been actually involved in terrorist activities 
in the West or who left the West to perpetrate terrorist activities in the 
Middle East. It concludes that the vertical approach does not help to 
understand the process of radicalisation, and considers it more productive 
to establish a transversal comparison between the different forms of 
violence existing among the various milieus that could support terrorists. It 
tends to downplay the impact of Middle Eastern conflicts and Islamic 
religious radicalisation. The arguments run as follows:  
•  There is a break between al-Qaeda and the traditional Islamists 
movement: al-Qaeda has no real political programme of establishing 
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islamo-nationalism (Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran) and the global de-
territorialised jihad of al-Qaeda. AQ’s references to Islam are for the 
sake of creating a narrative, not of establishing a genuine political 
agenda. Ayman Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s deputy, is an exception (the 
only AQ member coming from the elite of the Muslim Brothers) and 
is unduly seen as the ideologist of al-Qaeda. 
•  Instead of promoting a territorial caliphate in the Middle East, al-
Qaeda is committed to a global struggle against the world power (the 
US) in the continuation of the radical anti-imperialist struggles of the 
1960s and 1970s (Che Guevara, the Baader-Meinhof gang). It stresses 
political activism and addresses a wider audience than just the 
Muslim community (hence the converts).  
•  Al Qaeda does not play a vanguard or a leading role in the conflicts 
of the Middle East, but is trying to impose its own agenda even 
against the local Islamists (Hamas). There are continuous tensions 
between internationalist fighters and local insurgents in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and even Lebanon. 
•  The West should address the different Middle Eastern conflicts from 
a political perspective (a struggle for territorial control from different 
actors) and not by ascribing to them an ideological perspective 
(caliphate and sharia). 
•  Ideology plays little role in the radicalisation of the jihadist 
internationalist youth: they are attracted by a narrative not an 
ideology. 
•  The process of radicalisation is to be understood by putting it into 
perspective with the other forms of violence among European youth. 
•  Any process of de-radicalisation should address youth populations, 
and not an elusive Muslim community, which is more constructed 
(particularly by government policies and by self-appointed 
community leaders) than real. 
This perspective is undoubtedly a minority view. But it is finding 
more ground among police and intelligence practitioners, who now have 
an important database of radicals coming from or acting in Europe, and see 
the discrepancy between the individual profiles of the radicals and the 
motivations that are attributed to them from outside. 
If we adopt the first version, the Middle East is at the centre of the 
process of radicalisation and hence should be at the centre of the de-AL-QAEDA IN THE WEST AS A YOUTH MOVEMENT | 15 
 
radicalisation policy. There is no real difference between islamo-
nationalists and territorialised movements such as Hamas on the one hand 
and internationalist jihadists of al-Qaeda on the other. We should study 
radicalisation essentially from the top down: How do ideas and 
propaganda spread from AQ headquarters to would-be radicals? What is 
AQ’s strategy of recruiting? In this sense the young radicals are picked and 
manipulated by the organisation. 
If we adopt the other view, we should, as a necessary first step, 
delink territorialised and nationalist conflicts from supra-national jihadism, 
both in the Middle East (such a policy has been the basis of the surge 
strategy initiated by General Petraeus in Iraq) and in Europe (by stopping 
the mixing-up of radicalisation and the Middle East). We should also 
acknowledge that ideology has little to do with radicalisation. We should 
study radicalisation essentially at the individual level, addressing the 
reasons why young people who are not linked with a given conflict would 
join AQ. The main de-radicalisation objective is to destroy al-Qaeda’s 
narrative, not to provide an ideological or theological alternative, because 
both dimensions (ideology and theology) are simply not relevant. 
1.3  Is there a general concept of terrorism? 
The general category of ‘terrorists’ or ‘suicide bombers’ is not very helpful. 
We should put terrorist actions into their political and strategic contexts.  
If we consider terrorist activities in the Muslim world, there is clearly 
a difference between territorialised violence (Palestine, Chechnya) and de-
territorialised violence (al-Qaeda). The first is linked with a struggle for 
national liberation and is part of a broader use of politically motivated 
violent means with a precise objective: to free a territory from what is 
perceived as a foreign occupation. This violence does not spill over in other 
countries except occasionally into the territory of the occupying country. It 
goes along with other forms of violence (from intifada to guerilla warfare) 
and is hinged on a precise political agenda; the violence thus could be 
suspended or triggered according to the circumstances and the expected 
results. 
By contrast, global terrorism is defined by the following criteria: 
•  The terrorist action is not part of a broader spectrum of political and 
military actions; it is relatively isolated from the local political 
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•  There is no concrete political agenda (although there might be, as we 
shall discuss, a strategy of confrontation with the dominant power). 
•  Terrorists are not rooted in a given society (even if they are 
integrated): they don’t fight in their country of origin (with the 
possible exception of Saudi Arabia), and they have no or little 
background of militancy or participation in communal works. They 
are often circulating between three countries: country of origin of 
their family, country of residence and radicalisation and country of 
action, although the last two could coincide (the London bombings in 
2005). 
2.  Al-Qaeda as a global de-territorialised movement 
The first and probably more common explanation of radicalisation, as we 
saw, is to understand it as a consequence of the conflicts in the Middle East, 
and of the sense of humiliation they create among Muslims. But, if we refer 
to the bios of terrorists from Europe, it is clear that the motivating factor for 
violence is not based on personal humiliation or oppression experienced by 
the terrorists. There is an almost radical discrepancy between the map of 
the actual conflicts in the Middle East and the map of recruitment. 
Terrorists operating in the West are home-grown terrorists. When they 
have a foreign familial or personal background, it is North Africa, Pakistan, 
East Africa, the Caribbean islands or just … Europe. There is also a 
significant proportion of converts. Al-Qaeda is not only the sole ‘Islamic’ 
political organisation to have a very high level of converts (estimates range 
from 9 to 20%), but it is the only one to give them positions of responsibility 
(both Muslim Brothers and the Islamic revolution of Iran attracted some 
converts, but none of them was ever t o  b e  f o u n d  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  o f  
responsibility; Hizb ut-Tahrir has many converts but, until now, none is in 
the leadership). Let’s mention the French Christophe Caze, Jean-Marc 
Grandvisir, Jérôme Courtailler and the German Christian Ganczarski 
(Djerba attack in 2002), and more recently the Frenchman Willie Brigitte 
(tried in 2007 in Paris), the British Yeshi Girma (born in Ethiopia), wife of a 
man convicted for the 21 July 2005 failed attempt in London, the British 
Andrew Rowe (arrested in 2005) and Dhiren Barot, the Dutch (and former 
policewoman) Martine van der Oeven, member of the Hofstadt group, 
Abdallah Andersen sentenced in Copenhagen (2008), Fritz Gelowicz, 
arrested in Germany in 2007, Anthony Garcia (also known as Rahman 
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in 2008 in Brussels. Many converts are of Caribbean origin (French and 
British): they find in the Islamist milieus a fraternity free from racism and 
may recast the anti-racist and anti-colonial struggle in ‘Islamic’ terms; 
within al-Qaeda they achieve positions of responsibility that they would 
not have access to elsewhere. We may mention Grandvisir, Brigitte, 
Jermaine Lindsay (London 2005) or Abu Izzadeen (born Trevor Brooks) 
(sentenced in April 2008 by a British court). Here traditional anti-
imperialism merges with Islamism.  
The Europeans in al-Qaeda tend to take one of two routes to 
conversion: there are those who have pursued a personal path and joined 
AQ after having converted in a mosque, and those who followed their 
Muslim ‘buddies’, when, often after a story of petty crimes, they decide to 
‘go for action’, usually under the influence of a group leader, seen as a 
guru. The ‘group effect’, as Marc Sageman1 calls it, is far more effective in 
terms of triggering radicalisation than reading propaganda books. Dhiren 
Barot, born a Hindu from parents who left East Africa to settle in Great 
Britain, and who went to Kashmir, married a Malay woman from Thailand 
and was involved in different plots both in London and New York, 
embodies the perfect example of the de-territorialised jihadist. A 
remarkable case is that of the Belgian Muriel Degauque (who carried out a 
suicide bombing in Iraq with her husband in 2005), for it signals a recent 
development: the arrival of a generation of women in al-Qaeda, which until 
now has tended to be misogynistic (which shows that the converts also 
bring another form of deculturation). 
Interestingly enough, very few Western Muslims from Iraqi or 
Palestinian origin are involved, not only in terrorist actions perpetrated in 
Europe, but also in their countries of origin (the argument that it is because 
they are fighting in their own country does not make sense: during the 
1970s, Palestinians were heavily involved in international terrorism). By the 
same token the jihadists who travelled inside the Middle East to fight in 
Iraq are presently mostly Saudis and North Africans (including Libyans), 
and not people who have experienced a direct Western form of aggression. 
Furthermore al-Qaeda has seldom attacked Israeli or Jewish targets 
(contrary to more ‘secular’ Palestinian movements like Abu Nidal), with of 
                                                      
1 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia 
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course some exceptions (Istanbul and Casablanca). And finally, with the 
exception of some Pakistanis, no second-generation radicalised Muslim has 
gone back to the country of origin of his or her family to fight a local jihad. 
To sum up, the process of radicalisation in Europe is not a direct 
consequence of the conflicts in Middle East, although these conflicts are re-
interpreted through the ‘narrative’ of al-Qaeda. 
I consider that a dominant characteristic of al-Qaeda’s type of 
violence is de-territorialisation: specific conflicts play a role only as 
narratives and not as geo-strategic factors; the radicals are not involved in 
actual conflicts, but in an imaginary perception of the conflicts. The de-
territorialisation factor might also explain new forms of radicalisation 
among Middle Eastern Muslims. The third generation of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon for instance (insurgents of the Nahr al Barid camp in 
Northern Lebanon) have experienced a process of de-Palestinisation; they 
are no more geared towards Palestinian politics, have no hope of ever 
coming back, but did not receive a new identity or citizenship in exchange. 
They may jump from a desperate national struggle into identification with 
the global ummah. The phenomena may happen in Palestine itself because 
the hope to achieve a viable statehood is receding (as illustrated by the 
unexpected breakthrough of the Hizb ul-Tahrir party in the West Bank in 
2007-08, for which the caliphate is more important than the nation-state). 
Al Qaeda’s senior figures, grassroots cells, transnational networks 
and chain of command are thus rooted in personal bonds, forged either in 
Afghanistan or at the local level in the West, and which are then transposed 
to a transnational, ‘de-territorialised’ dimension (trips, moving to other 
countries, multiple nationalities, etc.). The West is the key place of 
radicalisation. Interestingly enough, many of the North Africans involved 
in radical violence in North Africa had at a time a project of migration to 
Europe. An FBI team sent to Kabul in 2001 to fingerprint all arrested 
insurgents made a surprising discovery: hundreds of arrested people in 
Afghanistan who were supposed to be local fighters (1% of the total) were 
already in the FBI's database for arrests ... in the US. Many arrests were for 
drunken driving, passing bad checks and traffic violations. That means that 
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went through the US without being arrested, and that the already arrested 
guys had ‘normal’ delinquency, not related to Islam.2 
A second factor supposed to explain international terrorism (after the 
reaction against the conflicts in the Middle East) is al-Qaeda’s strategy and 
ideology, embodied in the ‘far enemy/near enemy theory’. It defines al-
Qaeda as the ultimate stage of an ongoing Islamist revolutionary 
movement that strived to create Islamic states in Muslim countries, and 
then to establish a caliphate based on sharia. The subsequent failure to 
establish an Islamic state in a given country (whatever the reason: pressure 
of imperialism, lack of support among the population, strength of the 
ruling regimes or acknowledgement that utopia does not work) is 
supposed to have pushed the Islamists to go ‘global’, leading to the 
prevalence of the ummah on the nation, and putting jihad against the West 
on the forefront, because there was no way to defeat the near enemy (the 
Arab regimes) as long as the distant enemy was not checked or destroyed. 
Jihad is defined as a personal compulsory duty.  
But in fact few of the present radicals have been involved in domestic 
Islamic radical activities in their country of origin (with the notable 
exception of Ayman al Zawahiri). Bin Laden himself turned against the 
Saudi monarchy after joining the global jihad. Meanwhile the strategy of 
AQ is to entrap US troops in protracted local conflicts and to parasite these 
local conflicts, without defining a coherent political strategy to attract the 
local population. There is no political blueprint from al-Qaeda on what to 
do the day after. They just don’t care. The testimonies of the volunteers 
who joined al-Qaeda show that they go for jihad and martyrdom, not to 
create an Islamic State or impose sharia. 
We tend to over-ideologise al-Qaeda in order to understand its 
attractiveness. 
Although a study of the takfiri and jihadi thought certainly has its 
interest, it does not explain the personal radicalisation phenomena (even if 
it might provide an aftermath rationalisation),  
To my knowledge, none of the arrested terrorists or suspects had 
Zawahiri or other books in their house, while they often have handbooks 
                                                      
2 Ellen Nakashima, “Post-9/11 Dragnet Turns Up Surprises: Biometrics Link 
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on how to make bombs or videos about ‘atrocities’ perpetrated against 
Muslims. Contrary for instance to the Hizb ut-Tahrir members, who always 
formulate their positions in elaborate ideological terms, al-Qaeda’s 
members do not articulate before or after having been caught a political or 
an ideological stand (most of AQ suspects keep silent or deny any 
involvement during their trial, a very unusual attitude for political 
militants, who traditionally transform their trial into a political tribune). 
We should certainly not discard entirely the fact that some quarters in al-
Qaeda are writing or thinking in terms of ideology, but this does not seem 
to be the main motivation for joining al-Qaeda. 
A third explanation puts alienation at the core of the radicalisation 
process. There is certainly some truth in that, but the problem is how to 
define alienation. The socio-economic definition (deprivation, poverty, 
racism, social exclusion) is not supported by data. We find people from all 
backgrounds in al-Qaeda: engineers, former drug-addicts, social workers ... 
The fringes from where the radicals come are not socio-economic. Another 
definition of alienation is based on the clash of cultures: the radicals 
become violent because they are torn between two cultures. 
This ethno-cultural approach is reflected in the association of 
terrorism and crimes of honour under the label of ‘Islam-related violence’. 
Notwithstanding the fact that ‘crimes of honour’ are a paradoxical proof of 
integration (they show that young Muslim girls no longer abide by 
traditional rules), there is no correlation between them and political 
radicalisation. Crimes of honour are always strictly connected with the 
ethnic (and often tribal) background: perpetrators are mainly Anatolian 
Turks (mostly Kurds) and rural Pakistanis, and involve very few North 
Africans, urban Turks, or Arabs from the Near East. Except for Pakistanis, 
there is no connection between the map of honour crimes and the map of 
political radicalisation. Moreover honour crimes are an endeavour to 
restore the ‘integrity’ of the family or of the clan; they usually involve a 
tight-knit family, where sons obey their parents. On the contrary, joining al-
Qaeda is usually a posture of defiance towards parents and traditional 
family. Matrimonial patterns among al-Qaeda members are relatively 
modern: there is little difference in age between spouses, spouses choose 
each other, one often marrying a convert or the sister of comrades in arms, 
but never a cousin chosen by the family. In the group responsible for the 
Madrid attack, Serhane Fakhet married his friend Mustapha Maymouni’s 
sister in 2002. In France, Jamel Beghal married Johan Bonte’s half-sister. 
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commandant Masud in Afghanistan, is a good example: she previously 
bore a daughter out of wedlock, married a Tunisian, while she was a 
Moroccan-born Belgian; after the death of her husband, she married Moez 
Garsalloui, a man younger than her, whom she met through the internet; 
they live in Switzerland. While perfectly westernised (she writes and 
speaks in French and does not know Arabic), she behaves as a modern 
militant of a cause, but more as a dissident from inside the Western society 
than as a representative of a traditional Muslim culture. 
Clearly, pro-Al Qaeda’s radicalisation process is not linked with the 
outspoken condemnation of Western sexual liberalisation that is pervasive 
among conservative Muslim circles: homosexuality, co-education, sexual 
promiscuity (swimming pools), specific teachings (sexual education, 
biology) are never part of the agenda of al-Qaeda. Not to mention the fact 
that this rejection of loose morality is also on the agenda of many non-
Muslim religious communities. AQ recruits are not specifically puritanical 
and often live or have lived the usual life of western teenagers. 
3.  Al-Qaeda as a violent youth movement 
In fact it is more productive to understand al-Qaeda in Europe as a youth 
movement, which shares many factors with other forms of dissent, either 
political (the ultra-left), or behavioural: the fascination for sudden suicidal 
violence as illustrated by the paradigm of random shootings in schools (the 
‘Columbine syndrome’).  
The generational dimension is obvious: most of the radicals have 
broken with their families or become estranged. They define for themselves 
what should be the principles of their lives. They never refer to traditions 
or to traditional Islam, they don’t mention fatwas from established clerics. 
They act on an individual basis and outside the usual community bonds 
(family, mosques and Islamic associations). They usually remain aloof from 
the communal group. The group effect concerns the ‘small group’: the 
process of radicalisation takes place in the framework of a small group of 
friends (they knew each other before, used to have a common place of 
meeting: campus, local neighbourhood, networks of petty delinquency, 
etc…). Many travelled together to Afghanistan. It is a movement of age 
peers, not based on hierarchy.  
A ‘transversal’ approach (comparing youth violence among non-
Muslims with al-Qaeda recruitment) sheds much light on the present 
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vertical approach in terms of Islamic intellectual legacy (from the Koran to 
Sayyid Qotb, through Ibn Taymiyya). Instead of looking vertically through 
Muslim history and theology to explain al-Qaeda’s violence, one should 
connect it to the general phenomena of radical violence among youth.  
The leap to violence is not the result of a long process of 
indoctrination and maturation. We have already noted the predominance 
of activism on ideological and intellectual formation: there is a very short 
time between religious re-conversion and passage to violent action. 
Violence is at the core of the fascination for al-Qaeda. 
We underline below three aspects of this transversal fascination for 
violence. 
i) The recasting of a traditional leftist anti-imperialism into Islamic terms 
AQ is an avatar of the ultra-leftist radicalism. Its targets are the same as the 
traditional targets of the ultra-left: US imperialism, symbols of 
globalisation. When Bin Laden referred to Vietnam in his video speech of 
September 2007, instead of quoting the Koran, he was in fact addressing an 
audience more sensitive to the political dimension than to the religious one. 
When AQ executed western hostages in Iraq, it staged the execution by 
using the same mise en scène invented by the Red Brigades when they killed 
Aldo Moro. 
The continuity is indicated by the map of recruitment of radicals in 
France. The map of radicalisation does not really fit with that of the Muslim 
population. As expected, there are many radicals coming from the Parisian 
suburbs, Lille/Roubaix/Tourcoing and Lyon, where there is a huge 
Muslim population. But why are there so few radicals coming from 
Grenoble and Marseille, where there is also a huge Muslim population? 
There has been a tradition of leftist radicalism in the first three places 
mentioned, which did not really exist in Marseille. Nevertheless Grenoble 
was also a centre of the ultra-left (Maoists and Action Directe). Why are 
there so few young Muslim radicals coming from Grenoble? In fact there is 
a lot of violence related to second-generation Muslims in Grenoble, but it is 
linked with organised crimes, not with the usual petty delinquency. The 
issue of the link between Islamic radicalisation and youth delinquency, 
although far from being systematic, should nevertheless be approached a 
bit more in depth. 
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ii) A delinquent generation? 
There is a clear connection between radicalisation and petty delinquency, 
but not with ‘high’ organised crime. Many radicals have a background of 
drug addiction and delinquency. Jamal Ahmidan, a mastermind of the 
Madrid bombings, was a drug dealer (and a womaniser); many of his 
accomplices from Morocco were also delinquents. It is also a common 
pattern for many converts, who have ambivalent feelings towards 
conversion or a return to religious practice. On one hand, it is a way to 
redeem oneself, but on the other hand, ties are not severed with the less 
religious-minded former gang members, who are used to find money and 
logistical support. It is well known that in European jails, second-
generation Muslims are overrepresented and may constitute the absolute 
majority of the inmates, which explains why jails are probably the best 
recruiting field, including for converts. But on the other hand, it should be 
kept in mind that Muslims are not responsible for the worst crimes: serial 
killings, mafia-related murders and armed robberies are more often 
perpetrated by whites than by Muslims. The generational phenomenon is 
obvious in these differential patterns of delinquency. But the more second-
generation Muslims are aging, the more they tend to integrate ‘hard’ 
delinquency, but this time at the expense of their political engagement. 
This may have unexpected consequences. Paradoxically, the 
formation of ethnic mafias used to be associated with integration, as 
illustrated in the US during the first half of the 20th century. When second-
generation migrants join organised crime, they are less tempted by political 
radicalisation. If we go back to the example of Grenoble and Marseille, the 
lack of political radicalisation may be l i n k e d  w i t h  t h e  r i s e  o f  a n  e t h n i c  
organised crime, where young (well, less and less!) North Africans are 
involved: they are superseding the traditional Corsican and Italian gangs. 
Grenoble is presently (2007-08) the scene of a high-level and bloody mafia 
war involving second-generation North Africans: the field of potential 
violence is taken by non-political forms of radicalisation. By contrast, 
elsewhere in France, second-generation Muslims are more involved in 
petty delinquency and thus remain in the floating margins of society. But 
we should add a caveat: in all these sorts of deviant violence (organised 
crimes, petty delinquency, terrorism), the involved groups are never 
entirely ‘ethnic’: mixed ethnicity is a general pattern, although there is 
usually a dominant ethnic pattern.  
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A third category of transversal violence is the sudden leap into suicidal 
violence, as illustrated by the Columbine syndrome, i.e. the random killing 
by a student of schoolmates and teachers in his school, before shooting 
himself or being shot. There are many patterns in common with radical 
terrorists: a possible history of drug addiction, a lack of social life, the 
fabrication of a narrative through the internet, the recording of a video 
before taking action, search for fame, use of the internet, the attribution of a 
collective responsibility to the targeted random victims. In fact, the stress 
put on al-Qaeda by politicians, media and public opinion is probably 
concealing the increase of a more diluted phenomenon of youth terrorism 
(as illustrated by radical animal defence groups). The figure of the lone 
terrorist is more and more pervasive (as illustrated by the Frenchman who 
almost killed himself while making bombs to blow up road radars in June 
2008). 
4.  Al-Qaeda and recruitment: The power of a narrative 
But there remains a question: if there are common roots and patterns to 
explain a phenomenon of generational violence that is pervasive in the 
West, why do many youngsters choose jihad and not the other forms? 
More precisely, why do some who choose political violence, instead of re-
creating ultra-leftist movements, join precisely al-Qaeda? It is because AQ 
provides a powerful narrative. 
Al Qaeda provides not so much an ideology as a narrative. The first 
part of the narrative is the suffering of the “ummah”. But this ummah is a 
virtual one: all crimes (depicted through gruesome videos) committed 
against Muslims anywhere in the world are put on the same level. These 
stories are not contextualised: the picture of a tortured man could come 
from Bosnia, Chechnya or Kashmir. The ummah is presented as an 
undifferentiated whole. 
The second part of the narrative is centred on the individual who is 
suddenly put in the situation of becoming a hero who would avenge the 
sufferings of the community. It addresses an individual by combining 
different elements: 
•  Self-image: all personal humiliations or shortcomings are redeemed 
by the act of terrorism. The death is staged as is the self itself (hence 
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•  Salvation and death: there could be only one definite action that will 
turn the suicide bombers into a permanent icon; death is the definite 
seal on the story, it is part of the story. 
The third part of the narrative is the religious ‘qotbist’ dimension, 
which also plays its role here: jihad is a personal compulsory duty, the 
vanguard of the ummah is made of a few outstanding and devoted heroes; 
salvation is through sacrifice and death. Sources and authors who were 
seen by the ‘vertical view’ as of utmost importance make a comeback here: 
occasional references to Ibn Taymiyya, Said Qotb or Palestine may be called 
to illustrate the narrative. The narrative allows the would-be terrorist to 
connect with history and religious genealogy. 
But a fourth part of the narrative is less religious: it is the enactment 
of the fight against the global order. To people not specifically motivated 
by religion, al-Qaeda is the only organisation present on the market that 
seems to be effective in confronting the ‘evil’ that is the West. The fact that 
AQ is constantly presented by Western leaders as the biggest threat gives 
more value to the decision to join it. The narrative is substantiated by the 
Western reaction to it. 
Al Qaeda gives a meaning to the flow of information that comes from 
the media, describing a world of violence, explosions, blood and wars. Al-
Qaeda presents its action as some sort of a video game, where youngsters 
can easily identify themselves as actors. al-Qaeda also makes use of the 
dominant discourse on the clash of civilisation by inversing the values. It 
fits with the division of the world into two competing principles, good and 
evil. AQ plays on the mirror effect: we are what you say we are, that is your 
worst enemy, and the proof is not what we do, but what you say. 
With respect to these four dimensions of the narrative, it is clear that 
al-Qaeda would not have such an impact without the amplification effect of 
the media and without its constant assimilation with THE evil alternative 
to civilisation. 
De-radicalisation 
The most effective way to combat terrorism is a combination of two levels: 
one level employs traditional intelligence and legal techniques to trace and 
neutralise cells and networks. But it is very difficult to prevent young guys 
from suddenly leaping into violence who have previously shown no 
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difficult to pre-empt radical action. The second level would hence be to 
destroy AQ’s narrative, that is, to de-legitimise it. 
We should stop endorsing the mirror effect that is playing alongside 
AQ’s words. As mentioned earlier, AQ’s main assertions are: 
1)  AQ is the vanguard and the paroxysm of the ‘Muslim wrath’. 
2)  Terrorists are heroes. 
3)  AQ embodies radical Islam, or more precisely “radically” embodies 
Islam. 
To nullify the first statement, we should stop speaking of Muslims 
through the lens of terrorism, and should establish a coherent long-term 
process of integration of Islam as simply a religion in a Western context. To 
destroy the second assertion, we should stress the real nature of the 
radicals: not powerful devils, but petty and often unsuccessful delinquents, 
in a word, losers, who have no future. And by the way, this image already 
seems to be emerging: the repetitive dimension of AQ’s actions diminishes 
their power of fascination and attraction; the fact that there are more 
attempts that failed miserably (the attack on Glasgow airport, for example) 
stresses the growing vacuity of terrorism. For the third element, we should 
stop promoting ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ Islam, because it supports the idea that 
AQ is a religious organisation. AQ is not a religious organisation; it is not 
the armed branch of salafisme. And by the way, to promote ‘good Islam’ 
through governmental means is to give the kiss of death to ‘liberal’ Muslim 
thinkers. If AQ is a modern phenomenon and not the expression of 
fundamentalist Islam, there is no point in promoting modern liberal Islam 
against AQ. The process of secularisation or accommodation of Islam in the 
West may take place, but to be successful it should be undertaken outside 
the anti-terrorism framework.  
We should address the other issues related to second- generation 
Muslims (crimes of honour, salafisme) as they are, i.e. a socio-cultural 
transition, and not as harbingers of terrorism. We should de-Islamise AQ – 
not demonise it as ‘bad Islam’. That is what secularism means. 
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3.  IDEOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF MUSLIM 
RADICALISM IN FRANCE 
SAMIR AMGHAR 
ith nearly 5 million Muslims, France is home to more people of 
Islamic faith than any other European country. The French 
territory is regularly shaken by events relating to its Muslim 
population. While the French public authorities worry about the risk of 
terrorist attacks inspired by Islam, it appears that ‘Islamic crises’ are 
multiplying – from the ‘Muslim riots’ in 2005 and the development of the 
re-Islamisation phenomena, to the threats made by al-Qaeda against 
France. In the French public arena the ‘Islamic threat’, widely mediatised at 
the time of the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, has taken 
on a connotation of combat and revolution and become a synonym of 
violence and terrorism. Yet, far from constituting a homogenous 
movement, the Islamic threat is polymorphous. Islamic radicalism is 
neither incarnated in, nor limited to, al-Qaeda. It is a composite, 
heterogeneous movement based on the diverse projects (not always 
coordinated) of autonomous organisations or individuals acting alone or in 
small groups. As a circle of influence, it is both complex and continually 
evolving. It covers a wide range of political sensibilities stretching from 
religious radicalism, which is socially conservative and politically weak, 
and of which the sphere of action is based on religious training, to jihadism, 
which defends direct action, often with third-worldist overtones. Despite 
their divergences, these different veins of the Islamic threat have something 
in common: they have a direct impact on Muslim populations. In this 
chapter, we document the different forms of radicalism in France, with a 
view to understanding its permutations over the last 20 years, along with 
the various motivations of the members and sympathisers of these diverse 
forms. 
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1.  Religious radicalism and sectarian groups 
1.1  Three religious groups convey religious radicalism 
Salafists 
This movement was established in France at the beginning of the 1990s 
through ex-militants of the Salafist wing of the Islamic Salvation Front 
(Front islamique du salut, FIS) who were refugees in France, fleeing the 
repression of the Algerian regime.1 In its initial phases, Salafism in France 
was very strongly impregnated with the political issues and situation of 
Algerian Islamism, particularly through the FIS. At the Tariq Ibn Ziyad 
Mosque on Rue Myrrha in the 18th district of Paris, Abdelbaki Sahraoui, the 
imam and vice president of the FIS, was strongly critical of the repressive 
policies of the Algerian regime in his sermons at the Friday prayer services. 
He was assassinated in 1995 by members of the Armed Islamic Group 
(Groupes islamiques armies, GIA).  
This ‘first-generation’ Salafism, combining a spiritual mission with 
political vision and revolutionary objectives was also represented by 
Abdel-Hâdî Doudi, the current imam at the al-Sunna al-Kebira Mosque, on 
the so-called ‘international boulevard’ in Marseille. Graduating from the 
University of al-Azhar at the beginning of the 1980s, Abdel-Hâdî Doudi 
was also the brother-in-law of Moustapha Bouyali (the founder of the first 
Algerian resistance movement in 1983) and the teacher of Ali Benhadj. He 
belonged to the Algerian Salafist movement, which later became part of the 
FIS at the beginning of the 1990s. He was sentenced to death by the 
Algerian regime, and then to life imprisonment for his support of the 
attacks led by his brother-in-law. But his sentence was later commuted to 
life in prison. He arrived in France in 1987 with the consent of the Algerian 
services, and was responsible for the introduction of the movement in the 
region around Marseille and in the Parisian suburbs, especially in Nanterre. 
Revolutionary vision, political perspective and religious rigour were 
the characteristics of the Salafism of the 1990s. But, owing to the emergence 
of the second generation of Muslims born in Europe and the international 
evolutions of political Islam, it was progressively to become an actor in re-
Islamisation. 
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While in its initial stages, Salafism incarnated a form of religiosity 
that was linked to a political and revolutionary vision impregnated with 
the realities of Algerian politics. From the mid-1990s, however, it became 
more and more an expression of social and political conservatism, distinct 
from an obsession with the conquest of the state. This shift towards an 
apolitical and pietist Salafism can be explained by two factors: the 
marginalisation of political Salafism under Algerian influence and the 
emergence of a new centre of influence in the Arabian Peninsula.2 
Simultaneous with the decline of Algerian Salafism was the 
development, from the mid-1990s, of a new centre of influence in Salafism, 
stemming from Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula more broadly (the 
dar al-hadith (Islamic university) in Dammaj in Yemen, under the direction 
of Sheik Mûqbil, the al-Albani centre in Amman and the sharia department 
in Damascus). Within this framework, it was less a case of the decline of 
Algerian Salafism than of the rise of Saudi Salafism. This shift was partly 
owing to the policy of the Saudi royalty, who decided as early as the 1960s 
to establish themselves as a “religious superpower”.3 The expansion of this 
doctrine was essentially the work of proselytising by European students 
returning from Saudi Islamic universities (and training centres in Yemen), 
especially those in Medina. In France, it was thanks to the predication of 
the first generations of European graduates – who had gone to Saudi 
Arabia to study theology – that Saudi Salafism gained a foothold on the 
Continent.4 This was the case for example of Abdelkader Bouziane, who 
was behind the development of the movement in the region around Lyon. 
Before becoming an imam in various mosques in the Rhône-Alpes region of 
France in the 1990s, he spent two years in Medina studying Islam with 
Salafist theologians. It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia has three Islamic 
                                                      
2 Saudi Arabia played a central role, but countries like Jordan where Sheik Nassir 
ud-dîn al-Albani lived, and Yemen, with Sheik Mûqbil ibn Hadi, also contributed 
to the spread of Salafism in Europe and in France. 
3 See S. Amghar, “Islam de France et acteurs internationaux”, Politique étrangère, 
No. 1, 2005. Numerous pro-Saudi international institutions were created and the 
Muslim World League (Rabitat al-islamiyya al-‘alamiyya), created in 1963, is one of 
the largest Saudi institutions to participate in the expansion of Salafism in the 
world. 
4 This is true of Reunion, for example. Salafism is present through two mosques, 
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universities (Medina, Riyadh and Mecca), although non-Saudi foreigners 
may only study in Medina. Numerous French students are attracted by the 
quality and reputation of the Saudi teaching as well as the scholarships on 
offer. 
Moreover, encouraged by certain French students, religious teachers 
of a Salafist persuasion came to France from Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Jordan. 
Sheik Abdel Salam al-Bourjis (a disciple of the former mufti of Saudi 
Arabia) or Sheik Muhammed Bazmoul, who was Egyptian and a professor 
at the University of Mecca, participated in several religious conferences in 
France (as well as in Belgium, the UK and the US). Until 2001, a pious form 
of Salafism developed and was successful in France, especially with the 
arrival of Saudi teachers. Mosques were built (or taken over), and there was 
even talk of setting up an axis of Salafism in France. There were roughly 20 
Salafist cultural centres in France (Marseille, Paris, Lyon, Roubaix, Valence, 
Romans-sur-Isère, Aix-en-Provence, Stains, etc.) that organised many 
events. Every year since 1998, a large Salafist convention has been 
organised in the Parisian suburbs by a middle-aged Dutchman named 
Yacoub Leenen, who now lives in Saudi Arabia and directs a publishing 
house that translates works from Arabic into French. In 2001, this gathering 
attracted close to 1,000 participants from all over France, but also from 
Germany. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the French police 
authorities decided to limit the development of the movement they saw as 
being behind the terrorist attacks perpetrated against the West, particularly 
as Salafism was beginning to develop internationally and establish an 
organisational structure. Salafist sheiks were therefore refused entry to 
France; a Salafist convention to be held in June 2001 was suspended and the 
theologians who had come to address it were arrested at the Charles de 
Gaulle airport and sent back to their countries. Moreover, numerous imams 
were expelled or placed under surveillance. The imam who was behind the 
introduction of Salafism in Lyon, Abdelkader Bouziane, was sent back to 
Algeria for misogynist imprecations. The imam of the mosque in 
Argenteuil, Ali Yashar, of Iraqi origin, was dismissed; he now lives under 
surveillance in the region of Lozère. 
Ahbâch 
Originating in Lebanon, this movement was founded by Sheik Abdallah al-
Habachi in the 1950s before developing in France in the 1990s. The 
movement developed thanks to the proselytism of students from Lebanon 
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Khaled al-Zanat, created an association in Montpellier. In that town, the 
Ahbâch controlled a 400-seat mosque in a converted abbey: the al-Tawba 
Mosque. Simultaneously, in Paris, an Ahbâch activist network was set up 
by a Lebanese computer scientist named Tamim Abdelnasser. In 1991, he 
co-founded the Association for Islamic Charity (Association bienfaisance 
islamique, AIB). With the arrival of the leader of this movement, Sheik al-
Habachi, in 1996, the Parisian leaders decided to federate all these 
associations to create the French division of the Ahbâch: the Association for 
Islamic Charity Projects in France (l’Association des projets de bienfaisance 
islamique en France, APBIF). In this new structure, the Lebanese members 
(notably Khaled al-Zanat in Montpellier, Walid Dabbous5 i n  N i c e  a n d  
Tamim Abdelnasser in Paris) formed the ideological and administrative 
backbone, although they were surrounded by young persons from Muslim 
immigrant families (from north and sub-Saharan Africa). The group has 20 
or so centres at its disposal (in Saint-Etienne, Saint-Dizier, Nice, etc.), which 
are particularly well anchored in the south of France (Narbonne, Perpignan 
and Avignon) and in Paris, where they have a 300-seat mosque. Very 
dynamic, the movement has opened a number of places of Islamic teaching 
and learning as well places of worship over the last few years (in Marseille, 
Toulouse, Lyon, Strasbourg and Alès). As a place of postulation, France is 
of strategic interest for the Ahbâch because the French Muslim community 
is the largest in Western Europe; indeed, it is larger than the Muslim 
population of Lebanon. As proof of the particular attention paid to French 
Muslims, Sheik al-Habachi (who died in September 2008) came regularly to 
France, as did the president of the Lebanese branch, Houssam Qaraqira 
(himself married to a French woman who is also a member of the 
movement). 
Tabligh 
This movement was founded by Muhammad Ilyas in 1927, in Mewat in 
India, then under British administration. Responding to a desire to re-
Islamise the local populations that he judged only superficially Islamised, 
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APBIF. Having arrived in France in the mid-1990s to study, he graduated with a 
Doctorate in Computer Science. The author of numerous articles, he is currently a 
researcher at the National Institute of Research in Technology and Computer 
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the founder of this movement sought to preserve Indian Islamic identity 
through religious postulation, and protect it from what he saw as the 
dangers of the English presence and Hindu hegemony. Before establishing 
itself in France, the movement had a significant impact on the entire Indian 
sub-continent, such that many individuals were converted or re-Islamised 
through contact with the proselytism of the Tabligh.  
In 1944, upon the death of the founder, Ilyas’s son decided to 
internationalise the movement by taking its proselytising beyond the 
borders of the Indian sub-continent and setting up permanent missions 
throughout the world. At the beginning of the 1950s, the movement settled 
on the pilgrimage routes in the Middle East and in East Africa. In the 1960s, 
it spread to West Africa and South East Asia. In the space of a few years, 
the Tabligh became a religious multinational, following the example of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Wherever it is found, the organisation operates a 
policy of systematic management of the Islamic domain through the control 
or the construction of mosques, and through the numerous preaching 
activities that it organises. The internationalisation of the movement, which 
led to its presence in a number of countries, was the response of its leaders 
to their desire to spread the universal message of Islam, following the logic 
of proselytism. At the end of the 1940s, when the movement reached its 
peak on the sub-continent, it was also a matter of ensuring the continued 
development of the organisation by not hesitating to recruit in other parts 
of the world. Indeed, even at that time, there was a high turnover in the 
structure of the organisation: many of those who were re-Islamised through 
contact with the Tabligh left it after a certain number of years. In this 
context, it became vital for a movement as structured as this one was to 
find new populations to seduce in order to ensure the continuation of the 
movement.  
In the 1960s, the movement was also established in the UK through 
the Indo-Pakistani population, and it then increasingly turned towards 
Europe as a new land of postulation. Thus it was that the early Tabligh 
missions emerged at the same time as immigrants from the sub-continent 
settled in the UK. The leaders of the movement set up their European 
c e n t r e  i n  D e w s b u r y  i n  Y o r k s h i r e .  T h e y  t h e n  s p r e a d  t o  F r a n c e  i n  1 9 6 8  
following a mission run by Pakistani preachers operating with immigrant 
workers, in what is probably the oldest re-Islamisation movement in 
France. Under the authority of Sheik Hammami, the movement was 
officially established in 1972 with the creation of the Muslim association 
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founded the mosque of Abou Bakr on the boulevard Belleville in Paris, in 
1973. The mosque can hold 800 faithful and is one of the largest in the 
capital. Other mosques were created (in Mantes la Jolie, Creil, 
Goussainville, Le Mans, Rouen, Lyon, Toulouse, Marseille, Roubaix, etc.).  
In the middle of the 1980s, the movement underwent a crisis as a 
result of an internal conflict, when the authority of the charismatic figure of 
Sheik Hammami was contested. Under the instigation of a young Lebanese 
man, a dissident association was set up called ‘Tabligh wa daoua ila llah’. 
In 1985, it organised a large gathering in Lille. Despite being a new 
association, it managed to draw a certain number of the founding members 
of the Tabligh and the auspices of Indo-Pakistani leaders into its wake. At 
the end of the 1980s, this association had become the official representative 
of the movement in France. Its leaders founded their French centre in Saint-
Denis in the Parisian suburbs, where they could accommodate close to 500 
faithful. Faith and Practice and Tabligh wa daoua ila llah control roughly 
50 places of worship in France (Marseille, Saint-Denis, Dreux, Montereau, 
Mulhouse, etc.). In spite of having few mosques under their authority, the 
influence of the Tabligh extends beyond these places of worship. Indeed, a 
non-negligible number of first-generation immigrants were re-Islamised 
through the predication of the Tabligh. Today, many of those in this first 
generation are imams or leaders of ‘independent mosques’ and even those 
who are no longer official members of the Tabligh maintain friendly 
relations with Tabligh missionaries. Thus, Tabligh missionaries are 
authorised to preach in certain mosques. For example, in the mosque–
cathedral in Evry-Courcouronne, the rector Khalid Merroun (himself a 
former member of the Tabligh) regularly hosts Tabligh meetings. In Sens, a 
town of 30,000 residents, Tabligh missionaries from Auxerre preach with 
the agreement of the managers of the mosque. 
1.2  The content of the radicalism of these movements 
These movements set up a sort of ‘safety barrier’ between their militants 
and society, between a community that is conceived of as pure and French 
society that is seen as corrupt. This endows the movement with a number 
of the features that are characteristic of a sect in the sense that the German 
sociologists Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber6 understood it. These 
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movements developed a “negative attitude” towards France:7 they did not 
recognise the dominant values of society as legitimate. Indifferent to 
projects of social reform or to the political solutions to social problems – 
even when they concern Muslims – these movements have all the qualities 
of pietist sects as defined by the sociologist of religions, Bryan R. Wilson.8 
Proponents of these movements prefer to withdraw from the world in 
order to bask in the self-assurance of their own personal sanctity and the 
feeling of belonging to a chosen people. They are opposed to all forms of 
political participation in French society by Muslim populations, on the 
pretext that such participation is contrary to Islam. Democracy is thus 
assimilated into a form of associationism (shirk), which gives way to heresy 
because French ministers legislate in the name of values that are not those 
of sharia, and which occasionally even contravene Islamic norms – such as 
the 2004 law on the wearing of religious symbols at school. In France, they 
defend the idea of reticence, bordering on indifference, with regard to 
official politics, even when the debates concern French Muslims. During 
the demonstrations against the proposed law banning religious symbols at 
school that were organised by Muslim associations in December 2003 and 
January 2004, members of these movements were rare among the several 
thousand participants, according to personal observations. More recently, 
in 2005 and 2006, the demonstrations organised in support of Lebanon 
during the Israeli bombing or against the cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammed did not attract many Salafist or Tabligh participants. Along 
these lines, Salafist websites encouraged individuals to refrain from 
participating in these gatherings. The conspicuous absence of these 
movements from these marches, which contrasted with the presence of 
militants and sympathisers close to the Muslim Brotherhood, should be 
interpreted as a form of generalised indifference to the questions of 
citizenship and foreign policy that affect Muslims in France and the Arab 
world. In the words of one Salafist from the Parisian suburbs, “when there 
are demonstrations by Muslims to defend other Muslims, my brothers and 
I never go along. We shouldn’t use Western methods to make our voices 
                                                      
7 See M.E. Marty, “Sects and Cults”, Annals of American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, No. 332, November 1960, pp. 125-134. 
8 See B.R. Wilson, “Typologie des sectes dans une perspective dynamique et 
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heard. I don’t want to mix Islam up with the politics of the French. The 
[s]heiks tell us not to go.” 9 
For these movements, Islam is thus above political parties and issues. 
Consequently, the Muslim religion cannot be restrained through 
negotiation with the state, which implies that questions of secularism 
(laïcité) do not concern them. Their interpretation of religious faith as being 
based on the primacy of Islam over all other systems – especially secular 
ones – prevents them from considering themselves actors in a non-Muslim 
political system. Participation implies recognising an identical status 
between social questions and Islamic ones. An Ahbâch in Paris stated: “If I 
demonstrate or sign petitions or if I vote, it’s as though I’m putting Islam, 
the best of religious and the best of humanity, in with the political baseness 
of the French. Never in my life! I prefer to do nothing. In any case, that’s 
not how you should act.”10  
Although the Salafists, the Tabligh or even the Ahbâch are perceived 
by the French authorities as just a step away from violent action, one 
cannot help but notice that they do not constitute a vector of political 
radicalisation in the name of Islam – even if they are very critical of France. 
This form of religiosity is opposed to any form of political engagement in 
the name of Islam. Lacking in any will to involve themselves in French 
society and without a political project other than messianic expectation 
(with no immediate implications), they defend an apolitical and non-
violent vision of Islam. This is founded on a desire to organise all of their 
existence around the advice of their religious leaders. 
Out of fear of fitna [division] and anarchy, they advocate the non-
contestation of political authority, even when the power is in the hands of 
non-Muslims. The Salafist preacher Sheik al-Albani, who was of Syrian 
origin and who died in 1999, argued that the only solution to the problems 
of Muslims was not the Islamisation of the state but what he called “al-
tasfiyatu wa-tarbiyya”: the purification of education. On the one hand, this 
suggests the purification of the Muslim religion from all the forms of 
‘innovation’ that have marred its precepts and dogmas, in order to return 
to the original religion such as it was conveyed to the Prophet. On the other 
hand, it implies educating Muslims so that they conform to this purified 
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religion and leave behind their bad habits. Persuaded of the inevitability of 
Allah’s reign on earth, they deem that the establishment of Koranic law will 
follow a number of stages. Through education, they aim at creating an 
Islamic consciousness, and through predication at provoking a total 
reversal of the social hierarchical organisation of the world that will leave 
them collectively dominant. Hence, they are waiting for a future social and 
political revolution, as only then will the return of the true Islam lead to the 
emergence of a social movement that will allow the development of an 
Islamic state. 11 
Still, are these movements as apolitical and as pious as they pretend? 
It seems clear that the relations they maintain with the public sphere are 
not based on a strictly religious vision of Islam. Their discourse is in many 
ways very politically charged. In the Arab world, the appearance of 
neutrality presented by these movements with regard to political life 
conceals their support for the regimes in place.12 In Lebanon, the Ahbâch 
benefited from the support of the Syrian regime in exchange for the 
movements defending pro-Syrian positions. In Algeria, President 
Abdelazziz Bouteflika encouraged the development of Salafism to combat 
the development of jihadist Salafism. He institutionalised and 
operationalised many actors within this movement, and in Algeria, an 
exponential growth of this form of Salafism has been observed. From 
Algiers to Constantine and Béjaïa, Salafism has become the primary re-
Islamisation movement in the country, well ahead of the Muslim Brothers 
and the Sufi Brotherhood. Although the Saudi theologians advocate a pious 
vision of Islam, they openly support the monarchy, which they consider the 
best guarantee of Islamic values and the national cohesion of the country. A 
young person becoming Salafist reproduces the ideological positions of the 
Salafist clerics in France, and thus s/he also becomes pro-Saudi. One young 
person who has turned to Salafism told us that  
                                                      
11 See S. Amghar, “Le salafisme en France  : de la révolution islamique à la 
révolution conservatrice”, Critique internationale, no. 40, août-juillet 2008. 
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i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  o f  t h a t  o f  A b d e lazziz Bouteflika, who encouraged the 
development of the movement. Even the Saudi Sheik Uthaymin, before his death 
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Saudi Arabia is a magnificent country. I’ve never been but one day, 
God-willing, I’ll go. It’s magnificent, it’s a country that defends 
Muslims throughout the world in contempt of the West. When you 
see documentaries on TV on Saudi Arabia that show how it’s a 
bizarre society or that it’s corrupt, it’s just propaganda and 
manipulation by journalists. Saudi Arabia is the land of Muslims, is 
my country in a way, if I can say that. 13 
In this context, the numerous French youth who embrace Salafism 
constitute a loyal client network that i s  u n c r i t i c a l  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  S a u d i  
Arabia. Through these Salafist theologians, the Saudi monarchy facilitates 
the greater visibility of Saudi foreign policy by portraying themselves as a 
patron of European Muslims – while simultaneously discrediting the 
demands of certain Islamists for a more equitable repartition of oil revenue. 
A young French person wishing to study in Saudi Arabia will often benefit 
from scholarships and lodgings from the Saudi authorities. This strategy 
enables Saudi Arabia to inscribe itself in the minds of the French Salafists as 
the only religious and political power that benefits European Muslims. 
Through their pro-Saudi position, the Salafists contribute to maintaining 
the symbolic influence of that country in the construction of an ideological 
and religious zone of influence. Eventually, the objective is to defend the 
national and strategic interests of the Saudi kingdom through the 
promotion of a vision of Islam that is favourable to Saudi Arabia. 
While in the Arab world they have developed a form of loyalty and 
established non-conflictual relations with the authorities, in France these 
movements represent a powerful critical voice vis-à-vis the political system. 
Both their preachers and the Arab world more broadly rail regularly 
against the political, moral and social values of France. Salafists encourage 
the faithful to leave France, which they consider a land of kufr 
[unbelievers], for a Muslim country. They condemned the 2005 law on the 
wearing of ostentatious religious symbols at school. Although this 
discourse might lead young Salafists to refuse the examination of their 
wives by a male doctor or to physically threaten an imam whom they 
consider too conciliatory in his attitudes towards France, the trend tends 
simply to be avoidance. Salafists or Tabligh members have a tendency to 
flee from contact that might lead to clashes. Instead of continuing to go to 
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t h e  m o s q u e  o f  a n  i m a m  o f  w h o m  h e  i s  critical, a Salafist or a Tabligh 
member will move to a place of worship that better corresponds to his 
religious and ideological expectations. Rather than accompanying his wife 
to a hospital where he knows a male doctor will examine her, he will opt 
for a clinic where he can choose the doctor. 
Yet, neither their verbal violence towards France, nor their orthodox 
conception of Islam should be taken as the prelude to an engagement in 
jihad (even if this was the case in the 1990s). On the contrary, this form of 
religious radicalism and the anti-French tirades of its militants act as a sort 
of ‘safety valve’ that diverts the militants from direct action. Hence, 
violence is no longer necessary. Moreover, the Salafists, the Tabligh and the 
Ahbâch living in France continue to affirm that they respect the laws in 
force in their host country. According to them, they do not call for violence 
and rebellion each time their movement is accused of terrorism. A Salafist 
in the Lyon region explained to us that “the minhaj salafi [Salafism] has 
nothing to do with terrorism. The expectations of Salafists, the real ones, 
are never attained. The Sheiks teach us peace and good behaviour. It 
annoys me that Salafism is confused with terrorism.” 14 
2.  Politico-religious radicalism (jihadism) 
Since 2002, a hundred activists have been jailed in the fight against 
terrorism, according to the figures given to members of parliament by the 
then Minister of the Interior Nicholas Sarkozy on 23 November 2005. 
Actions of the French security services included the neutralisation of a 
‘Chechen group’ in the suburbs of Lyon and Paris in 2002, the dismantling 
of Farid Benyettou’s group in the 19th district of Paris in January 2005, and 
the identification and arrest of volunteers leaving for Iraq in 2005. There 
were also arrests of militants associated with the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat, 
GSPC), in September 2005 in the Yvelines. This armed Algerian 
movement has been directed by Safé Bourrada, himself already associated 
with the 1995 bombings in Paris. 
As noted earlier, far from representing a homogenous and well-
structured trend, the politico-religious radicalism of these movements is 
made up of several tendencies and sensibilities. It stems from a composite, 
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heterogeneous group, based on the diverse projects (not always 
coordinated) of individuals acting alone or in small groups, or of 
autonomous organisations. A trend that is both complex and evolving, it 
covers a large spectrum of political sensibilities. From the different 
examples of Islamic-inspired terrorism that can be seen in France, we can 
identify three types of radical or jihadist mobilisations of a politico-
religious persuasion. We should also emphasise the great diversity of 
positions within this form of radicalism. 
2.1  Islamo-nationalist radicalism: The construction of an Islamic state 
or a caliphate in immigrants’ countries of origin 
The first trend among these movements that can be seen in France concerns 
groups that seek to conquer power in order to establish an Islamic state 
(dawla islamiyya) in their countries of origin. Many organisations follow this 
kind of jihad, such as the GIA, the Takfir wal hijra (Anathema and Exile), 
and the GSPC, of which some members distinguished themselves in 
Afghanistan. Before it developed its terrorist actions in Algeria, the armed 
violence of the GIA struck French residents in Algeria. Shortly after the 
attacks, foreign residents were instructed to leave the country on pain of 
execution.15 On the 24th of December 1994, the GIA struck outside Algeria: a 
commando hijacked an aeroplane leaving from Algiers, with the apparent 
intention of crashing it into the Eiffel Tower. Because of its colonial past, 
France appeared to be a scapegoat on which the jihadists of the GIA pinned 
the responsibility for Algeria’s woes. These actions were designed to 
demonstrate that the Algerian state was not capable of ensuring the 
security of those whom it was supposed to be protecting, to make an 
impact on public opinion internationally and to make Western 
governments question the appropriateness of their support for the Algerian 
government. Because of their link to the problems of Algerian politics, 
these structures are principally composed of persons of Algerian origin, 
including some who were members or sympathisers of the FIS, such as 
Mohamed Chalabi. They also include new immigrants, such as Chellali 
Benchellali, and young persons of immigrant origin, such as Khaled Kelkal 
and Jamel Beghal. In 1995, the GIA organised a series of bomb attacks in 
the stations at Saint-Michel and Maison-Blanche in Paris. In 1998, to 
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prevent possible attacks during the football World Cup, a hundred 
members of the GIA were arrested. On the 11th of June 1999, by way of a 
threatening letter to the press, the GIA announced a jihad on French 
territory. 
Expressing the return to a former political order that was perceived 
as ideal, these movements are prone to seeking Islamisation of the state by 
force. Often incarnating the most radical of the different currents of 
Islamism, this form of radicalism is the product of both state repression in 
the countries of origin and deception born of the vote-catching strategies of 
Islamism. Its central core is often composed of former mujahideen fighters 
who had joined the Islamist opposition in their own countries at the end of 
the war in Afghanistan. Within the Islamist opposition in Muslim 
countries, these militants were allied with those groups that had the most 
experience with political strategies. This form of radicalism believes that 
the jihad constitutes the only instrument capable of Islamising the state and 
then society if the political option does not work. Faced with state 
repression and the closure of the political sphere, the partisans of this 
movement encourage the whole Islamist movement and the wider 
population to take arms and rise up against the state. Considered the only 
obstacle to the establishment of an Islamic regime, the state is accused of 
taghut.16 The urgency is thus placed on the mobilisation of combatants 
rather than on the political strategies of the Islamists, who are criticised for 
having negated the effects of an Islamic revolution. Although they 
continually attack political Islam, of which they are extremely critical, this 
movement does consider its objectives in line with those of the Islamists: 
the establishment of an Islamic state. 
The terrorist attacks became progressively more frequent. Fearing for 
the political stability of the region, France acted by multiplying its 
declarations of support and its supply of material aid to the Arab 
governments. In fact, France was concerned that the insurrectionist 
rationale of the jihadists would bring the Islamists to power. The jihadists 
saw France as being a barrier to the establishment of the Islamic state, in 
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cohort with the authoritarian regimes that curb the Islamic revolution. 
From then on, the jihadists sought to convince France to withdraw its 
support for the Arab regimes – and particularly Algeria – by direct action. 
France was not directly targeted but the attacks were seen as a way of 
destabilising and then overthrowing the regimes in the various countries of 
origin. The aim was to export the political crises of these countries into 
France to the 5 million or so Muslims residing there. 
Embodying an important anti-colonial message, this form of 
radicalism accused France, a former colonial power, of having designs on 
the economic, cultural and political domination of the region and of 
continuing to support the Arab regimes. In these countries, this accusation 
was accompanied by violent action directed against political, economic and 
military personnel seen as being the manifestation of the state structure. 
Advancing the idea of the destruction of all non-Islamic authority and the 
rejection of the order of things, this form of jihadism assumes an anarchist 
and nihilistic dimension. The dominant figure of this jihadist militancy is 
that of the mujahideen. The jihadist Salafists consider themselves 
combatants for justice who are fighting for a legitimate cause: the 
construction of the Islamic state that is to precede the coming of divine 
justice on earth. This feeling of fighting for a noble cause is reinforced by 
certain religious authorities who authorise this type of jihad, whereas 
others, without explicitly legitimising it, do so by not condemning it.17 
Moreover, they believe that they have the support of Muslim communities 
in Europe, of whom they consider themselves the representatives. In 
polarising the attention of the masses through their actions, their objective 
is to awaken the popular consciousness of Muslims in Europe. 
2.2  The politico-religious radicalism of al-Qaeda: Fighting American 
imperialism 
Many organisations claim to belong to the same kind of jihadist Salafism as 
the ‘Gang of Roubaix’. In 1995, Christophe Caze and Lionel Dumont, two 
French converts, went to Bosnia with friends of Algerian origin to fight 
against the Serbs. When they returned to France, they embarked on 
recruiting their friends and did not stop until they had convinced all of 
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them to take part in the jihad in Bosnia. The following year they launched a 
number of attacks in the north of France, against businesses and armoured 
vans to collect funds to finance the jihad, before they were shot by police. 
Several years later, in 2002, another group of a dozen or so individuals was 
arrested in the suburbs around Lyon. The police suspected them of 
preparing terrorist attacks against France. This group was organised 
around the Benchellali family, of Algerian origin, of which the father was 
an imam in the working-class area of Minguettes. Just before 1990, he 
created a humanitarian association called ‘Openness’ (Ouverture) with a 
friend who was a nurse. These two men collected funds, medicine and 
supplies ‘for the Chechen cause’. They went regularly to Bosnia in a truck 
carrying humanitarian aid. On one of these trips in 1993, Benchellali was 
captured by the Croatians, who suspected him of being an Islamic soldier. 
He was released some months later, after undergoing torture. His son, on 
the other hand, left with some friends for Chechnya to fight the Russian 
army.  
This form of radicalism is incarnated for the most part by al-Qaeda, 
and all the organisational structures that have set up allegiances with it in 
France, such as the GSPC. These are organisations that originally operated 
within a nationalist paradigm (often Algerian nationalism), and which are 
now reorienting their activism according to the jihadist ideology advanced 
by al-Qaeda. This recycling of the Algerian jihadists into the al-Qaeda 
network is explained by the strong links between those who are active in 
France and the members of Osama bin Laden’s organisation. In many 
cases, the Algerian jihadists first took up arms in the war in Afghanistan. 
Moreover, there was a lack of well-known Algerian spiritual guides – some 
of whom had been assassinated, such as Mohammed Saïd – capable of 
influencing the ideological direction of the jihad in Algeria. This lack led 
the Algerian jihadists to turn to leaders of other nationalities, who were 
also active in other forms of jihad and often moved by internationalist 
visions. Finally, the pressure for security by the Algerian army and the 
French secret services led the Algerian emirs to reconsider their strategy 
and find another ideology for the fight. It was thus that in 1998, the emir of 
the GSPC, Hassan Hattab, swore allegiance to the World Islamic Front for 
Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, created by Osama bin Laden. 
Although the terrorist attacks perpetrated by the first form of jihadist 
radicalism are part of a process of extending the activism of Islamo-
nationalist radical movements in foreign countries, the violent action of the 
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concerns French (European) residents and draws on an anti-imperialist 
Islamised discourse, fed by the questions of Palestine and Iraq, as well as 
the question of discrimination in France.18 The combat is now of a different 
nature. Whereas the first form of jihadist radicalism aimed at seizing power 
and establishing an Islamic state in a given country, the second form is part 
of a larger confrontation with the enemies of the resolutely transnational 
Islamic community (umma). Contrary to the first kind of mobilisation, 
which had a nationalist dimension, the second is part of an international 
rationale that sanctions the transfer of the oppositional struggles in the 
Arab world to the international scene. Several factors are behind the 
emergence of this kind of violent radicalism. Faced with police action from 
the secret services, the lack of success in mobilising Muslim populations 
living in France (as well as in Europe) in support of insurrection, and 
incapable of changing the foreign policy of Western countries in their 
support of Arab regimes threatened with Islamic terrorism, this form of 
Islamo-nationalist jihadism has progressively reoriented itself towards 
international networks. The enemy is ever less specific countries that 
support Arab states and ever more the new world order dominated by the 
US, the government of which makes demonstrative use of Christian 
religious references. Even if the choice of targets remains the same, the 
reasons for targeting them have changed. Unlike the first type of jihadism, 
in which the criticism of France was part of an anti-colonialist rationale, the 
second is characterised by its anti-imperialist dimension. The globalisation 
of American power is increasingly answered by the internationalisation 
and the re-territorialisation of armed combat.19 According to its supporters, 
the universal battle must set in opposition a coalition composed of jihadist 
movements from the different lands of Islam and a clearly defined enemy – 
Western countries such as France and the US (the latter being the principle 
enemy to be defeated). 
While the first form of jihad followed a political logic of negotiation 
by violence aimed at pressuring states and eventually overthrowing them, 
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the second form of jihad does not seek to negotiate or compromise but 
annihilate the opposition. Motivated by an extremist logic, their action 
seeks neither to change political power relations nor to overthrow the 
regime but to upset the social order profoundly. The combatant feels 
compelled by a mission: saving an endangered Islam and the project of an 
Islamic state is merely a necessary utopia that serves to maintain a tension 
that liberates bellicose energy. From that point on, violence is understood 
as a sacrifice cloaked with meta-political significance. Indeed, jihadist 
violence has risen above politics to become a vector of meaning that gives it 
an air of intransigence, of non-negotiability and the religious impact of 
absolutism. This is de-territorialised violence, beyond borders, and the 
issues that it targets are so vital to its militants that they are willing to 
sacrifice their very existence for them.  
Although it is not in the logic of political negotiation, this is not 
apolitical violence: the political elements of its objectives are just associated 
and subordinated to other goals, defined in cultural and religious terms, 
which will suffer no concession. This violence is about identities, which is 
foreign to the political sphere. This jihadist militantism applies the sectarian 
disqualification to those it means to fight: Muslims, who in their eyes are 
not sufficiently Muslim, as well as Jews and Christians. Faced with another 
Muslim, the rhetoric of takfir [excommunication] is mobilised to deny the 
adversary the guarantees of legitimate belonging. Faced with a non-
Muslim, the person is disqualified through recourse to the identity of the 
unbeliever (kufr). Whereas the first kind of radicalism is aimed against the 
taghut state, the second form of radicalism is aimed at the society that is 
accused of impiousness. Excommunication, takfir, is the response in this 
case. The movement holds that the society is in the jahiliyya (a period 
before the Islamic divine revelation) and the combatant is not regarded as 
noble (as a jihadist would normally be), but as a pure figure in a sullied 
world. The jihadist militant is no longer a mujâhid [warrior of the holy war] 
but a shahid [martyr]. In this kind of jihad, the repertoire of action in 
combat is not taken from the guerrilla logics of bombing and so forth, but 
from that of suicide attacks. The objective is not to set up an Islamic state 
but to create hell on this world for all those who, for one reason or another, 
are not considered Muslim.20 
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The first form of jihad found the justification to overthrow the state in 
certain fatwas, approved by some of the Muslim population who saw 
democratic virtues in the holy war. The second form, however, is 
unanimously condemned by the entire body of Muslim theologians and 
Muslim populations of Europe. Thus, the day after the attacks in New York 
on 11 September 2001 and after the attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the 
religious authorities of Islam in both the West and the Muslim world 
condemned these acts, which according to them had nothing to do with 
Islam. It is worth noting that some of these clerics simultaneously justified 
the first form of radicalism. 
Stemming from a feeling of belonging to the global umma, and not 
being linked to any country of origin, the defenders of this kind of jihad 
take little account of nationalities and national reasoning. This movement is 
transnational because the networks have become global and intertwined 
with the international operators of jihadism. This undoubtedly explains the 
diverse national origins among these jihadists, compared with those of the 
first category, and their recognition of themselves more easily in 
internationalist claims. Therefore, compared with the first form of jihad in 
which there was an over-representation of persons of Algerian origin, this 
second form of jihadist radicalism mobilises individuals of different origins 
(e.g. Moroccans and Tunisians). This jihad also facilitates the conversion of 
French-born members, the centrepiece of the jihadist operation in France 
since 1995 and an increasingly important one. These new networks evolve 
in a ‘de-territorialised’ imaginary space. 
2.3  Radicalism mobilising the defence of Muslims’ agenda 
The third movement of jihadist radicalism does not seek to fight against 
‘Jews and Crusaders’ by direct action and the use of violence, nor does its 
action seek the establishment of an Islamic state and society, as it is not 
concerned with the question of dawla islamiyya. The jihad actually waged 
by this group aims at defending and supporting Muslim populations 
whose territorial, political and physical integrity is threatened by foreign 
powers. For its members, the use of violence is legitimate if it is consecrated 
to the defence of Muslims put in danger by non-Muslim armies. In the 
name of transnational Islamic solidarity, they have an obligation to provide 
military and financial assistance to their brothers in arms, in the defence of 
dar al-Islam and in maintaining the cohesion of an imaginary umma. 
Within the logic of patriotism and Islamic independence, this jihadist 
radicalism takes the form of a national war of liberation, in mobilising a 46 | SAMIR AMGHAR 
 
sovereigntist discourse.21 Comparing himself with the International 
Brigade, a jihadist told us during an interview that “we are for the jihad in 
Iraq or anywhere because our brothers are in mortal danger. We want to 
defend them and France doesn’t understand, even though some French 
people did the same thing in the 1930s to defend the Spanish democrats 
against the dictator Franco.” Therefore, while the dominant figure of the 
second type of jihadism is that of the kamikaze, the third type is 
characterised by the figure of the mûhtal or the mûnâdil [resistance fighter] 
or the mûqatil al-oumma [the fighter of the umma] fighting against 
occupation. They consider themselves the protectors of Islamic unity and 
fight to save the morality and piety of Muslims who could no longer live 
their Islamic way of life under the occupation of impious armies. These 
jihadists wage a sacred war to defend a sacred nation, a belief that 
reinforces in their mind their feeling of performing a higher task. Contrary 
to the kamikaze, death is not the goal of these jihadists, but rather military 
victory against the occupying armies. This is what constitutes the ultimate 
objective of this form of jihad. It is heavily marked by mythologised stories 
of a war in which the Afghans “threw rocks at the [S]oviet tanks and made 
them explode, where an army of mountain people defeated the most 
powerful army in the world”, according to one former soldier who today 
runs a Koranic school in Paris. He suggests that this holy war is part of a 
logic of negotiation by force: to cause the opposing army to capitulate so 
that it leaves dar al-Islam. The soldiers of the opposing armies are 
undoubtedly deemed impious but this religious disqualification is only 
relevant in the context of the war. 
The jihad does not happen in the West; instead, it is deployed in all 
the conflict zones in which Muslims and non-Muslims are in opposition 
(Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq). Although these 
jihadists are very critical of the West and they condemn its bellicose politics 
towards Muslim countries, this movement maintains peaceful relations 
with Europe. It draws a parallel between the situations of Muslims in war 
against foreign armies where it is necessary to go and fight on the one 
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hand, and on the other hand the conditions of Muslims in Europe who, 
although they are subject to discriminations, are not threatened militarily 
by the armies of the Old World. Farid Benyettou told us, before he was 
arrested for having been behind the Iraqi group, that 
France is a country of unbelievers. I don’t like this country. It 
doesn’t respect Muslims, there is discrimination and Islamophobia. 
We must fight in France to defend Muslims but we must do so by 
legal means. We must turn democracy against France. But we must 
not use arms or lay bombs. France has not declared war on us.  
It is thus that he demonstrated (peacefully) against the American 
military intervention in Iraq in March of 2003. To the question of which 
Muslim country he would choose in order to live his Islam fully, he replied 
“You think I’m going to say Saudi Arabia, Yemen or Algeria. These are not 
countries that are benevolent towards Islam. I would choose the United 
Kingdom or the United States. There they respect Muslims and I could be 
active in the defence of the Muslims of the world.” Whereas the jihadists of 
the second group live their engagement as a deviance and a social 
transgression that is punishable by the security forces, the third category is 
convinced of the legitimacy of its cause. This feeling is all the stronger for 
the fact that Arab countries tolerate imams who rail against “non-Muslim 
armies that attack impious Muslims”, to take the words of a religious 
leader and public servant during a Friday service in an Algerian city. In the 
eyes of these jihadists, this holy war is all the more legitimate because it 
benefits from the support of Muslim populations living in Europe (but also 
in the Muslim world) and has the backing of theologians. In fact, 
theologians encourage their followers through numerous fatwas to ‘go and 
fight the impious armies that are attacking Muslims’. From Youssouf al-
Qardawi to the Salafist theologians in Saudi Arabia, they all justify this 
jihad, considering it an act of rightful defence and resistance. Because 
armed combat is part of the defence of the umma, the ethnic origin of the 
jihadist combatants is highly variable as was the case for the second group. 
As such, we find young persons of different origins (e.g. Moroccan and 
Tunisian) as well as converts in this group. The core of this third group, 
however, remains of Algerian origin (Benchellali, Benyettou and Fateh 
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3.  Secular political radicalism 
This kind of radicalism or radicalisation is carried out by political groups 
and individuals of Muslim origin who do not incorporate a religious 
argument into their radical position. Their rhetoric is based on secular 
politics. It is in the name of political and ideological values that the 
partisans of this form of radicalism attempt to defend their position by 
force. This concerns groups such as those involved in the urban riots in the 
French suburbs in November and December 2005, and extreme left, rap 
groups.  
The riots in the suburbs are the first form of this a-religious political 
radicalisation. This violence can be analysed as the eruption of an 
accumulated tension from daily frustrations and general annoyance about 
economic difficulties and precarious living conditions, the absence of 
opportunities, the perceived contempt of the political class, discrimination 
in housing, work and daily life, and so forth. For others, they were also 
witness to the general unhappiness over the policies of Nicolas Sarkozy. 
Most of the early acts of vandalism were spontaneous and isolated 
movements of idle youth in the streets among the housing estates. These 
acts then became veritable riots, notably involving direct combat with the 
riot squad. The riots were sparked by the death of two young men who 
were being chased by the police in Clichy-sous-Bois in the Parisian 
suburbs. They were also clearly the product of a yearning to break with 
what was seen as a repressive situation, linked to the inflationary security 
policies that had been in force in these areas for many years (Minguettes in 
1983, Vaulx-en-Velin near Lyon in 1990, the suburbs north of Marseille and 
riots in the suburbs in November and December 2005). More than through 
the temptation of jihadism, it is through popular revolt that political claims 
are made when the citizenship structures are lacking.  
The blaze in the suburbs at the end of 2005 was an episode without 
religious content or actors. In spite of a number of attempts to bring calm to 
the situation, the Muslim organisations did not play the role of social 
r e g u l a t o r  e x p e c t e d  o f  t h e m .  T h i s  s h o w e d  t h a t  M u s l i m  a c t o r s  d o  n o t  
organise the riots, nor do the neighbourhoods, although sometimes they 
are active in the latter on a local level. These riots were manifestly the result 
of a desire to fight against an order perceived as authoritarian and 
repressive, especially stemming from the security policy in place in these 
areas since 2002. FOUNDATIONS OF MUSLIM RADICALISM IN FRANCE | 49 
 
This movement is part of a demand for social recognition, through 
the use of violence. In choosing to attack institutions, it is the state that is 
targeted for its shortcomings, e.g. the police for its repression, the bus 
stations because of geographical isolation and schools because they 
reproduce social failure. 
The second element within this radical mobilisation is rap music. Part of 
the French rap scene aims at being radical. Its messages are provocative and 
seem to signify a desire for rupture, often by violence. In thematic compilations 
(e.g. “Patrimoine du ghetto”, 2005; “Yzo”, 2005; “Prison”, 2005) or through 
albums of groups such as Sniper, Bakar or Médine, the rappers point the 
finger at those guilty for social misery and exclusion. Among the accused, 
the state is represented as an oppressive machine, of which the armed 
presence is the police, the number one enemy. Constant identity checks, 
blunders, arbitrary arrests and so on, lead rappers to think of the police as 
an organised gang. Behind their critique of the institution of the police 
force, the state is incriminated, accused according to a vision of the world 
that resembles a conspiracy theory. Below are some extracts of their songs: 
For the kids with hands of vengeance  
To burn the police state and send 
The Republic to burn at the same stake, yeah... 
Why are we waitin’ to screw up their game, 
Why are we waitin’ to not play by their rules 
(“What are we waiting for?”, NTM) 
Fuck the system; they’ll get fire ‘cos they spread hate 
Burn them, hang them, throw them in the Seine 
The youth of the ghetto have rage in their veins 
Gotta break the chains 
(“The System”, Sniper) 
Despite the dimension of extreme protest calling for an insurrectional 
uprising, these texts essentially play a role in channelling that violence. The 
violence expressed in these texts has a cathartic effect on rappers and the 
youth who listen to this music. 
The third group that defends the idea of secular political violence 
concerns individuals belonging to movements on the extreme left. In the 
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trying to organise Muslim immigrant workers. Other structures for 
students of Middle-Eastern origin (e.g. Lebanese and Pakistani) who were 
close to the national liberation movements occupied themselves with 
radical political activities (political assassinations and hostages). Today, the 
‘Islamic extreme left’ is principally incarnated by the Movement for 
Immigration and the Suburbs (Mouvement de l’immigration et des 
banlieues, MIB), which regroups former Maoists and uses direct action 
against discrimination in the legal system and against police violence, of 
which youth in the suburbs are often the victims. 
Conclusions 
The forms of radicalism among the Muslim populations in France are 
multiple and varied. To overplay the religious variable would prevent us 
from seeing the great plasticity of the phenomena of radicalisation. Political 
violence can take its source from religious justifications, or religious 
references can impede radicalisation, or Islam is absent altogether, even 
though the radicalism is practised by Muslims. Beyond this, it is necessary 
to recognise that all these different forms of radicalism are the product of 
experiences of injustice and exclusion, which can be directly linked to 
realities on the ground or to the political trauma of young persons having 
known delinquency and homelessness, personal failure, long-term 
unemployment and so on. 
Yet, the link between Muslim populations and radicalism cannot be 
reduced to an economic equation in which poverty is the common 
denominator. It seems more likely to be the inadequacies of social and 
political regulation that is a problem, along with the lack of recognition, 
contempt and “the great wall” – in the words of Khaled Kelkal22 (one of the 
perpetrators of the terrorist attacks in 1995) – separating the estates where 
most of France’s Muslims live and the rest of the towns. 
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4.  POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC 
RADICALISATION AMONG MUSLIMS 
IN BELGIUM 
THEODOROS KOUTROUBAS, WARD VLOEBERGHS 
& ZEYNEP YANASMAYAN 
ere we to believe alarmist reports on Islam in Belgium, such as 
that of the Dutch journalist Arthur van Amerongen, a major 
terrorist attack against Brussels is only “a matter of time”.1 A bit 
further away from Europe’s capital, other journalists keep announcing the 
imminent introduction of the sharia in Flemish municipalities,2 who 
trembled some years ago at the prospect of Muslim patrols antagonising 
the police. Responsible for the security of the several international 
institutions established on its soil and eager to avoid a repetition of the 
terrorist attacks experienced by other states, the Belgian authorities in fact 
already take such threats seriously. In December 2007, following the receipt 
of intelligence reports of an alleged plot to liberate Tunisian-born al-Qaeda-
related convict Nizar Trabelsi, extraordinary measures were adopted in 
                                                      
1 See for example the interviews of Arthur van Amerongen in Knack, “Aanslag in 
Brussel is kwestie van tijd” (Attack on Brussels is matter of time), 8 August 2007 
and in De Morgen, “De islam woekert hier als een roos op een mestvaalt” (Islam 
thrives here like a rose on a dung heap), 27 January 2008. A Dutch journalist, Mr 
van Amerongen claims to have infiltrated Brussels Moroccan Islamist circles and to 
have lived among them during a whole year, an experience he chronicles in a book 
Brussel: Eurabia, published by Uitgeverij Atlas (Amsterdam) in February 2008. 
2 See “Ooit wordt de sharia hier ingevoerd” (One day, the sharia will be introduced 
here), Knack, 12 March 2008.  
W 52 | KOUTROUBAS, VLOEBERGHS & YANASMAYAN 
 
order to protect the capital from an imminent threat.3 Some months 
afterwards, in May 2008, the Moroccan authorities announced the 
dismantlement of a small Islamist group, based in their country but 
involving a Belgian resident Moroccan as well, allegedly aiming at 
bombing buildings of the European Commission in Brussels.4  
Notwithstanding the accuracy of such information, both its impact 
and the frequency with which it occurs prove at least that there is a broad 
perception of the ‘Muslim community’5 of Belgium as being increasingly 
radicalised. 
Whether or not this perception is accurate is of course a matter for 
debate, as several other observers seem to refute such an evolution, 
pointing rather towards the emergence of a distinctively ‘Belgian’ or 
‘European’ Islam, well integrated in the Western cultural values.6  
What is clear, however, is that the time is past when it was sufficient 
that issues relating to this community could be successfully managed – or 
so it seemed – by a handful of charismatic mayors and personalities 
responsible for areas with a high concentration of Turkish and North 
African populations.7 Individuals with leadership and vision can certainly 
                                                      
3 See for example Le Soir, 22 December 2007, “La menace terroriste sous le sapin de 
Noël”  (The terrorist threat under the Christmas tree). Fourteen persons were 
arrested in relation to this alleged plot, only to be released two days afterwards for 
insufficient proof (Le Soir, 24-25 December 2007). See also 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2007/12/22/01003-20071222ARTFIG00126-
alerte-antiterroriste-a-bruxelles-.php  
4 See for example Le Soir, 19-20 May 2008 (also in http://www.lesoir.be/actualite/ 
belgique/demantelement-d-un-reseau-2008-05-19-599389.shtml  
5 The term is used here to describe both believers in Islam and persons coming 
from a Muslim cultural background. 
6 See e.g. La Libre Belgique, “L’islam s’intègre bien chez nous” (Islam is well 
integrated among us), 12 March 2008. Also see Felice Dassetto, Brigitte Maréchal 
and Silvio Ferrari, Islam in the European Union: What’s at stake in the future?, study 
prepared for the European Parliament (IP/B/CULT/ST/2006_061), May 2007 (PE 
390.031). 
7 Such as for example former mayors such as Guy Cudell of Sint Joost ten Node or 
the Socialist Party’s heavyweight Philippe Moureaux of Molenbeek St Jean. To a 
less successful extent, the same applies to the city of Antwerp, with figures such as 
Bob Cools and, more recently and more efficiently, Antwerp’s mayor, Patrick 
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still produce good work, but with only 54 of the at least 333 mosques 
operating legally in Belgium, it is obvious that more carefully designed, 
long-term efforts are needed.8  
In this paper, we propose to discuss a number of different types of 
radicalisation that have been observed among persons of Islamic faith or 
culture in Belgium, highlighting the conflicts it has caused or it could 
become the cause of. Of course, the authors are well aware that there are 
numerous other issues, completely unrelated to the presence of a ‘Muslim’ 
community, that can cause conflict at a micro level in Belgium.  
1.  Political radicalisation  
1.1  The country’s political context 
Religion has never been absent from Belgium’s political life. Since its 
declaration of independence from the Netherlands in 1830, the small 
country has in fact almost always counted a ‘Christian’ party amongst the 
components of its successive coalition governments, whilst the consensual 
model that still characterises the country’s governance is based on a 
perpetually renewed balance between the Catholic (Socio-Christian), the 
Liberal (originally strongly linked to Free-Masonry and rather anti-clerical) 
and the Socialist political families. At the same time, the Belgian royal 
family, whose constitutional powers and influence continue to be quite 
important, has never made a secret of its strong links with the Roman 
Catholic Church. Thus, issues such as the financing of faith-based schools 
or the legalisation of abortion, have become landmarks in the history of the 
lengthy and subtle negotiations that Belgian politicians are famous for, 
with inventive solutions of compromise assuring every time the 
continuation of internal peace and the stability of the regime. 
Notwithstanding how difficult and sometimes divisive such issues might 
have been, it is interesting to point out that, neither these nor the ever-
present grievances and rivalries between the Flemish North and the 
Wallonian South have caused any serious violent conflict in the land. This 
tradition of non-violent co-existence between people of different 
                                                                                                                                       
Janssens. On the impact of Cudell, see F. Dassetto, Immigrés et communes. Equilibres 
difficiles. Le cas de Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia, 1991. 
8 De Standaard, “Vlaanderen erkent moskeeën” (Flanders recognises mosques), 22-
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convictions, culture, faiths or language is still a major source of pride 
amongst Belgians. 
As is the case in most countries of Western Europe, the last 20 years 
have witnessed a progress of secularism in the Belgian society. By the mid-
2000s, the once rather conservative country was amongst the first countries 
to legalise marriage between same-sex persons and euthanasia with a 
broad consensus. With the numbers constantly diminishing of those 
regularly attending church services, joining the clergy or baptising their 
children, the two ‘Christian’ parties have begun to play down their Roman-
Catholic identity, putting forward a ‘humanistic’ profile and vocally 
dissociating themselves from Vatican guidelines on ‘moral’ issues.  
This period also witnessed the emergence of a growing involvement 
of Muslims and other persons coming from an Islamic cultural background 
in Belgian politics, first at the local and then at the regional and the federal 
levels. Most of these citizens were of Moroccan or Turkish origin whilst 
Algeria and Tunisia constituted respectively their third and fourth source.9 
The access of citizens of foreign origin to elected office was far from being a 
taboo in the country at the time ‘Muslims’ started becoming interesting 
potential candidates for political parties.10 Despite common beliefs that 
religious practice and values are higher among citizens hailing (or having 
parents who hail) from predominantly Muslim countries,11 it is the 
traditionally agnostic and morally liberal Socialist Party (both in the South 
and in the North of the country) that seems to take the biggest share of their 
vote and counts most of those elected within their ranks. It is interesting to 
note that during all recent debates and votes on legislation strongly rejected 
by the official representatives of the most organised religions recognised by 
the Belgian state,12 ‘Muslim’ members and officials of political parties have 
                                                      
9 Open Society Institute, EU Monitoring and Advocacy Programme, Muslims in the 
EU: Cities Report – Belgium, Preliminary research report and literature survey, 2007. 
10 An example amongst many others, Dr. Elio di Rupo, a son of Italian immigrants, 
who has occupied several ministerial seats including the position of Vice-Prime 
Minister, and was Minister-President of Wallonia in the 2000s. Dr. di Rupo is 
currently the President of the French-speaking Socialist Party (PS).  
11 According to the preliminary research report of the Open Society Institute, op. 
cit., there is a lack of academic knowledge regarding religious practice and beliefs 
among Muslims in Belgium.  
12 Islam has this status since 1974. RADICALISATION AMONG MUSLIMS IN BELGIUM | 55 
 
chosen not to differentiate themselves from party lines (at least openly), 
even when those lines where clearly opposed to the opinions of their 
community’s religious leaders.  
In the pages to come, we are going to discuss the attempts of some of 
the members of Belgium’s Muslim community to establish Islamic or 
community-based political parties, their discourse and the tensions they 
have or could create. 
1.2  Islamic political parties 
The first attempt to set up an Islamic political party in Belgium took place 
in Flanders, with the creation of the Moslim Volkspartij van Brussel en 
Vlaanderen in 1992. The party never submitted a list to elections at any 
level and was rather quickly disbanded.  
More organised than the leaders of the ‘Moslim Volkspartij’, Mr. 
Redouane Ahrouch has founded Noor – Le Parti Islamique in 1999. The 
party, self-defined as an ‘Islamic movement’, was created out of concern for 
the fact that “the Jewish / Christian values are no longer the foundations of 
the political orientations that have determined the future for all over the 
centuries” and with the belief that “religion provides the solution” for the 
problems society is facing.  
Its short ‘manifesto’, figuring in the initial page of what is a very basic 
(six pages only), non-interactive website (http://noor.ovh.org), uses a 
discourse often proposed by radical religious groups/movements of all 
denominations. The party’s programme, distributed in mailboxes during 
electoral campaigns, contains 40 points, presented as simple headlines with 
no further explanation. A small number of these points express ideas that 
do seem radical in the current Belgian socio-political context, such as the 
“re-establishment of capital punishment”,13 or the promise to “favour 
marriage in adolescence”. Other points address concerns common to 
several religious-minded voters such as the “real protection of the family”, 
the “struggle against alcoholism, smoking, drugs and debauchery” or the 
need to render divorce more difficult.  
                                                      
13 T h e  a u t h o r  m a k e s  i t  p r e c i s e :  “ f o r  o d i o u s  c r i m e s  ( m u r d e r s  o f  i n n o c e n t s ) ”  
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Most of the programme, however, seems to contain promises 
obviously aimed at pleasing voters in a country with a high level of 
taxation (abolition of the VAT, the tax on work, etc.).  
Absent from the federal elections of June 2007, Noor, which didn’t 
manage to get more than 0.02% of the votes in those of 2003, seems today 
almost dismantled. Initially designed to contain pages in French, Dutch, 
Arabic and Turkish, its website was, in May 2008, unavailable in most 
languages and it was obvious that no updating had been done for a long 
time. No activity of the party was mentioned in the country’s written, 
electronic or radio-televised press for the last two years, thus rendering its 
visibility almost non-existent.  
Noor’s (rather discreet) existence did not prevent the Belgian convert 
to Islam, Jean-François Abdullah Bastin, to found, together with another 
group of converts and Muslims coming from Muslim families, the Parti 
Citoyenneté Prosperité (PCP) in 2003.  
The party became quickly visible thanks to its active opposition to the 
ban of the Islamic scarf or hijab  in school premises by an institute of 
secondary education in one of Brussels’ municipalities (Laeken), and its 
vocal defence of the female students who defied that decision. The 
interdiction of wearing the hijab during school hours, adopted by several 
other schools in Brussels and Wallonia during the years 2003–04 became 
indeed an issue of tension and controversy in Belgium at that time, and 
PCP’s militancy did bear fruit in the federal elections of 2003. The (new) 
party, which had presented lists only in the Brussels-Halle-Vilvorde 
district, scored a mere 0.13% at the national level. It did however manage to 
obtain almost 3% of the vote in a number of the capital’s communities with 
a high percentage of ‘Muslim’ population,14 thanks to a programme 
including a lot of specifically ‘Islamic’ proposals, such as the right of 
Muslim women to wear the Islamic scarf both in class and in their identity 
card picture, the inclusion of halal menus in school cantinas, the creation of 
Islamic cemeteries, etc. 
Considered to be radical because of its founders’ often controversial 
statements (discussed later in this paper) the party was nevertheless 
declaring that “it does not contest the legitimacy of the government or any 
democratically constituted authority in the country” and explicitly 
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denounced “any terrorist activity, any armed or violent expression of a 
religious, ideological or political revendication”. 
Almost one year after PCP’s foundation, Jean-François Abdullah 
Bastin has resigned from membership denouncing the party’s “sectarian 
and arrogant re-orientation” of its ideology by its ‘spiritual guide’, Sheikh 
Bassam Ayachi. A few months after his departure, “Citoyenneté et 
Prosperité” took part in the June 2004 elections for the regional government 
of Brussels-Capital, realising a score of 3.281 votes, or 0.84% of the French-
speaking electorate with a list including an important number of ‘new’ 
Muslims (converts to Islam).  
By May 2008 however, this party was also all but extinct according to 
all indications: it did not present lists for the June 2006 federal elections, it 
had no presence on the web and in the media and no activity was reported 
even in those of the capitals’ municipalities that used to constitute its 
stronghold.  
Last in the list of inactive Muslim political parties in Belgium, the 
ephemeral Moslim Democratische Partij was founded by the then leader of 
the Arab European League (AEL), Dyab Abou Jahjah, in an effort to 
translate the League’s alleged popularity among youths of Arabic origin in 
Flanders into elected representation at the local, regional and federal levels.  
An advocate of Arab nationalism,15 Abou Jahjah had already 
participated in the federal elections of 2003 as a candidate of the far left 
coalition RESIST obtaining 0.90% of the vote in the city of Antwerp, 
headquarters of AEL. Given the rather non-religious political discourse of 
the League (to be discussed in the following pages) and its (very) secular 
political allies within RESIST (the ‘Parti du Travail de Belgique’), the choice 
of ‘Muslim’ as an adjective describing the nature of the new party was 
rather surprising, and is certainly characteristic of a tendency among 
‘Muslim’ candidates (and not only) to often confuse religious affiliation 
with national origin in order to serve their agendas. Anyhow and despite 
its founders’ hopes,16 the Moslim Democratische Partij got worse results 
                                                      
15 See his lengthy interview to the ‘Open Democracy’ 
(http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/article_1908.jsp). 
16 In his interview to the ‘Open Democracy’, op. cit., Abou Jahjah was predicting 
that the new party would grow so much that by 2006 it would be able to “have a 
higher vote and perhaps win one or two representatives in city hall”. 58 | KOUTROUBAS, VLOEBERGHS & YANASMAYAN 
 
than RESIST in Flanders (Antwerp and East Flanders) at the regional 
elections of 2004 (0.27% in Antwerp and 0.14% in East Flanders) and is now 
completely disbanded.  
The only Islamic party really active in Belgium by May 2008, when 
this chapter was written, was the Parti Jeunes Musulmans (PJM), founded 
in 2004 by Jean-François Abdullah Bastin after his resignation from the 
PCP. PJM considers itself to be “the party of all Muslims and of all the 
generations that have definitively turned the page of colonialism and 
humiliations” and according to its statutes “conceives its activities in total 
harmony with the rules of democracy and the applying legislation in the 
Kingdom of Belgium” .17  
Much like Noor and several other radical Christian political 
movements in Europe, the party deplores “a world that has banished the 
sacred in a stupid and dangerous way” and calls upon “all men and 
women of good will who (are) scandalised by the programmed 
disappearance of every moral sense”.18 Like its ‘predecessor’, the PCP, PJM 
also supports the right of Muslims to wear the hijab in schools, insist upon 
halal  menus in cantinas, have holidays during Islamic feasts and be 
educated in religious schools respectful of the principle of separation 
between the sexes. At the same time, it pleads for the right of parents to 
have the ultimate choice on all activities proposed to their children in the 
framework of their school curriculum (including, for example, museum 
visits) and promises a free of charge and less ‘West-centred’ compulsory 
education.19  
Its allegiance to the rules of democracy and the Belgian laws seem 
however much less sincere after a careful study of the ideas proposed in its 
website. When presenting the democratic nature of the party, for example, 
the authors of the electronic portal of PJM admit that the latter “plays the 
game (of democracy)…respects scrupulously its rules …but this does not 
prevent it from promoting another game, another form of governance, 
more elaborate, more appropriate to the destiny of Muslims, of Islam, of 
humanity in general and whose rules are not fixed by men but by God. 
When the day will come, it will stand up from the table of the game, along 
                                                      
17 http://www.mvjm.be  
18 See the Statutes of the party, updated June 2006, on its website, op. cit. 
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with all the Muslims who have played beside it in the most civilized 
manner, it will thank its hosts and it will re-join its country (its State)”.20 
Some (web)pages further, state that the party its objective “is obviously, in 
no way to install an Islamic State in Belgium”, only to observe immediately 
afterwards that it is “perfectly conscious of the fact that the Muslims cannot 
live but elsewhere, and in due time, when God shall decide, (there will be) 
an Islam integrally re-established in its original authenticity, in a really 
Islamic and independent State, perfectly respectful of and respected by the 
other States of the international community”.21  
At the same time, PJM’s leaders are often using in public a 
provocative discourse, likely to raise tensions or create conflict both within 
the community they have pleaded to defend and between the different 
components of Belgian society. As an example, during the time of the 2007 
electoral campaign, the party’s chairman, Mr Bastin, has caused significant 
controversy by declaring in an interview with TV Brussel that “there is a 
Muslim party and thus all Muslims must defend their party...”, claiming 
that “all learned men of Islam and not only the Salafists…have condemned 
in the most explicit way as being haram all Muslim votes for a non-Islamic 
party where the possibility of that choice exists”.22 Bastin often uses an 
ironic, aggressive and bitter tone, against those ‘Muslims’ who do not 
support his party and have denounced his politics and discourse as being 
un-Islamic, challenging the sincerity of his conversion. His attitude is not 
very different from that of many of PJM representatives who often 
participate in public debates on issues relating to religion and secularism, 
and defend their views in an aggressive way. Their reports published 
afterwards in http://www.mvjm.be are all but polite towards those who 
express different ideas.23 
                                                      
20 Op. cit., «Parti Démocrate». 
21 Op. cit., «Etat islamique». 
22 «Lettre ouverte à Monsieur Jean-François Abdullah Bastin, Parti Jeunes 
Musulmans» and «Réponse de Abdullah Bastin à la lettre ouverte de Salim 
Haouach», op. cit.  
23 See, for example, in the page “Le PJM y était” the party’s coverage of the 
conference on the issue, “La laïcité, rampart contre les intégrismes le racisme, 
l’antisémitisme, la misogyny et l’homophobie”, organised in Brussels in December 
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Aggressive campaigning didn’t succeed, however, to raise PJM’s 
popularity. Despite being the only Islamic party competing in the latest 
federal elections (with candidates in the district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvorde 
like the PCP four years before) the ‘Young Muslims’ obtained a mere 0.07% 
of the vote at the national level. Their score was even inferior to that of the 
PCP in 2003 (0.13%),24 when Mr Bastin was still the leader of ‘Citizenship 
and Prosperity’.  
Born to parents of Belgian origin (his father was a University 
professor), PJM’s chairman has become a familiar and rather picturesque 
figure in Belgian households thanks (at least partially) to his oriental dress, 
headgear and long beard, that constitute a striking antithesis with the 
western clothing of almost all politicians with Arabic or Turkish origin in 
the country. The later often point out the important presence of converts in 
PJM’s lists (5 out of 14 candidates in 2007), as well as Bastin’s own origins, 
in order to contest his right to represent a Muslim community still quite 
divided along ethnic lines. The verbal vehemence with which Mr Bastin 
usually attacks his ‘coreligionist’ political opponents have made him 
‘persona non grata’ in numerous manifestations on community-related 
issues and in several mosques.25 Last but not least, his active support to 
radical Christian organisations at the time of the discussion of the law 
opening adoption to same-sex couples in Belgium earned PJM a reputation 
of extreme right-wing movement. It is interesting to note here that some of 
these organisations, like Belgique et Chrétienté26 do not hesitate to use a 
strong anti-Muslim discourse in their ‘defence’ of the country’s ‘Christian 
roots’, in spite of their alliance with the PJM against the “destruction of the 
last ramparts of civilisation”.27  
Often a cause of (micro)tension mostly within the ‘Muslim’ 
community, the Parti Jeunes Musulmans did not appear to have the 
                                                                                                                                       
2005 by the Free University of Brussels (ULB) and Secular Jewish Community 
Centre (CCLJ).  
24 See the comparative results of the 2003 and 2007 federal elections in the Belgian 
government’s federal web portal (http://polling2007.belgium.be/fr/cha/results/ 
results_graph_etop.html).  
25 See, as an example, his own complaints in his answer to Salim Haouach, op. cit.  
26 See http://www.bechrist.be  
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potential for the creation of serious conflict or violence between 
communities in Belgium at the time these lines were written. As the 
electoral results demonstrate, its influence was diminishing among voters 
and its presence in the media seemed to be more due to its leaders’ dress 
code than to the party’s real importance. PJM’s radical discourse however, 
and especially the parts relating to a future ‘Islamic State’ to be founded on 
an unidentified space, can be used as a weapon by the country’s extreme 
right-wing parties which are constantly growing in popularity in the North.  
Not really a political party, but important enough to make the 
headlines of the international press, Malika El-Aroud, a Belgian of 
Moroccan origin, spouse of the Tunisian Abdessatar Dahmane and one of 
the assassins of Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban leader, Ahmad Chah Massoud, 
is also worth mentioning here. Viewed as the “Belgian woman who wages war 
for al-Qaeda on the web”,28 Ms El-Aroun is managing to successfully 
manipulate Belgium’s legal requirements on e-publishing in order to 
diffuse particularly heinous discourse against the West and to overtly 
encourage terrorist activities, rallying, notably, Muslim women to support 
them.29 Allegedly unwilling to arrest her in order to avoid attracting further 
publicity around her name,30 the Belgian authorities are closely monitoring 
her actions. At the time these lines were written, a serious study on the 
impact of El-Aroud’s message amongst the population of Islamic culture or 
faith in Belgium was yet to be carried out. 
1.3  Non-religious political radicalisation 
The Arab-European League (AEL) 
Founded in 2000 by Dyab Abou Jahjah, the Arab-European League defines 
itself as “a political and social movement that stands for the Rights of the 
Arab and Muslim communities in Europe and the Arab causes in general. 
“.31 The movement, which proclaims that it also stands for “solidarity with 
all Muslim peoples and communities and all the oppressed peoples of the 
world”, declares that its members’ objective is to abide and strive for 19 
                                                      
28 See for example the International Herald Tribune, 27 May 2008 
(http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/27/europe/terror.php?page=2).  
29 See for example http://minbar-sos.com/  
30 See Le Monde, 17 June 2008. 
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principles and goals, 6 of which concern the Arab Diaspora and 13 the Arab 
world in general.  
The goals of the League regarding Arabs in Europe are not radically 
different from those of many an immigrant-friendly political party or NGO 
in modern-day Belgium. AEL pleads in fact for the right of Arab 
immigrants to cultivate their cultural identity “while engaging actively as 
European citizens in the countries of residence, with equal rights and 
treatment”, and vows to combat racism, Islamophobia, discrimination in 
the fields of employment, housing and education, as well as attempts to 
breach their freedom of expression, religion, religious practice or any other 
of their human rights.  
It is however the “Arab Nation”, and not so much its Diaspora in 
Europe, that seems to be the target of the movement’s manifesto. AEL’s 13 
declarations “towards the Arab world” are in fact nothing less than a 
project for the creation of an Empire, redrafting the current map “in order 
to give birth to the “Unity of the Arab people in one democratic federal 
State.” (points 7 & 8). The League’s vision includes a whole constitution for 
its ideal future ‘Arab homeland’, the borders of which would extend from 
the Atlantic to Iran. Political freedom, freedom of expression, social rights, 
eradication of poverty, measures against the concentration of power 
including the field of the media, rights for linguistic minorities, internal 
autonomy for the ‘provinces’ of Rif, Sous and Kabilya, no detail has been 
left out from the movement’s ambitious plan!  
The son of a Muslim father and a Christian mother, Abou Jahjah calls 
for a secular State that “will also respect religious diversity… provide all 
individuals and groups the freedom to practice their religion (and) grant its 
citizens the protection in order to be able of changing religion, or practicing 
no religion at all without being persecuted or discriminated.” (point 11). 
Despite that, and probably for historical reasons or in order not to 
completely alienate religious-minded from potential AEL membership, the 
movement affirms that “the Arab Constitution will refer to Islam as the 
Religion of the Arab State”. It is obvious however that we are here far away 
from the PJM’s imaginative future Islamic realm. For the League in fact, 
democracy is “the only acceptable system of government” and has links to 
the Arab tradition. In that context, AEL makes clear its disapproval of the 
current Arab regimes – albeit falling short from openly denouncing them 
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These ambitious declarations of intentions would have certainly not 
justified the classification of the Arab-European League among the 
examples, of political radicalisation within Belgium’s ‘Muslim 
community’,32 if it weren’t for the discourse and activities with which it has 
chosen to promote its goals, and, of course, for its attitude regarding the 
State of Israel. Already in the fourth point of its declarations of intentions, 
the movement defines itself as “an anti-colonial and anti-Zionist 
organisation”. Point 6 becomes even more explicit: “We reject the Zionist 
project in Palestine and we call for the dismantling of the Zionist entity and 
the establishing of a united Palestinian democratic state in all historical 
Palestine.” The terminology of the League is very close to that often used 
by the Hamas, or the Hizbullah, even if Abou Jahjah’s movement does not 
(at least officially) wish to see the entire Jewish population extinct from an 
‘historical Palestine’ but rather calls for an Arab state where “Arabs and 
Jews can coexist peacefully enjoying equal rights without any 
discrimination.”. 
With an important part of its activities in Belgium concentrated in the 
city of Antwerp, which also serves as a traditional centre of the country’s 
orthodox Jewish community, the absence of tensions between the latter and 
the Arab-European League would have been indeed a surprise. In April 
2002, the AEL made its debut in the Belgian media by organising a pro-
Palestinian demonstration close to Antwerp’s Jewish neighbourhood. 
Condemned by the city’s union of mosques, the event degenerated into 
violence and soon Dyab Abou Jahjah became a household figure in a 
context marked by the growing popularity of the openly anti-immigrant, 
far-right-wing party Vlaams Blok in Flanders.33 It was one of this party’s 
MPs, Filip Dewinter, who triggered the event that gave the movement a 
visibility without precedent in Belgian annals. A confidential note of the 
police, announcing an intensification of controls towards youths of 
Moroccan origin, was in fact transmitted to the Flemish press by the 
extremist parliamentarian, who was obviously aiming at raising inter-
community tension in order to serve his party’s scaremongering goals. AEL 
reacted almost immediately by announcing the creation of Arab squads 
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composed of young men who would patrol the city with cameras in order 
to monitor police excesses against Antwerp’s (mainly North African) Arab 
community. The appearance of the first AEL patrols (dressed in black) on 
the streets of the Flemish metropolis caused a wave of outrage among all 
Belgian political parties, greatly increasing the perceived importance of 
what was in reality a group with no more than 800 members (according to 
its own estimations).34 A dreadful coincidence, the assassination of a 
Moroccan-born young schoolteacher by a 66-year-old pensioner (described 
as being mentally unstable by the prosecutors) just days after the setting up 
of the patrols, pushed Antwerp into at least two days of violent riots in 
which the League played a prominent role. Accusing the AEL of 
attempting to create areas of no-go for the police, the authorities arrested 
Abou Jahjah, charging him with conspiracy to cause disorder, whilst Prime-
Minister Guy Verhofstadt was announcing an investigation on his 
movement and the Parliament was debating how to handle the affair.35  
Eventually, the unrest in Flanders’s biggest city calmed down, no 
incriminating evidence was found regarding AEL’s finances nor any links 
to terrorist groups (a suspicion initiated, again, by the Vlaams Blok, 
nowadays re-named Vlaams Belang) and Dyab Abou Jahjah was released36 
with a brand new reputation as ‘Belgium’s Malcolm X’’37 and a storm of 
invitations for interviews by media from all over Europe. In the years that 
followed, the League and its President have fully exploited their prestige as 
champions of the immigrant youth’s cause, establishing a strong branch in 
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36 His trial for these events before the appeals court of Antwerp was still going on 
at the time these lines were written. 
37 See BBC News: 
 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/2847621.stm).  RADICALISATION AMONG MUSLIMS IN BELGIUM | 65 
 
the Netherlands and profiting from different controversial debates in order 
to make their voice heard.  
As mentioned in the previous pages, the AEL did try to translate its 
visibility into votes by forming a cartel with the Marxist-Leninist Parti du 
travail de Belgique - Partij van de Arbeid van België (PTB - PVDA) and was 
not discouraged by its poor electoral results in the federal elections of 
2003.38 Acting in a way that could be viewed as political opportunism given 
the organisation’s and his own secular credo, Abou Jahjah founded soon 
afterwards the Moslim Democratische Partij (MDP). A month before MDP’s 
first (and last) electoral test, in an interview with “Open Democracy”, he 
was defining himself as a “moderate Muslim”, albeit insisting on his Arab-
nationalist ideology: 
It is easier to mobilise if you talk only about Islam. But we chose a 
more difficult and complex route. Having taken up that challenge, 
we are succeeding despite the obstacles. This is because when you 
talk to people for a while they realise that their identity is more 
complex than just their religion. They know it in themselves.39  
Voters did not seem to share his views, however, and the MDP had a 
very short existence. After this second electoral defeat, the movement 
began to concentrate on the political developments in the Middle East, 
organising demonstrations against the war in Iraq or Israeli occupation of 
“historical Palestine” and using an increasingly radicalised discourse. 
During the controversy caused by the caricatures of Muhammad published 
by a Danish newspaper, the League encouraged the drawing of anti-
Semitic, anti-gay or anti-European cartoons in retaliation, and its current 
website still hosts a couple of particularly heinous ones under the cynical 
title: “Freedom of speech Campaign”.40 The League had already become so 
vehemently anti-Israel by then that it didn’t hesitate to publish its support 
for some of the most extremist enemies of the Jewish State.41  
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At the time of the Hizbullah–Israeli conflict of 2006, Dyab Abou 
Jahjah resigned from the AEL leadership and left for Lebanon in order to 
join the fighting. He delivered a particularly theatrical adieu to his 
“comrades”: 
This might be the last thing I’ll write before going home on a trip 
that might be my last…I lived my life for this Nation and not a hair 
in me will hesitate in laying it down for this Nation too. When 
oppression rises above the sun to cover it, and injustice defies the 
wind and the Wicked and the Evil feast on the Flesh of innocent 
men, women and children, from within the darkness and the orgy 
of blood, a sword will shine, and the brave will murmur: “What a 
beautiful day to die.42 
At the end, Mr Abou Jahjah didn’t die a martyr, nor did he realise his 
dreams to see the AEL expanding in France, gaining seats in Antwerp and 
Utrecht city councils and becoming a European trans-national party.43 He 
did continue to write though, with the same militant attitude. His personal 
diary, Dagboek Beiroet Brussel, parts of which were published in the Dutch 
newspaper Trouw,44 betrays however a certain fatigue towards his fellow 
Arab-Belgian ‘compatriots’, considered by him to be “very conservative in 
matters of religion …(and) strictly following an approach that excludes any 
rationality ( een kritiekloze benadering) when it comes to faith in its most 
orthodox form”. Still active within the movement, AEL’s former President 
nowadays has his own blog,45 from where he keeps attacking ‘Zionism’, 
and those of his fellow Belgians of Arab origins who were luckier than him 
with the voters, or less critical of their country of adoption.46 
The Arab-European League was still active by May 2008, mostly in 
Flanders. Its discourse hasn’t changed much from its days of glory (the 
latest item posted on the website was a call for demonstration “against the 
crimes of the Zionist entity”) but its presence in the media was severely 
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reduced and it has never tried to put forward candidates in elections since 
2004.  
The movement still represents a potential source of severe tension 
and violent conflict in Brussels and the North of the country, albeit less 
than it used to, but it seems to have lost a great deal of its credibility among 
the immigrant youth and to have become rather marginalised within the 
Belgian Muslim community.  
2.  Religious, non-political radicalisation  
Non-political religious radicalisation can be observed among Belgian 
Muslims both at an individual and at a collective level. By May 2008, a 
number of organised radical religious groups without known or openly 
expressed political ambitions were active in the country. We discuss below 
the more important and visible among them.  
It is, at this point, necessary to keep in mind that the existence of 
organised groups animated by and practising a ‘radical’ form of religion – 
one that totally or partially rejects the ways of society and proposes a 
conservative interpretation of sacred texts as absolute rules for everyday 
life – is a phenomenon as old as organised religion itself. Some of these 
groups have a ‘mystic’, monastic approach to their self-appointed mission 
(constantly praying for the salvation of humanity for example), and some 
other a militant one (proselytising the ‘infidels’ and calling upon the 
‘sinners’ to repent, in ways that vary, from preaching to coercion). Extreme 
militancy in a number of these groups leads to violent or even terrorist 
activities.  
It goes of course without saying that immigrants and their sons and 
daughters are far from being the only category of persons that could be 
tempted to join these groups. It is interesting to note in this context that 
converts, born to non-Muslim ‘autochthon’ parents, constitute a privileged 
target for some of the most militant among the radical Islamic religious 
groups in Belgium. It is a sad fact that the only Belgian Muslim who ever 
committed a suicide attack, Muriel Degauque (in Iraq in 2005), was a 
convert to Islam of Belgian origin.  
By May 2008, a highly diversified but not always inter-related 
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capital was home to approximately 39% of all Belgian ‘Muslims’, 70% of 
whom were of Moroccan origin.47 The community was geographically very 
concentrated (75% of its members were residing in 5 of the 19 
municipalities of the Brussels region) and well organised. One could 
observe that Muslims of Turkish origin have the tendency to more easily 
set up organisations than their co-religionists of Arab or Berber 
background.  
Milli Görüş 
Today a major, if not the major movement among religious-minded persons 
of Turkish origin in Western Europe, Milli constitutes a significant actor in 
Belgium’s Islamic scene. Even though the literal translation of its name, 
National Vision,48 bears no mention of Islam, the word Milli does in fact not 
refer to the Turkish nation but to the Qur’anic notion of ‘Millet’.49 
In Belgium, the organisation has never demonstrated political 
ambitions. Its actions evolve around strengthening and inspiring Islamic 
practices among families and youth. It also runs a number of educational 
institutions and boarding schools. Unlike official Turkish Islam, the Milli 
Göruş preaches what it considers to be a ‘filter-less religion’, 50 understood 
as a close following of the literal meaning of the sacred texts of Islam. It 
could be said in fact that it takes a rather holistic approach to religion and 
claims that Islam provides all necessary guiding principles for a Muslim’s 
(everyday) life. These ideas have given the organisation a political 
dimension in Turkey, where it has traditionally supported political parties 
sharing its vision.  
Despite its Turkish frame of reference, Milli Görüş does place 
religious identity higher than national affiliation and works for the 
dissemination of a traditionalist Islamic ideology in a European context. Its 
discourse and activities seem to progressively take into consideration the 
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structuration de l’associatif musulman à Bruxelles”, Brussels Studies, No. 4, 5 March 
2007, pp. 1-15.  
48 The name of the organisation refers to the title of a pamphlet published in 1973 
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need of the community’s full integration in Belgian society and it has 
recently began to propose Koranic courses in French and Dutch. 
Currently, the organisation has a significant number of adherents in 
the provinces of Limburg (Flanders), Hainaut (Wallonia) and in the 
Brussels-Capital region. They all operate under the name Belçika-Islam 
Federasyonu, the Islamic Federation of Belgium, established in 1986. It 
estimates that its members constitute up to 30% of all persons of Turkish 
origin living in Belgium, and attributes its influence to its operating of 
some 30 mosques.  
Süleymancilar 
Founded in Turkey during the 1940s by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, 
Süleymancilar began its activities in Western Europe in 1973. Its followers, 
the Süleymancis, attribute saintly powers to the founder and call 
themselves the ‘disciples of Süleyman’, being often accused of being 
heretics despite the fact that they claim not to constitute a sect.  
The movement is thought to be the first of its kind established among 
the Turkish immigrants living in Europe. An Islamic judge under the 
Ottoman Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan was disenchanted by the attitude of the 
secular Turkish Republic towards Islam. His (and the movement’s) 
activities have thus taken the form of opposition to the new regime, 
responsible for the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate, which Süleymancilar 
still strives to restore albeit by non-violent means. In Turkey, its Koranic 
schools oppose the official Imam-Hatip schools that are under the control 
of the secular authorities, and they are often identified with (right-wing) 
radical extremism.51 Notwithstanding that, the organisation has no 
(known) political activities or ambitions in Belgium. 
Today, Its members concentrate on changing secular practices among 
the society through the setting up of new mosques and education facilities, 
as well as through publications and lectures, notably in Antwerp, in 
Brussels and in the province of Limburg. The movement is in fact running 
approximately 13 Islamic cultural centres throughout Belgium, called 
Belçika Islam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği. Unlike Milli Görüş, it is very 
discreet when it comes to publicity and it does not seek many contacts with 
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other organisations or the political authorities. Hence, it is not considered 
to be a major actor in the national debates concerning Islam or the 
integration of Turkish immigrants in Belgian society.52 
Tablighi 
Jama’at al-Tabligh was founded by Mohamed Ilyas (1885-1944) in the first 
half of the 20th century in Northern India. The centre of the movement is 
located in Nizam ud-Din, in the vicinity of Delhi. 
This religious movement has at times been labelled as “Islam’s 
Jehovah’s Witnesses”, mainly because of its organisational structure and 
activities, which evolve around mobile Koranic schools (madrassa’s), door-
to door proselytising and continuously renewed preaching teams, formed 
by volunteers trained to reach even those parts of the population generally 
ignored by similar other groups.  
Peaceful behaviour constitutes a key notion for the Tablighi, since 
according to their founder a religious act can never result from coercion. As 
a consequence, the movement claims not to be interested in any quest for 
(political) power and its members observe strict neutrality towards political 
parties, viewing them as a cause of division among Muslims. Tablighis 
practice a radical form of Islam, studying the scripture and transmitting53 
the faith. They believe in a struggle to imitate the way of life of the prophet, 
with poverty, simple ways and a meticulous regulation of corporeal facts 
and gestures. The nucleus of the orga n i s a t i o n  i s  i n  f a c t  f o r m e d  b y  a  
relatively small number of such missionaries.  
In Belgium Tablighi is active within different mosques and non-
profit-making associations, the first and most central of which was 
established in 1975. Since the 1980s it has became more visible in all parts of 
Belgium and has obtained a legally recognised status.54 Because of their 
strong organisation, the movement has quickly managed to become the 
first effective and successful alternative for an ‘Islam of the people’ in the 
                                                      
52 Meryem Kanmaz, “Des organisations turques aux fédérations flamandes: 40 ans 
de vie associative en Flandre”, Nouvelle Tribune, No. 34, December 2003.  
53  Tablîgh (Arabic) can be translated as “transmission” or as “conveyance” and 
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country and by 1985 it was able to set up a Federation of Mosques and 
Cultural Islamic Organisations (Fédération des Mosquées et des 
Associations Culturelles et Islamiques de Belgique). This federation 
gradually evolved, cunningly using the attention of the media, into a very 
influential element within Belgian Islam. Since the 1990s, however, the 
movement appears to have lost some of its influence, notably amongst the 
younger generation.55 Most of its members today seem to be of Moroccan 
origin, although the organisation can still count on the loyalty of many well 
connected Pakistanis as well.  
Muslim Brotherhood 
The Jama’iyyat al-ikhwân al-muslimîn, very well known for its actions in 
the Middle East, is particularly active among Muslims of Arab origin in 
Belgium. Composed of a myriad of fractions, the ‘brothers’ are also divided 
between an Egyptian and a Syrian ‘obedience’. The organisation seems to 
raise members and sympathisers by proposing an authentic religious 
discourse that does not resent the reform of some of the most antiquated 
traditions and encourages the merging of the faithful within their host 
societies. Its activities in Belgium mainly evolve around preaching and 
education with an emphasis on the renewal of moral norms.  
Hizbullah 
The ‘party of God’ is also present in Belgium, albeit not significantly so. Its 
members seem to be working to raise funds to finance its Lebanese 
activities. It is mentioned here mainly because of its purely religious 
activities, which include preaching and dissemination of sermons. Even 
these endeavours however are most often framed within a discourse 
denouncing the Israeli occupation of Palestine,56 whilst issues proper to the 
Muslim community of Belgium do not seem to belong to its top priorities. It 
is interesting to mention that Hizbullah is one of the few Shiite 
organisations in the overwhelmingly Sunni landscape of Islamic 
movements in Europe.  
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Other Groups 
Belgian citizens or residents belonging to Sufi orders have organised 
themselves according to different traditions of Islamic mysticism. The most 
significant ones include the Naqshbandiyya (with different branches), the 
Barelwi (originating from the Indian peninsula), the Deobandi (reformist 
soufis focusing on traditional learning) and the Nurcu (attaching particular 
attention to personal devotion and the compatibility of Islamic revelation 
with discoveries in natural science). Very few Belgian Muslims (of Turkish 
origin concentrated mainly in Liège) are believed to be members of 
Kaplancilar,57 an Islamic movement outlawed in Germany. 
3.  National/Ethnic Tensions  
Our analysis of the landscape of the Belgian Muslim community could not 
be complete without the discussion of groups whose activities are related to 
the politics of the countries of origin of its members. Such groups are 
particularly present in the associative life of Turkish immigrants: It is 
believed in fact that the combination of interlinked dynamics such as 
economic exclusion due to rural origins, cultural and linguistic 
marginalisation and residential concentration made it possible for Turkish 
immigrants to keep very close links with their home country.58 
Indeed, for many among the Turkish community in Brussels, 
nationalism provides an overarching framework for self-definition. To 
quote a Belgian politician of Turkish descent, “regardless of their stance in 
the political spectrum, everyone is a bit of a nationalist here”.59 The results 
of a survey60 very recently conducted indicate in fact that 42% of Belgian-
Turks feel equally close to their country of residence and to that of origin. 
According to the same research, their close attachment to the home country 
does not seem to decrease according to the length of the period they have 
been residing abroad or according to their political affiliation. Thus, even 
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groups such as the Milli Görüş, which aim to address Belgian Muslims 
rather than Belgian Turks, would have had a hard time recruiting members 
if they’d dare to completely estrange themselves from the notion of 
Turkishness.  
Milli Görüş’ participation in the organisation of a demonstration 
entitled “Condemning the terror – Invitation to solidarity” can be seen as 
an acknowledgement of this fact. The event in question took place in 
Brussels on 3 November 2007, and its analysis is very helpful in 
understanding the current feelings within the Turkish community in 
Belgium. 
At the end of October 2007, the killing of 12 soldiers by PKK in an 
ambush in the Southeast of Turkey led to violent reactions throughout 
Europe. In Brussels, Turkish youngsters, mostly teenagers, demonstrated 
their anger in the streets of Schaarbeek – mainly along the Chaussée de 
Haecht which is heavily populated by Turkish immigrants. The protest 
degenerated into acts of vandalism (breaking the glass windows of cafés, 
throwing stones at the police, beating up journalists, etc.), widely attributed 
by the Belgian media to ultra-nationalist groups. Even though such groups 
were also to be blamed for the aggression, the media coverage of the events 
underestimated the complex nature of the youngsters’ behaviour.  
Of course, the deep-rooted rivalries between the Turkish and the 
Kurdish populations have played a significant role in the genesis of the 
violence and so have done the extreme-right wing organisations. It is not 
by coincidence that the Turkish youngsters attacked cafés and shops 
known to be owned by Kurds. These intolerable acts were indeed 
committed by a band of Turkish ultra-nationalists and a number of ill-
advised teenagers who received SMS and e-mails about the venue and time 
of the demonstration from sources they have refused to name. The Turkish 
associations of Brussels said to be unaware of the senders of these messages 
and claimed that they believed the manifestation to be spontaneous. Both 
the silence of the youngsters and their elders, and the fact that many 
inhabitants of the area have shown their sympathy to those arrested by 
driving around in cars bearing Grey Wolves stickers61 is an indicator of the 
vulnerability of the Turkish population in Schaarbeek to radical nationalist 
discourse.  
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But the youngsters who demonstrated against the PKK have been 
also particularly aggressive towards the Belgian police. Far from being 
impulsive behaviour, this reflects a wider frustration caused by their 
perception of the way the Belgian authorities dealt with the issue. Many 
Belgian Turks felt in fact that they had been unfairly treated and that their 
grief had not been respected, an impression shared and spread by the 
major community organisations. Moreover, several Turkish-speaking 
media have accused Belgium of being tolerant towards the activities of 
organisations considered to be terroristic in Turkey.62 The escape of Fehriye 
Erdal, from the hands of the Belgian justice whilst she was wanted for 
murder in Turkey, has contributed to this feeling.  
One of the reasons many within the Turkish community are eager to 
condone nationalistic discourse is their economic and educational situation, 
which seems to be worse than that of other immigrant groups.63 Coupled 
with the Belgian Turks’ tendency to concentrate their residencies,64 this 
situation provides the perfect ground for nationalist discourses to flourish. 
Hence, a triggering event such as the killing of soldiers in the Southeast of 
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Turkey, combined with a provocation orchestrated by the ultra-nationalist 
groups, is sufficient to provoke serious tensions. Failing to understand the 
complexity of these sociological dynamics could largely undermine the 
effectiveness of policies aiming at addressing the issues creating them and 
their (more visible) effects.  
Tensions between a big part of the Belgian Turkish community and 
the Turkish authorities in Belgium should be also taken into consideration 
in the analysis of the November 2007 events. Many have in fact criticised 
the Turkish embassy for downplaying their national sensitivities. At the 
same time, the embassy’s failure to address in a sensitive manner the 
community’s feelings has facilitated the stirring up of these feelings by the 
ultra-nationalists, leading eventually to the violent demonstrations.65 
Criticism has also been addressed to Belgian politicians of Turkish descent. 
Instead of intervening in order to calm feelings, a number of them have 
allegedly tried to increase their popularity by using a ‘double discourse’, 
including statements such as “We are all soldiers”.66  
We have tried to demonstrate that radical nationalistic groups are not 
solely responsible for the violence and conflict within Belgium’s Turkish 
community. In the sections that follow we discuss a number of movements 
that exalt ethnic identity among Belgians of immigrant origin and that 
might become a source of serious tensions in the years to come.  
Grey Wolves 
Although its formal name in Turkish is Ülkücüler, the youth organisation 
of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) is better known as the 
‘Grey Wolves’, a reference to a Turkic legend in which a female wolf is 
believed to have fed a wounded boy and to have helped him reproduce a 
new generation of Turks. 
The Ülkücü ideology puts accent on Turkish history insisting on its 
glorious days and exploiting events such as the establishment of the first 
Turkish States in Central Asia, almost tracing a ‘Turkish race’.67 At the 
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same time, its conception of the Turkish nation is blended with Islam. The 
principle of what they consider to be the synthesis of Turkishness and 
Islam is very dominant in their rhetoric and activities. Mottos like “Your 
doctor will be a Turk and your medicine will be Islam” reflect their feelings 
on the issue. The Wolves are also characterised by a strong emphasis on 
leadership and hierarchical, military-like organisation. 
In Belgium, the largest among the organisations considered to be 
affiliated with or sympathetic to the Wolves is the Belçika Türk 
Federasyonu (BTF). BTF came under considerable criticism during the 2006 
regional and local elections when mainstream parties such as the Parti 
Socialiste (PS) and the Centre Démocrate Humaniste (CDH) chose to 
include BTF members or sympathisers on their lists of candidates and were 
thus accused by Belgian media at belonging to a fascist ultra-nationalistic 
movement.68 In fact, some of these candidates have regularly attended 
organised events of a nationalistic character, such as the ceremony to 
commemorate the death of the “Great Turkish Idealist leader”69 Alparslan 
Türkeş, founder of the Nationalist Movement Party in Turkey.  
The official aim of the Grey Wolves in Belgium is to foster loyalty 
among young people of Turkish origin to their ancestral culture, religion 
and history and to keep alive the Turkish identity in Europe.70 BTF claims 
to oppose not the integration of Belgian-Turks into their host society but 
rather their assimilation by it. Most of its activities seem to be centred on 
issues relevant to Turkish national sensitivities. It has a strong stance 
towards the Armenian genocide controversy and the Kurdish question and 
its demonstrations, such as, for example the one against the erection of an 
Armenian monument in Brussels, have often led to violence and/or 
tensions between members of different communities.  
                                                      
68 To read a few press articles, see http://archive.indymedia.be/news/2003/07/ 
70265.html,  http://www.lesoir.be/regions/bruxelles/2006/08/25/article_van_ 
gorp_chez_l_extreme_droite_turque.shtml 
69 Our translation from the speech of the President of the BTF. 
70 Emre Arslan, “Turkish Ultra-nationalism in Germany: Its Transnational 
Dimension”, in Thomas Faist and Eyüp Özveren (eds), Transnational Social Spaces: 
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Kurdish Institute of Brussels 
The association was established in 1978 in order to raise awareness of the 
Kurdish cause and to help the integration process of Kurdish immigrants. 
Its activities have always been in line with this double objective. The 
institute organises many cultural events such as concerts and folkloric 
dance shows in order to better acquaint Belgian society with Kurdish 
civilisation. Largely dominated by Turkish Kurds, it also assists the 
immigrants by offering French, Dutch and Kurdish language courses. In 
parallel to these activities, the Kurdish Institute has a very explicit political 
agenda, served by other actions, such as press conferences or 
demonstrations, designed to draw attention to violations of human rights 
in Turkey and the precarious situation of the Kurdish people in the 
Southeast of the Republic. These actions are sometimes organised jointly 
with other associations of immigrant groups with issues against past and 
present Turkish policies, such as its stance vis-à-vis the Armenians. 
Belgium also hosts other Kurdish organisations active in promoting 
the Kurdish national cause, such as the Kurdish Cultural Centre or the 
Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe. At the time of 
publication, the latter was pursuing a campaign to prevent Europeans from 
going to Turkey for holidays arguing that their money would be financing 
the war against Kurds. The campaign in question is an example of how 
issues relating to the homeland politics can cause tension in the host 
country. 
All these organisations are looked upon with suspicion by Belgium’s 
Turkish associations. The latter believe them to be supporters or 
sympathisers of the PKK, and demand that they denounce it as a terrorist 
organisation before entering into dialogue with them.71 The Kurdish 
organisations refrain from condemning PKK’s acts but they often underline 
that their problem is not with the Turkish people as such but with the 
politics of Turkey.72 Thus, for the time being a constructive dialogue 
between the two communities seems rather unlikely. This lack of 
                                                      
71 As remarked in interviews with representatives of local Turkish associations and 
the comments by the secretary-general of the EYAD in a broadcasted debate on 
Télé-Bruxelles on 4 November 2007, following the violent events.  
72 As stated by the representative of the Kurdish Cultural Centre in a Broadcasted 
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communication is further accelerated by physical separation. While Belgian 
Turks predominantly live and socialise in Schaarbeek, Kurds reside in the 
neighbourhood of Saint Josse.  
Conclusions 
Our research and interviews suggest that the majority of Muslim Belgians 
seem to have embraced the spirit of compromise and moderation prevalent 
in the country’s political scene. Despite the presence of several radical 
movements within its borders, Belgium in fact was largely spared the very 
serious violence and conflict that were recently experienced by some of the 
neighbouring countries with large populations of Islamic cultural 
backgrounds.  
Nevertheless, a number of the groups and movements discussed 
have indeed represented a challenge to the peaceful co-existence between 
Belgian society’s cultural components and the attempt to create a 
distinctively Belgian Islam is far from bearing fruit. 
One of the most important conclusions to draw from this brief study 
is the considerable antithesis between the visibility and mediatisation of 
radical movements and the very poor results they have obtained every time 
they have tried to transform their alleged popularity into electoral gains. It 
seems to us in fact that the attention often given by the media to such 
movements is attributable more to a quest for the dramatic and sensational 
than to a genuine wish to raise awareness about the different tendencies 
within Belgium’s relatively large Muslim community.  
Even the most radical organisations in the country’s Muslim 
community have never really been the cause of an incident more serious 
than the usual tensions one witnesses at the end of football competitions 
between long-standing rivals. At the same time, however, an important 
number of initiatives and activities launched and carried out by other 
groups originating from the same community but striving for much less 
provocative or spectacular effects are barely mentioned, with the excuse 
that they concern only a minority of Belgian Muslims. It is our belief 
however, that electoral results are a very reliable test of real popularity and 
one that none of the radical groups that often occupy the national and 
regional television channels or newspaper front pages has managed to 
pass.  
Many Belgian citizens of Islamic cultural background in fact deeply 
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wholeheartedly condemn all criminal acts. These citizens appreciate what 
they experience as being the benefits of living in Belgium (freedom of 
religion, freedom of speech,…). And unfortunately, these citizens are the 
first victims of the stigmatisation of “the Muslims in Belgium” or the 
“Moroccans/Turks in Belgium”, as a consequence of unfounded 
generalisations, or manipulation of public opinion by extreme right-wing 
political parties, such as the Vlaams Belang.  
As is well known, religion can be both a personal ‘mystical’ 
experience and a collective one. In Belgium, as in several other countries, 
many youngsters born to immigrant parents (and not only) feel alienated 
by both the cultural values of their families and those of the society 
surrounding them. In search of stronger beliefs that could provide them 
with a feeling of belonging, these youngsters are often tempted by radical 
groups, where such a feeling is particularly stressed. Inside such groups 
their energy is channelled into activities designed to make them feel 
accepted, important and even self-righteous, when many among their 
‘autochthon’ compatriots are quick to collectively hold them responsible for 
anti-social behaviour or an alleged rise of criminality.73 At the same time, 
membership/participation in such movements offers them the opportunity 
to express their discontentment, in a way that is ‘dignified’ by the prestige 
of a great religious/cultural tradition, with what they perceive as being 
unfair treatment by Belgian authorities and society as well as with their 
own parents’ attitude towards them (and towards life in general). This is 
not an unavoidable or irreversible process, however, and it is important to 
keep in mind, as we have already discussed elsewhere,74 that, far from 
being static, identity is a dynamic process, a conception that is lived and 
experienced day by day in an ever-changing/evolving society and 
throughout life. As such, identity has by definition a changing nature. It is 
something that can be easily claimed but cannot be authoritatively 
attributed.  
                                                      
73 On this topic, see Ed Husain, The Islamist: Why I joined radical Islam in Britain, what 
I saw inside and why I left, London: Penguin Books, 2007. 
74 See Theodoros Koutroubas and Ward Vloeberghs, “De l’identité imputée: à 
propos de l’islam comme appartenance ethnique”, La Revue Générale, February 
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In a multicultural society such as ours the risk of micro conflicts is 
always present and in fact unavoidable. The realities we have analysed can 
easily lead us to predict that issues such as evolution of the political 
situation in Iraq and the related reaction of Turkey is likely to create 
tensions between the Turkish and Kurdish communities living in Belgium. 
Likewise, the liberation of Palestine will continue to be a major issue of 
mobilisation and tension for Belgian residents with Arab sensibilities and 
groups such as the ones we have observed will certainly try to capitalise on 
the unrest. And of course, xenophobic and fear-mongering parties in both 
the North and the South of the country are likely to use tensions (or an 
eventual terrorist attack) as grounds for promoting their own agendas. 
On the whole, however, Belgium’s Muslims are likely to remain no 
more radicalised than their Christian or their Jewish compatriots. At a time 
when religious radicalisation has become almost synonymous with Islamic 
radicalisation, it is important to remember that the need for political parties 
that express religious concerns or are inspired by a faith-based world view 
is present in all communities and is not likely to disappear as long as there 
are persons who place faith high among their priorities. As for political 
radicalisation, the phenomenon does occur in Belgium in many contexts, 
and unfortunately no faith, language, culture or any other element-based 
community is immune.75 
Can we say that everything is ok then? No, it is not. Youngsters of 
immigrant origin, who feel excluded from both their parents’ culture and 
their autochthon compatriots’ world, constitute a huge potential source of 
tension and an easy prey for radical groups. There are many of them in 
Belgium, but fortunately they are not yet lost to our society.  
                                                      
75 As witness to this statement, a book published in Brussels by the city’s Dutch-
speaking free university in 2001 discusses the rise and fall of radicalisation in 
Belgium (seen as leftist – liberal thought) without even mentioning Islam as a 
relevant issue. See Johan Basiliades, “De lotgevallen van het radicalisme in België. 
Het ontstaan, de opkomst en de ondergang van een negentiende-eeuwse links-
liberale stroming”, in Sven Gatz and Patrick Stouthuysen (eds), Een vierde weg? 
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5.  MUSLIMS IN THE NETHERLANDS: 
TENSIONS AND VIOLENT CONFLICT 
TINKA VELDHUIS & EDWIN BAKKER 
he release of the anti-Islam movie “Fitna” by the Dutch Member of 
Parliament Geert Wilders, early 2008, aroused anxious fears of angry 
responses by Muslims communities. As happened in the Danish 
cartoon crisis, people expected the movie to trigger violent demonstrations, 
boycotts, the burning of flags and other aggressive responses by Muslim 
communities, both in the Netherlands and around the world. Months prior 
to the actual release of the movie, the Dutch prime minister already spoke 
of a crisis, predicting violent confrontations between Muslims and non-
Muslims, and devastating consequences for Muslim integration in Dutch 
society.  
Contrary to the wide anticipation that Muslims would respond 
violently to the movie, there were few incidents. In the Netherlands, there 
were no noticeable incidents at all. Eloquent young Muslims stepped 
forward as representatives for their communities and of Islam, explicitly 
distancing themselves from radical or violent action by Muslims in answer 
to the film. Likewise, orthodox Muslims made strong pleas to react in a 
non-violent and dignified way to “Fitna”. Outside the Netherlands, there 
were only a few incidents, like the attack on a Dutch consulate in Indonesia 
by a group of students and the expected burning of the Dutch flag in 
countries like Afghanistan.  
Nevertheless, the Dutch fear of violence involving Muslims typifies 
the implicit association that people easily seem to make between Muslims 
and violence. Almost irrespective of the actual level of violent incidents, 
Muslims seem to project an image of responding violently to every political 
incident. How did this image come into being? In the Netherlands, what 
types of incidents and developments have occurred that led to potentially 
violent tensions and conflicts in which Muslims were involved?  
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This chapter seeks to answer this question. For that purpose, it first 
elaborates on radicalisation and on tensions and violent conflicts, both 
within and between social groups, and on the underlying mechanisms that 
are responsible for causing inter-group conflicts. Thereafter, we give an 
overview of radicalisation and tensions and violent conflicts involving 
(elements of) Muslim communities in the Netherlands. We focus on three 
different categories of events: Muslims ‘attacking’ non-Muslims, non-
Muslims ‘attacking’ Muslims and confrontations between or within Muslim 
communities. In the concluding part, we elaborate on global trends 
regarding the peaceful or not-so-peaceful co-existence of different social 
groups and focus on the current situation in the Netherlands. 
1.  Tensions, conflicts and radicalisation  
Essentially, we are interested in types of incidents and developments that 
have or may have posed a threat to a) the democratic order, b) society at 
large or c) that have or may have otherwise undermined integration of 
minorities or relations between and within social groups in the 
Netherlands. That is, the focus lies on violent incidents, or incidents that 
may potentially have led to violent outcomes.  
For example, in October 2007, Bilal Bajaka, a young Dutch Muslim 
from Moroccan descent, entered a police station in Amsterdam, pulled a 
knife and stabbed two police officers. In self-defence, one of the officers 
shot the man who died on the spot. Immediately, the incident prompted 
questions about the perpetrator's motivations. Was Bajaka a radical 
Islamist, inspired by fundamentalist ideologies and beliefs that instructed 
him to attack any representation of the Dutch state? Was this an act of 
terrorism or was the perpetrator simply a criminal whose acts were not 
religiously or politically charged? It was rapidly publicised that Bajaka was 
probably not radicalised; apparently, he was a suicidal schizophrenic who 
had just left a psychiatric clinic where he had been treated for mental 
problems. Nevertheless, especially after it turned out that in 2005, Bajaka 
had had loose contacts with some of the members of the Hofstadgroep – 
the radical network that included the murderer of filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh – the media started speculating about whether Bajaka was a radical 
Islamist and whether the Netherlands was the target of a terrorist attack. 
Although the Bajaka case was unrelated to radicalisation or terrorism, the 
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neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and fuelled tensions between Muslim and 
the non-Muslim communities in the Netherlands. 
The foregoing example illustrates the implicit association that is often 
made between incidents involving Muslims and radicalisation, although 
this link is often not justified. Particularly after the assassination of Theo 
van Gogh, who was murdered by a radical Islamist named Mohammed 
Bouyeri, radicalisation of Muslim youth received extensive attention by 
Dutch media, policy-makers, politicians and academics. Radicalisation is 
only one manifestation of intergroup conflicts, however, and in contrast to 
what often seems to be popular belief, most Muslim-involving tensions and 
conflicts are not associated with radicalisation. In fact, radicalisation of 
Muslims is a very rare phenomenon. In comparison with other European 
countries, the Netherlands is home to a relatively large Muslim community: 
according to the latest estimations, over 857,000 Muslims live in the 
Netherlands, comprising approximately 5% of the total population.1 
According to the Dutch Minister of Integration, between 20,000 and 30,000 
of them are potentially attracted to Salafi ideologies, and yet another 2,500 
might be susceptible to violent radicalisation.2 The latter figure represents 
only a mere 0.3 percent of the total Muslim population. Although 
radicalisation of Muslims can have profound societal consequences, it is 
quite rare.  
1.1  Defining radicalisation 
What is radicalisation exactly? Despite the increased scientific attention to 
radicalisation and its causes and consequences, scholars have not yet 
developed a generally accepted definition. Nevertheless, faced with 
pressure to tackle radicalisation, policy-makers have developed a few 
definitions. In particular, the European Commission came up with a clear 
and frequently applied definition of violent radicalisation: “The 
phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views, and ideas which could 
                                                      
1 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2007), “Naar een nieuwe schatting van het 
aantal islamieten in Nederland” (Towards a new estimate of the number of 
islamists in the Netherlands), CBS (http://www.cbs.nl). 
2 R. Kloor (2007), Radicale Islamstroming Islamisme Rukt Op (Radical Islam 
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lead to acts of terrorism”.3  This definition accounts for a few distinct 
features of radicalisation that illustrate the differences with other types of 
tensions and conflicts.  
Primarily, although it can occur very rapidly, radicalisation is a 
gradual process that has no strictly specified beginning or end. It is a two-
fold process including a shift in thinking towards fundamentalism and a 
heightened readiness to act on behalf of a cause. Secondly, its gradual 
nature indicates that in most cases, the direct causes or triggers of 
radicalisation are unclear and can even be unknown to the radicalising 
person. Rather, radicalisation is the product of a combination of causal 
factors that interact and that is unique for every individual.4 People are 
drawn to radical movements or ideologies for different reasons, of which 
some are more conscious than others. Whereas some are primarily inspired 
by ideological or political motivations, others might simply be attracted by 
action and adventure or seek group membership to obtain a positive 
identity. Even more so, radicalisation can occur beyond the consciousness 
of the relevant person, who might not be aware that he or she is in a 
process of radicalisation.  
Again, the Bajaka case, which was unrelated to radicalisation but 
triggered violent behaviour by young Muslims in Amsterdam, illustrates 
how radicalisation is only one factor in the emergence of tensions and 
conflicts involving Muslims. Therefore, the present study aims to widen the 
scope and focuses on a broad spectrum of incidents and developments that, 
over the last three decades, have led to tensions and conflicts, including 
cases of radicalisation, in which elements of the Muslim community have 
been involved. In doing so, however, one essential question deserves 
further exploration. How do tensions and conflicts between social groups 
emerge and under what circumstances are they likely to be sustained and 
result in violent outcomes? 
                                                      
3 European Commission (2006), Terrorist recruitment: Commission 
Communication addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation, 
MEMO/05/329. 
4 T.M. Veldhuis and E. Bakker (2007), “Causale factoren van radicalisering en hun 
onderlinge samenhang” (Causal factors of radicalisering and their mutual 
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1.2  Inter-group tensions and violent conflicts 
The first academic notions on the origins of inter-group tensions and 
conflicts date back several decades. Initially, the main premise was that 
realistic competition between groups leads to favouritism of the own group 
(in-group) and hostility towards other groups (out-groups).5 Since that 
time, however, our understanding of the wellspring of inter-group conflicts 
has grown considerably sophisticated. Decades of empirical investigations 
of the roots of inter-group conflict have reached the conclusion that, 
irrespective of the presence of competition or conflicting group interests, 
the mere act of categorising individuals into groups can generate tensions 
and conflicts between groups.6 According to social identity approaches and 
self-categorisation theories,7 people define themselves not so much in terms 
of self, but rather in terms of group membership. People are driven by a 
powerful need to belong,8 and simply categorising people based on 
random, meaningless associations like colour preference or even by the flip 
of a coin, can trigger the sense of belongingness in people. To feel good 
about themselves, people thus need to feel good about the group and seek 
collective self-esteem.9 In doing so, people make biased judgments. For 
                                                      
5 See for example, M. Sherif and C.W. Sherif (1953), “Groups in harmony and 
tension”, New York, NY: Harper & Row; M. Sherif (1966), In common predicament: 
Social psychology of intergroup conflict and cooperation, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 
6 E.g. H. Tajfel (1970), “Experiments in inter-group discrimination”, Scientific 
American, 223, pp. 96-102; Tajfel and Turner, 1989. 
7 H. Tajfel and J.C. Turner (1979), “An integrative theory of intergroup conflict”, in 
W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The social psychology of intergroup relations, 
Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole, pp. 33–47; N. Ellemers, R. Spears and B. Doosje (2002), 
“Self and Social Identity”, Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 53, pp. 161-186; J.C. 
Turner (1982), “Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group”, in H. Tajfel 
(ed.),  Social identity and intergroup relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 15-40; J.C. Turner (1984), “Social identification and psychological group 
formation”, in H. Tajfel (ed.), The social dimension: European developments in social 
psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 518–538. 
8 R.F. Baumeister and M.R. Leary (1995), “The need to belong: Desire for 
interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation”, Psychological 
Bulletin, Vol. 117, No. 3, pp. 497-529. 
9 J. Crocker and R. Luhtanen (1990), “Collective self-esteem and ingroup bias”, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, pp. 60-67. 86 | VELDHUIS & BAKKER 
 
example, they tend to attribute superiority to the in-group over out-groups 
and derogate other groups and their characteristics as inferior. In addition, 
they tend to believe that whereas the in-group is heterogeneous, members 
of the out-group are all similar to one another10 and very different from 
members of the in-group.11 Hence, the mere perception that one belongs to 
a social group can be sufficient to activate stereotypes and discrimination of 
out-groups and can eventually result in violence between groups.  
Having said this, two important implications become clear if we look 
at how conflicts involving Muslims can emerge. First, an identity crisis can 
have profound consequences for people’s well-being and behaviour. An 
identity crisis can arise under various circumstances, for example, when the 
group we wish to affiliate with rejects us or when we are unsure which 
group we identify with. Scholars often suggest that many young, second-
generation Muslims in the West face an identity crisis.12 On the one hand, 
they face a generational conflict with their parents. On the other, they do 
not feel fully accepted by Dutch society. Buijs and his colleagues,13 for 
example, suggest that Moroccan youngsters in the Netherlands feel 
alienated from both their parents and Dutch society and have a hybrid-
identity that is not recognised and accepted by their direct environment. 
Consequently, they find a satisfactory identity in the Ummah that connects 
them with other Muslims and for which nationality, be it Moroccan or 
Dutch, becomes irrelevant.  
                                                      
10 P.W. Linville and E.E. Jones (1980), “Polarised appraisals of out-group member”, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, pp. 689-703; P.W. Linville, G.W. 
Fischer and P. Salovey (1989), “Perceived distributions of the characteristics of 
ingroup and outgroup members”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, pp. 
165-188. 
11 T.F. Pettigrew (1997), “The affective component of prejudice: Empirical support 
for the new view”, in S.A. Tuch and J.K. Martin (eds), Racial attitudes in the 1990s: 
Continuity and change, Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 76-90. 
12 T. Choudhury (2007), The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (A Study in 
Progress), London: Department for Communities and Local Government; S. Malik 
(2007), “My brother the bomber”, Prospect Magazine, 31 May.  
13 F.J. Buijs, F. Demant and A. Hamdy (2006), Strijders van eigen bodem. Radicale en 
democratische moslims in Nederland (Worriers of own soil. Radical and democratic 
Muslims in the Netherlands), Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. MUSLIMS IN THE NETHERLANDS | 87 
 
Second, once people have categorised themselves into a social group 
and this group has become an important part of their social identity, issues 
that concern the group also concern the individual. This implies that 
members of a group will perceive and treat a threat to the group as a 
personal threat.14 Given that Muslims perceived the anti-Islam film “Fitna” 
as an illegitimate assault on Islam, the release of the movie definitely had 
the potential to result in violent outcomes. Indeed, prior to the release of 
“Fitna” the public, the media and even the government suspiciously eyed 
the Muslim community in anxious anticipation of violent responses. 
Fortunately, violent manifestations remained absent but the release 
illustrates how incidents that prompt a sense of being threatened among 
Muslims can easily erupt in violent outbursts or otherwise negatively affect 
inter-group relations with Muslim communities.  
2.  Radicalisation and organised groups  
In the Netherlands of today, Muslim communities are – rightly or wrongly 
– associated with tensions, violence and radicalisation. It should be stressed 
that this is a rather new perception. In the past Muslims were at first 
associated with work many Dutch no longer wanted to do. During the 
1960s and 1970s, the larger Dutch companies recruited a considerable 
number of so-called ‘guest workers’ from Turkey and Morocco. 
Additionally, refugees and immigrants from former colonies like the 
Antilles, Suriname and Indonesia were arriving in substantial numbers and 
creating large communities of immigrants in the Netherlands. Initially, 
guest workers were encouraged to return home as soon as the Dutch labour 
market no longer required their services, but most did not. On the contrary, 
a process of family reunification took place, bringing thousands of new 
immigrants, mainly women and children. Since the early 1980s, sizable 
communities emerged from Morocco, Turkey, and Suriname, mainly 
concentrated in the larger cities and industrial areas. During this period, 
the Netherlands experienced its first encounters with radical Islam and 
tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. Naturally, the societal 
                                                      
14 See e.g. E.R. Smith (1993), “Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward new 
conceptualisations of prejudice”, in D.M. Mackie and D.L. Hamilton (eds), Affect, 
cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception, Oxford: Blackwell, 
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context as it is today is a product of developments and incidents that 
occurred over decades. In other words, in order to understand the 
contemporary relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in the 
Netherlands, it is essential to take into account the historical context in 
which these relationships developed. For that reason, we include incidents 
of tensions and conflicts involving Muslims in the Netherlands that 
occurred within a time span of approximately three decades; from the 
1980s until today. First, however, we discuss the rise and increase of 
radicalisation in Muslim communities. 
2.1  Radicalisation in practice 
Radicalisation among Muslims in the Netherlands is not a post-9/11 
phenomenon. However, since the attacks on the United States in 2001, this 
process and in particular radical Islamism has been generally regarded as a 
threat to the state, Dutch society and Muslim immigrant communities in 
general. This feeling was intensified by a series of terrorist incidents and 
numerous scandals in the Netherlands that revealed extremist, 
discriminatory and illegal practices by a number of radical Islamist groups 
and institutions.  
The first signs of radicalisation date back to the 1980s, when 
individuals and groups started to organise themselves around issues such 
the start of the first Palestinian intifada in 1987, and the row over Salman 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988. The demonstrations related to these events 
alarmed the Dutch Minister of the Interior, who was aware that these 
incidents could lead to increasing tensions in the Netherlands with regard 
to Islamism. 
Following the Rushdie affair, fears regarding the influence of radical 
Islamism within Muslim communities increased. This concern led to 
publication of the first public reports on radical Islamist groups’ activities, 
produced by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (then 
known simply as the Security Service). In 1991, the Service revealed the 
existence of small groups of militant fundamentalists and expressed 
concern regarding their consequences for the integration of Muslims into 
mainstream society; the Service indicated the possibility that these militants 
might offer their services to foreign powers or that these countries were 
already directing them. 
Partly based on the idea that the existence of such groups could 
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asked to investigate this potential threat. Their classified study, whose 
main conclusions were made public in 1994, found that radical Islamists 
had indeed attempted to impede this process but had not been very 
successful in their endeavour. Furthermore, it concluded that very few 
Muslims wanted to challenge existing social structures in the Netherlands. 
In its 1995 annual report, the Service reaffirmed the idea that the 
threat of radical Islamism was rather limited. It stated that there was no 
real threat from Islamic society in the Netherlands. However, it noted 
serious prejudices toward Islam that had a negative impact on the 
integration of Muslims into mainstream society. Various terrorist attacks by 
Islamists – including those in France (attacks by the Algerian Groupe 
Islamique Armé), Israel (suicide attacks on buses in Jerusalem) and the 
United States (the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center) – were among 
the factors leading to such negative stereotypes. 
After 1995, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Services 
abandoned the idea that the threat posed by radical Islamism was 
insignificant. From 1996 onwards, all public documents on this issue 
repeated warnings about the potential danger. Moreover, the 1996 annual 
report spoke for the first time of information on possible attacks in the 
Netherlands, by Hizballah, which had been investigated by the Service. 
In response to the increase in Islamist terrorist activities worldwide as 
well as growing concern over domestic developments, in 1998 the Service 
published a report on political Islam in the Netherlands. It described the 
various political organisations based on Islam. Most of them, in one way or 
another, rejected Western society and the integration of Muslims into that 
society. Yet the report revealed that only small groups of Muslims had 
radical opinions and were prepared to pursue their ideal of an Islamic state 
or world order through violent means. With regard to mosques, the report 
depicted them as political arenas in which many different political actors 
operated. The main political issues were integration and education. Some 
of the actors were supported or influenced by foreign powers, with Iran, 
Libya and Saudi Arabia being mentioned as examples. In addition, the 
governments of some of the mother countries of Muslim migrants were 
known to be interfering in the political-religious lives of their (former) 
nationals in the Netherlands – something particularly evident in the cases 
of Morocco and Turkey.  
The interference of external forces was also apparent in the field of 
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the Islamic Call Society), was involved in the establishment of an Islamic 
university in Rotterdam. The same holds for the Turkish government’s 
Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet Iserli Baskanligi).  
Concerning political-religious organisations, the report showed that 
most were established on a national basis. Their focus of interest mainly 
pertained to their countries of origin and not the fate of the Muslims in the 
West. However, they did try to gain support from this Diaspora by way of 
taking a strong anti-Western, anti-integration and isolationist position. 
Although anti-Western feelings and resistance to integration were 
relatively widespread, the Service concluded that political Islam played a 
minor role within Muslim communities. Moreover, it did not anticipate 
that the more radical variants of political Islamism in the Netherlands 
would gain in power and size. However, it did warn that ongoing 
marginalisation of Muslim immigrants would possibly pose a long-term 
threat with regard to the growth of radical groups. Ideological polarisation 
between Muslims and their surrounding society was considered a likely 
consequence, which could possibly lead to a negative impact on the 
integration process, as well as undermine the peaceful and democratic 
coexistence of different cultures in the Netherlands.  
By the end of the 1990s, the threat of radical Islamism in the 
Netherlands was still more or less a distant one. Threat perceptions were 
dominated by events taking place both outside the Netherlands and even 
beyond Europe. Moreover, on its territory, the main players were ‘foreign’ 
in the sense that the groups mainly consisted of foreign nationals who 
predominantly focused on their mother countries without receiving active 
support within the local Muslim communities. Nonetheless, the diversity of 
these groups continued to grow. 
One of the leading causes of this growth was the increase in both 
legal and illegal immigrants with an Islamist background, including 
asylum seekers from Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Egypt, Iraq and Syria. In 
the Netherlands, these individuals established political-religious 
organisations that were strongly oriented towards their mother countries. 
Examples include fundraising organisations for the Palestinians, Bosnia, 
Chechnya, Afghanistan and Algeria; some of these groups emphasised 
both ties to their mother countries and a strong rejection of the Western 
society in which they lived.  
After the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the idea 
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considering them a Trojan horse or a fifth column – was gaining ground. 
This perception was bolstered by reports about the deaths at the hands of 
Indian security forces in Kashmir of two Dutch citizens of Moroccan 
descent who were believed to be jihadists. The boys who died in December 
2001 shortly after their arrival in the troubled Indian territory were 
associated with one of the most radical mosques in the Netherlands, the Al-
Fourqaan mosque in the city of Eindhoven. 
These incidents also worried many politicians and policy-makers, 
leading them to request information about the extent and nature of Islamist 
terrorism in the Netherlands from the Dutch General Intelligence and 
Security Services. In a report published in March 2004, the Service 
estimated the numerical strength of radical Islamists to be between 100 and 
200 activists. According to the General Intelligence and Security Services, 
this group included so-called ‘veterans’ from Afghanistan and Chechnya, 
who played an important role in the conversion of young Muslims into 
potential jihadists. Moreover, the Service contended that there were several 
dozen young Muslims preparing for jihad. This jihad includes both conflict 
areas in the Muslim world and potential targets in Europe.  
Furthermore, the role of these ‘veterans’ is not the decisive factor in 
the development of new recruits. Indeed, internal dynamics within groups 
of radical young Islamists play an important developmental role as well. 
This was observed through intensive Internet discussions among young 
Muslims on the developing patterns of strife in arenas of conflict such as 
Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, which resulted in the development of 
increasingly radical opinions. Additionally, anti-Muslim feelings – brought 
on by incidents in the Netherlands as well as the Madrid bombings and 
other Islamist terrorist attacks abroad – also contributed to this 
radicalisation. Consequently, a number of these Muslim youths developed 
an exceedingly hostile attitude towards the Dutch state and society to the 
extent that these youngsters, predominantly of Moroccan descent, 
developed views so extreme as to embrace the use of violence. In 
November 2004, one of them, Mohammed Bouyeri, killed Dutch filmmaker 
Theo van Gogh. This young Moroccan, born and raised in Amsterdam, was 
a member of the Hofstadgroep, a loose-knit radical Islamist group of 
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2.2  Radical groups 
The Hofstadgroep is probably the most extreme and infamous radical 
Muslim organisation in the Netherlands. There are, however, quite a 
number of other organisations that can be regarded as radical Muslim 
organisations. These include political groups, religious groups and all 
kinds of mixes between these two categories. Below is a list of the most 
important formal organisations and informal groups – in alphabetical 
order. It should be stressed that a number of these organisations do not 
consider themselves as radical. Nonetheless, they are generally considered 
as such by the authorities or scholars. 
Al-Jama'a al-Islamia (AJAI) 
Al-Jama'a al-Islamia, or the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, is an Islamist group 
active since the late 1970s, with origins in the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
organisation’s primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian government and 
replace it with an Islamic state. The organisation is responsible for several 
terrorist attacks against high-level Egyptian government personnel and 
official US and Egyptian facilities. A few key members of AJAI live in the 
Netherlands, among them Usama Rushdie Ali Kalifa (who lived there until 
2003). 
Arab European League (AEL) 
The Arab European League is a pan-Arabist political and social movement 
that is active in Belgium and the Netherlands. The AEL was founded and is 
led by Dyab Abou Jahjah, a Lebanese-born Shiá Muslim who emigrated 
from Lebanon in 1991 to study political science in Belgium. The 
organisation strives to develop an Arab Muslim communalist movement in 
Europe. Particularly in Belgium, mainstream political parties sharply 
attacked the AEL for anti-integrative ideas, alleged anti-Semitism and for 
disturbing the social peace. In 2002, its leader was arrested and detained for 
several days after he allegedly organised riots and called for violence (see 
chapter on Belgium). In the Netherlands, the AEL was never associated 
with violence. Nonetheless, the organisation was under observation of the 
Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD).  
Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) 
The Armed Islamic Group is a militant Islamist organisation with the 
declared aim of overthrowing the Algerian government and replacing it 
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Algerian military government voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation 
Front in the first round of legislative elections held in December 1991. It 
conducted a violent campaign of civilian massacres in Algeria. The GIA has 
also established a presence in Europe. In France, it was responsible for 
several terrorist attacks, and some of its members who were wanted by 
French authorities reportedly are hiding in the Netherlands.  
Hamas/al-Aqsa Foundation 
Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian Sunni Islamist 
organisation. At the beginning of the first intifada in 1987, Hamas was 
established by Shaikh Ahmad Yassin of the Gaza wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The European Union lists it as a terrorist organisation. About 
a dozen individuals of Palestinian descent are actively involved in Hamas 
in the Netherlands, receiving financial support from a few hundred 
sympathisers. One of the institutions that channelled these funds was the 
al-Aqsa Foundation, which had a local branch in the Netherlands until the 
EU put it on the list of terrorist organisations and it was banned as an 
illegal organisation.  
Hizb al-Tahrir 
Established in 1953 by Shaikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, Hizb al-Tahrir (Party 
of Liberation) is an Islamist political party whose goal is to re-establish the 
caliphate. The party has been banned in many Arab countries, Central Asia 
and a few Western countries (such as Germany). Its activities in Europe are 
concentrated in the United Kingdom, though the organisation also has a 
branch in the Netherlands. Most of its supporters are of Turkish or 
Moroccan background. They are organised in small groups numbering a 
few dozen people each. Their activities include the organisation of (protest) 
meetings against alleged attacks on Islam, such as the Danish cartoons, and 
the activities of the Dutch Member of Parliament Geert Wilders. These 
events have always been non-violent.  
Hofstadgroep 
The Hofstadgroep is an Islamist organisation of mostly young Dutch 
Muslims of mainly Moroccan descent. The name ‘Hofstad’ was originally 
the codename the Netherlands secret service used for the network and 
leaked to the media. The name refers to the nickname of the city of The 
Hague, where some of the members used to live. In total, a few dozen of 
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dozen of them were tried on membership of a terrorist organisation. Other 
charges included obstructing the work of Members of Parliament, 
including Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and the illegal possession of firearms. Some 
members were acquitted for lack of evidence, while others were found 
guilty and sentenced ranging from one to fifteen years imprisonment. 
Mohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of Van Gogh, was also sentenced for 
membership of the group. In January 2008, however, the Dutch Court of 
Appeals overturned a number of the convictions in the Hofstadgroep case. 
Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the alleged network 
members embraced and incited radical attitudes and ideologies, it stated 
that it could not be proven that the Hofstadgroep was a terrorist 
organisation and that these acts would inevitably result in terrorist 
engagement.15  
According to the Ministry of Interior, there exists a number of other 
loose-knit informal groups similar to the Hofstadgroep. Not very much is 
known about these radical groupings. The exception is the group around 
Samir Azzouz, also described as the ‘Piranha Group’, which is further 
described below. 
İslami Büyükdoğu Akıncılar Cephesi (IBDA-C)  
The Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front follows the ‘Great East’ ideology of 
Necip Fazil Kisaktürek, a well-known Turkish author and Islamist 
ideologue. This organisation’s goal is the creation of a Sunni Islamist 
federal state in the Middle East and the re-establishment of the caliphate. 
The Front is responsible for a series of terrorist attacks in Turkey, including 
the dual synagogue bombings in Istanbul in November 2003 as well as the 
subsequent attack on the HSBC Bank and the British consulate. While 
support for this movement exists in the Netherlands, it has been limited in 
scope. 
Milli Görüs  
Milli Görüs, or ‘National Vision’, is a Turkish orthodox-Islamic movement 
that has clear political aspirations. Its aim is to Islamise the Turkish state 
and society through democratic ways. Milli Görüs has approximately 
40,000 members in the Netherlands. The movement is part of the European 
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Milli Görüs organisation whose headquarters are located in Cologne, 
Germany. The movement is widely considered to be of a politico-religious 
nature. The Dutch branch is considered more moderate than the German 
and Turkish branch.  
Piranha Group/Samir Azzouz 
In October 2005, the police arrested a young Dutch national of Moroccan 
descent, Samir Azzouz, on suspicion of attempting to procure firearms and 
planning terrorist attacks in the Netherlands, a case that was codenamed 
‘Piranha Group’.16 Azzouz had been apprehended twice before on 
suspicion of terrorist activities, but had not been convicted. This time he 
and two others ended up in jail. In December 2006, Azzouz received a 
sentence of eight years for membership of an organisation with terrorist 
intentions, for preparing an attack and recruiting followers. He was not 
sentenced for membership of the Hofstadgroep, although he had close 
contacts with some of its members, including Mohammed Bouyeri.17 
Azzouz is also known for his failed attempt to join the jihad in Chechnya. 
At 17 years of age, he and a friend were arrested at the border between 
Russia and Ukraine and sent back to the Netherlands. 
Teblig movement (Islami Cemiyet ve Cemaatlar Birligi)  
The Teblig movement, also known as Kaplanci's, is a radical splinter group 
of the Milli Görüs movement. Its goal is the establishment of an Islamist 
Turkish state, using force if necessary. Following the death of its spiritual 
leader Cemaleddin Kaplan in 1995, the organisation broke up into different 
factions. In the Netherlands, and today there are about 200 Muslims active 
within two separate Kaplan factions. 
3.  Types of tensions and violent conflicts  
As mentioned earlier, we look at three types of tensions and violent 
conflicts involving Muslims: incidents in which Muslims attack non-
Muslims and vice versa, as well as incidents within and between Muslim 
communities. We look at politically inspired events, as well as political-
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religious and apolitical-religious or pseudo-religious violence. It should be 
stressed that it is sometimes rather difficult to make distinctions along 
these two lines. As in most conflicts, when two or more groups clash it is 
never easy to distinguish the perpetrators from the victims. The same holds 
for the nature of incidents. When is something politically inspired or more 
of a political-religious nature? Is a violent demonstration of Muslims 
against the occupation of Palestine purely political, and what if some of the 
demonstrators wear burqas and djelabas?  
Regarding the Netherlands, most of the violent attacks of Muslims 
against non-Muslims are associated with violent Islamists, who are 
considered political-religious. Most of the violent attacks by non-Muslims 
on Muslims are of a right-wing political nature, although the low level of 
political awareness of some of these groups and individuals raises 
questions. The tensions and violent conflicts between Muslim communities 
are both of a political and a-political nature. The same holds for 
confrontations within the same community. 
We have singled out the incidents that attracted the most attention 
and that had most impact on communities and Dutch society as a whole. In 
the following sections, we first look at non-violent tensions, followed by 
violent incidents. Relatively much attention is paid to the only deadly 
incident, the murder of Theo van Gogh. 
3.1  Muslims versus non-Muslims 
The al-Moumni affair 
In May 2001, a Moroccan imam, Khalid al-Moumni of the al-Nasr Mosque 
in Rotterdam, was interviewed on television. The interview took place 
against a backdrop of growing discrimination against homosexuals by 
Moroccan youth. When questioned about homosexuality, al-Moumni 
described it as a disease that was pandemic the world over and that posed 
a threat to Muslim youth. The interview led to a public outcry, causing 
leading members of parliament, NGOs and ministers to hold weighty 
discussions. Following this incident, a news agency began investigating al-
Moumni’s past. The agency revealed that the controversial imam was 
forced to leave Morocco because of his fundamentalist views and sermons 
in which he described Christians as pigs. The interview and article about 
al-Moumni led to debates in Parliament that called for closing Islamist 
mosques and possibly expelling radical imams. Even key members of 
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Resulting from this and other comparable incidents, the Dutch government 
received a lot of pressure from Parliament, the media and the public to take 
a tougher stance on Islamism than it did before. After the al-Moumni 
incident, more would follow and a few radical Imams were indeed 
extradited from the Netherlands. 
Cheering young Moroccans on 9/11 
In the city of Ede, a group of young Muslims of mainly Moroccan descent 
allegedly was loudly celebrating the attacks on the United States on 11 
September 2001. Journalists were shooting pictures of some young man 
who had quickly printed a picture of Osama bin Laden. It remains unclear 
to what extent members of the media incited this small group of teenagers 
to produce this picture. Nonetheless, the incident provoked a lot of 
criticism and could be considered one of the starting point for journalists to 
hunt ‘scoops’ like this by finding out all kinds of worrisome developments 
within Muslims communities. At one official state-sponsored Islamic 
school, for instance, journalists found Hamas propaganda and posters 
glorifying attacks against the West.  
Foiled attack on the US embassy in Paris 
In July 2001, a Frenchmen of Algerian descent, Djamel Beghal, was arrested 
in Dubai. He subsequently confessed to plotting an attack against the 
American embassy in Paris and was extradited to France in September 
2001. His network included Kamel Daoudi, a number of other (French) 
Algerians and three French converts. In multiple court cases, in France and 
elsewhere, members of this network were sentenced to prison terms 
between one and 10 years. In The Netherlands, two persons were convicted 
on terrorism charges. One was a French convert, the other an Algerian 
living in France.  
Plot to threaten Dutch politicians and to make an explosive device 
In September 2004, two youngsters of Moroccan descent were arrested and 
accused of terrorist activities. On 14 February 2005, a court sentenced one 
of them, Yehya Kadouri, to 140 days jail and forced admission to a 
psychiatric institution. He was convicted of publishing death threats on the 
internet towards Dutch politicians and collecting information and raw 
materials to make an explosive device. The individual was radicalised 
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The murder on filmmaker Theo van Gogh 
In spring 2004, against the backdrop of growing anti-Muslim sentiment and 
increasing radicalisation among certain groups of Muslims, the Dutch 
General Intelligence and Security Service issued a clear and unprecedented 
warning in its report Background of Jihad Recruits in the Netherlands (10 
March 2004). The report warned about “a growing number of Muslims who 
feel [that they are] treated disrespectfully by opinion-makers and opinion-
leaders… In addition, from their perspective, the government’s attitude is 
[either] not impartial enough or not impartial at all.” These feelings were 
deeply shared by a small group of radical Islamists, but they also existed 
among the larger community of Muslim individuals who felt loyal to the 
democratic principles of the Dutch state. In particular, young second-
generation and third-generation Muslim immigrants appeared to feel 
strongly about the alleged alienation between society and Muslim citizens. 
In particular, it was found that this group of Muslim youth felt that they 
were treated disrespectfully, which potentially made them a vulnerable 
target for radicalisation and possibly recruitment efforts.  
One of these opinion-makers was the filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who 
had earned a reputation in the Netherlands as an outspoken provocateur. 
In his short film Submission, shown on Dutch television, van Gogh adopted 
an adversarial stance concerning Islamism. It challenged the abuse of 
women in the Islamic world based on verses from the Koran, which were 
projected onto the bodies of naked women wearing only veils. A Dutch 
parliamentary deputy, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a woman of Muslim Somali origin, 
wrote the script. A member of the liberal Freedom and Democracy Party, 
Hirsi Ali is a known critic of Islamism. Following the showing of the film 
Submission, both Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh received death threats via 
the internet.  
One such individual who took the issuance of these threats very 
seriously was a young man of Moroccan descent by the name of 
Muhammad Bouyeri, who was born in 1978 and raised in the Netherlands. 
Friends and acquaintances described him as a shy but intelligent man.18 
Bouyeri had been an eager and successful student in secondary school19 
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and easily advanced on to studying at college. Nevertheless, although he 
started several studies he never finished any of them until finally, after five 
years, he dropped out of college all together.20 In the same period, his 
mother died and a number of his ideas to improve the situation of 
youngsters in his neighbourhood failed to get the support of the 
authorities. For whatever precise reason, he started to become radicalised. 
He spent months attempting to gain a more in-depth knowledge of Islam 
and radical interpretations of the Koran. Often, he would lock himself up in 
his home and sit behind his computer for hours, downloading, reading and 
translating radical Islamist texts, writing articles and distributing his work 
via the internet under a pseudonym. Meanwhile, Bouyeri became 
embedded in a network of similar-minded peers all of whom frequented 
the same mosque and met at regular basis at Bouyeri´s home to discuss 
Islam-related issues. During these meetings, Bouyeri played videos of 
decapitations in the Middle East and attempted to persuade his friends to 
participate in violent jihad against the West.21  
By the summer of 2003, Bouyeri had become so radicalised that he 
even rejected the most prototypical orthodox al-Tawhid Mosque as being 
too liberal. In his radicalisation, Bouyeri adopted an ideology contending 
that violence against both non-believers and moderate Muslims – often 
characterised as renegades – was justified. On 2 November 2004, Bouyeri 
assassinated Theo van Gogh. In a threat letter, which he stabbed with a 
knife to Van Gogh’s body, Bouyeri expressed anger and disgust against 
Western societies and their governments’ foreign policies. He accused the 
Dutch Liberal Party of being anti-Islamic and accused Member of 
Parliament Ayaan Hirsi Ali of terrorising Islam.22 Bouyeri was 
apprehended by police while attempting to die a martyr’s death – a fact 
confirmed by a farewell letter, which was found on him. While Bouyeri 
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may have failed to become a martyr, he succeeded in underscoring the 
home-grown terrorist threat to the Netherlands.  
Soon after the murder of Van Gogh, it became clear that although 
Bouyeri proclaimed to have acted independently, he was one of the central 
figures in the Hofstadgroep. The event very much shocked the 
Netherlands. It became obvious that extreme ideologies as vented by al-
Qaeda and other radical terrorist organisations had gained ground in the 
Netherlands, even among those born and raised in the country. It also 
became clear that radicalism among Muslims in the Netherlands had a 
´home-grown´ terrorist dimension that could no longer be ignored, as had 
been the case with the Kadouri case and a number of other thwarted plots. 
Violent arrests and convictions 
In the investigation following the murder of Van Gogh, the police arrested 
several youngsters allegedly embedded in the radical network surrounding 
Bouyeri. Approximately one week after Bouyeri´s arrest, the police set out 
to investigate a building in a neighbourhood called the Laakkwartier in The 
Hague. Jason Walters and Ismail Akhnikh, two members of the 
Hofstadgroep, were inside the building. One of them threw a grenade at 
the police, injuring four police officers of whom two were seriously hurt. 
The incident was the start of a 14-hour stand-off during which several 
attempts to arrest the suspects failed. Ultimately, the police used tear gas to 
force the two suspects out of the building and shot one in the shoulder. 
In the year following the murder of Van Gogh, more than a dozen 
alleged members of the Hofstadgroep stood trial. In March 2006, the court 
convicted nine of them and sentenced them to between one and 15 years 
imprisonment. In its verdict, the court stated that the Hofstadgroep aimed 
at destroying existing Dutch structures and terrorising Dutch society. At 
that time, Bouyeri was already sentenced to life imprisonment in a separate 
court case.  
Plot to prepare a terrorist attack and attempt to recruit a fellow-prisoner 
In February 2006, Bilal Lamrani, a young Dutch Muslim was given a three-
year sentence.23 According to the court in Rotterdam, Lamrani was 
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preparing a terrorist attack and had tried to recruit a fellow prisoner while 
in jail for threatening a leading Dutch Member of Parliament. In his home, 
the police found hundreds of (digital) copies of radical Islamist texts and 
information on how to make explosive devices. The 21-year old had close 
contact with some members of the Hofstadgroep and Mohammed Bouyeri 
who murdered Theo van Gogh. 
Plot to attack politicians and a government building 
Samir Azzouz, a long-time suspect of terrorism, was arrested with nine 
others in October 2005, on suspicion of preparing terrorist attacks on 
politicians and a government building. Azzouz was close to most of the 
members of the Hofstadgroep. One of the other suspects in this case had 
already been sentenced for membership of the Hofstadgroep. Of the 10 
persons arrested in October 2005, three were convicted. As mentioned 
earlier, Azzouz and the other two were given sentences for membership of 
an organisation with terrorist intentions, for preparing a terrorist attack 
and for their recruiting activities. 
Dutch jihadi terrorists abroad 
Besides the loose-knit, home-grown terrorist networks, the Netherlands has 
been confronted with a number of locally embedded international 
networks controlled from abroad, or in a manner whereby foreign 
recruiters residing in the Netherlands play a key role. These networks and 
recruiters have managed to find young Muslims in the Netherlands willing 
and able to go on jihad. In the past decade, two of them, associated with a 
radical Salafi mosque in the city of Eindhoven, died in Kashmir. Some 
Dutch Muslims are believed to be fighting in Iraq. Six of them, from the city 
of The Hague, were ostensibly on a journey to Chechnya or Dagestand. 
Religious leaders and family members successfully persuaded them to 
return from Azerbaijan and not to continue their assumed journey. It is not 
clear whether this ‘trip’ was organised by an internationally operating 
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network or a more autonomously decided ‘adventure’. The latter seemed to 
have been the case with the earlier mentioned failed attempt by Samir 
Azzouz to join the jihad in Chechnya. 
3.2  Non-Muslims versus Muslims 
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, growing anti-Muslim 
sentiments in reaction to cases such as the al-Moumni affair escalated. 
Newspaper reports about a group of nine adolescents of Moroccan descent 
“celebrating” the terrorist attacks caused public fury and rendered 
substantial damage to the image of Muslims in the Netherlands. In 
addition, a series of arrests of suspected Islamist terrorists led some to 
question the loyalty of Muslim communities towards the Dutch state, 
norms and values. Spurious findings by opinion polls employing 
questionable methodologies further added fuel to the fire by fostering the 
notion that there was indeed a lack of loyalty exhibited in the Dutch 
Muslim population.  Moreover, in the weeks following the attacks, the 
media revealed many scandals and potential threats, thereby exacerbating 
the situation. For example, there was a report about propaganda in Islamic 
schools that glorified terrorism and quoted from radical anti-Western 
speeches by Salafi imams. Although many of these reports later turned out 
to be based on hearsay or misinterpretations of texts and events, with most 
of the suspected terrorists being released within days or weeks, the damage 
had already been done. 
The impact of September 11th and the previously mentioned incidents 
was profound, resulting in a tougher tone of debate. While in the past, few 
in the Netherlands dared to speak out against Islamist radicalism, the 
Dutch community suddenly became unbridled in its (often negative) 
expressions regarding Islamism.  
A number of public opinion polls in the months following these 
attacks consequently revealed strong anti-Muslim sentiment and a fear of 
Islam. One survey indicated that about three-quarters of the Dutch 
population were in favour of providing military support to the United 
States. At the same time, 60% also feared that this might lead to terrorist 
attacks in the Netherlands. Another poll showed that a clear majority of the 
Dutch wanted to expel Muslims with anti-Western opinions from the 
country. A survey among Muslims that appeared in a multi-cultural 
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showed that the majority of those interviewed believed there was at least 
some justification for the attacks on the United States.  
Pim Fortuyn 
As the relationship between non-Muslims and Muslims in the Netherlands 
grew increasingly tense, the flamboyant right-wing Pim Fortuyn entered 
the Dutch political arena. Being a former member of the Social-Democratic 
Party, he became the head of the populist party Leefbaar Nederland 
(Liveable Netherlands) in 2001. Fortuyn, who was openly gay and 
appeared to enjoy controversy, was forced to leave this party after some 
very provocative statements regarding Muslims and Islam in the 
Netherlands. More specifically, he emphasised that the Netherlands should 
put a hold on immigrant flows from, in particular, Islamic countries. He 
proclaimed that if he were to be elected into the next government, he 
would grant citizenship to large groups of Muslims already residing in the 
Netherlands, but at the same time would heavily restrict Muslim influx. He 
considered Islam a backward culture that had never undergone a period of 
Enlightment and was therefore unfit to integrate into modern western 
societies.24 
After being rejected by LN, Fortuyn founded his own political party, 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in February 2002, and was running for the 
upcoming governmental elections that were to be held in May that year. 
During his political career, Fortuyn continued to make provocative 
statements, hereby fuelling existing tensions between Muslims and non-
Muslims. The taboo on conservatism and right-wing politics seemed to 
disappear, and Fortuyn appeared to have triggered a revival of extreme-
right lobbying groups and organisations. On 6 May 2002, approximately 
one week prior to the governmental elections for which he was running, 
Pim Fortuyn was assassinated after having given a radio-interview in 
Hilversum. Initially, the common assumption among the Dutch public 
seemed to be that Fortuyn had become the victim of radical Islamists 
seeking revenge for his anti-Islam statements. Even though it was soon 
publicised that Fortuyn’s murderer, Volkert van der Graaf, was a left-wing 
environmental activist, the killing of Fortuyn increased the tension between 
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Dutch and non-Dutch populations, particularly focusing on Muslims. 
During the days after the murder, representatives of the radical right-wing 
vented anti-Islam sentiments and in cities in the eastern part of the country 
incidents were reported of harassment of immigrant youngsters by right-
wing extremists.25 Despite the assassination, the elections continued one 
week later with Fortuyn as a posthumous candidate winning 26 out of 150 
seats in the Parliament. Nevertheless, the LPF’s success was not to remain; 
after the next elections in 2004, it lost 18 seats and by 2006, the party was 
elected out of the parliament. Ultimately, the party fell apart by January 
2008. Nevertheless, although Fortuyn’s political career was relatively short, 
his provocative statements contributed significantly to the debate about 
multiculturalism in general and multiculturalism in the Netherlands in 
particular.  
Violent reactions to the Van Gogh murder 
Immediately after the murder of Van Gogh, the authorities realised it might 
provoke violent reactions by non-Muslims, but they did not react with a 
strong statement urging everyone to remain calm. And the situation did 
not remain calm. Dutch society was shocked not only by the crime itself, 
but also by the manner in which the basic principles of the Netherlands’ 
democratic constitutional state had been so brutally attacked. Not only did 
Dutch society exhibit outrage over the murder, but many also sought 
violent revenge against ‘those Muslims’. Youngsters with racist and right-
wing ideas exploited the situation to incite hatred and violence against 
Moroccans, Muslims and immigrants in general. As Albert Benschop 
elaborates in Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold, “the Islam-inspired 
murder of van Gogh was grist to the political mill of extremely nationalist 
and racist groups… [who] seized the event to give vent to their violent and 
venomous opinions.”26 Consequently, the Netherlands has witnessed a 
growing climate of intolerance in its non-Muslim community followed by 
increased episodes of attacks against Muslims and cases of discrimination. 
In the days following the murder of the film maker, there were more than 
100 incidents of arson and assault directed at mosques, Islamic schools and 
                                                      
25 “Blanke terreur in de Kempen” (White terror in the Kempen), NRC Handelsblad, 2 
June 2003. 
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individual Muslims. In reaction, young Muslims also attacked a number of 
churches and individuals. 
Attacks by right-wing youngsters 
In the context of the inflamed racial tensions that followed the Van Gogh 
murder, right-wing extremists launched a renewed assault on the Dutch 
Muslim communities in 2005. In particular, the so-called ‘Lonsdale youth’ 
received extensive attention by the media as well as by politicians. 
Lonsdale is a popular clothing brand among right-wing elements of the 
‘gabber’ youth, a subgroup that is largely defined by a preference for house 
music. In a study of the Lonsdale issue, Van Donselaar27 concluded that the 
Lonsdale subgroup is very diverse in both nature and size. Between 2002 
and 2005, the authors counted more than 100 groups in the Netherlands 
that were either right-wing-oriented or had been involved in extreme right-
wing or racist incidents. After a fight between right-wing and immigrant 
youngsters in Venray and an attack on an Islamic primary school in Uden, 
early in 2005, the Intelligence Service started an investigation into Lonsdale 
youth.28 In the report, the Service concluded that at present, Lonsdale youth 
do not pose a considerable threat to the democratic order, and that the 
subgroup mostly consists of unorganised, loosely-knit structures that are 
not defined by political ideologies. The threat for society is mostly long 
term, in the sense that provocative statements and symbolism prompt 
frequent confrontations with immigrant youngsters and can erode social 
cohesion and multicultural relations within the Dutch society.  
Geert Wilders 
In recent years, Member of Parliament Geert Wilders has made a name for 
himself as the leading politician on immigration and integration issues. 
Many Muslims (and non-Muslims) perceive MP Geert Wilders as having 
an anti-Muslim agenda. The earlier-mentioned movie “Fitna” was not his 
first provocative statement concerning Islam. Other well-known statements 
of his include comparing the immigration of Muslims with a tsunami wave, 
                                                      
27 Jaap Van Donselaar (ed.), Monitor racisme en extremisme: zevende rapportage 
(Monitor racism and extremism: seventh report), Amsterdam: Anne Frank 
Stichting; Leiden: Universiteit Leiden, 2006. 
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comparing the Koran with Hitler’s Mein Kampf accompanied with a plea for 
a ban on the Koran, and questioning the ‘loyalty’ of Dutch politicians with 
a Moroccan or Turkish background. His alleged anti-Muslim attitude and 
remarks have led to several charges against Wilders for inciting hatred of 
Muslims or insulting them. He was never convicted in court, however, and 
repeatedly has stated that he respects the rule of law. Nonetheless, he is 
generally regarded as contributing to a harsh, polarised debate on the 
integration of Muslim communities in the Netherlands. The popularity of 
Geert Wilders and his ideas did result in his Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, 
Party For Freedom) winning nine (out of 150) seats in Parliament.  
3.3  Muslims versus Muslims 
Kurds and Turks 
There are many different levels and types of tensions and violent conflicts 
between Muslims. If we look at incidents between Muslim communities, 
the most striking ones are of a political nature, especially concerning 
tensions and violence between Turks and Kurds. Both have their own 
groups and organisations. Think of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) or 
the Turkish nationalist ‘Grey Wolves’. This is not to say that tensions and 
incidents are always ‘formally’ organised through groups like these. There 
are also quite a number of locally organised or ‘spontaneous’ incidents, 
such as provocative behaviour of young Kurds in front of a Turkish 
coffeehouse just after an important European football match in which 
Galatasaray or Besiktas were beaten. In addition, the invasion of Turkish 
troops in Iraq in early 2008 caused an increase of tensions between the two 
groups, both accusing the other of terrorism and organising protest 
meetings or demonstrations. There have been a number of arson bombings 
of Turkish and Kurdish targets. However, it remains unclear whether these 
incidents were of a political nature or criminals fighting criminals. The 
latter type of tensions and violence is perhaps one of the most serious ones, 
at least in terms of people killed or injured, but falls beyond the scope of 
this study. 
Customary and pseudo-religious violence 
Within some Muslim communities, dramatic incidents have occurred 
involving family members beating up and even killing girls and women. 
These ‘honour crimes’ have added to the earlier-mentioned association 
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towards women. Of course, this kind of pseudo-religious behaviour not 
only gives Islam and the Muslim communities a bad-image problem, but it 
is also a very serious social problem within communities – between 
generations. The problem is even more serious within families – between 
parents and children and between couples of which one partner is born and 
raised in the Netherlands and the other is the ‘imported’ partner.  
Whereas in the past, these kinds of crimes were more or less ignored 
or considered as crimes of passion, today they are given widespread 
attention in the media and receive special attention by social workers, the 
police and public prosecutors. The exact number of honour crimes is 
unknown but in recent years, more than a dozen cases have led to hefty 
debates, including in Parliament. In fact, political parties are currently 
pushing the authorities to restart investigations into the murder of a young 
Kurdish woman by her ex-husband (who committed suicide immediately 
after killing her).  
Conclusions 
In recent decades, the world has witnessed a trend of globalisation that 
brought forth an increase in interaction, interdependency and networking 
between social groups. However, one of the side effects of these 
developments is that they also led to an increased awareness of social 
heterogeneity. Cultural diversity becomes increasingly salient, not only 
across borders but also within them. For social groups with different 
values, different norms, different historical backgrounds and different 
beliefs to coexist peacefully, it is important that they can agree on a basic 
set of common rules and values and that there is a minimum level of 
mutual respect and understanding.  
In the Netherlands, many different cultural, ethnic and religious 
groups have lived together peacefully and successfully for decades. The 
country has experienced hardly any violence between social groups. In 
contrast to countries like France and the United Kingdom, the Netherlands 
has not been confronted with many serious terrorist attacks. There have not 
been riots like those in Paris or Bradford, and there have not been violent 
confrontations with extreme-right groups like there have been in Germany. 
In other words, the Dutch experience with inter-group violent conflict is, 
fortunately, rather limited.  
However, in recent years, a few incidents and developments have 
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Muslims and that have eroded the idea of the Netherlands as a peaceful 
and tolerant country. This new image of the Netherlands as a place of harsh 
debates, polarisation and violence did not only take root outside the 
country, but also among many Dutch citizens. There are as yet no 
convincing explanations of how and why this happened. The single 
incidents that probably added to the polarised political and social climate 
are the attacks on the United States in 2001, the ‘discoveries’ by the media 
of extreme radical behaviour among Muslims and the murder of Theo van 
Gogh in 2004. These and other incidents inflamed inter-cultural and inter-
ethnic tensions between different social groups and have led, in some 
occasions, to violent outbursts. They also contributed to political 
polarisation over issues related to Muslims (and other immigrants), as well 
as to the implicit association that presently seems to be easily made 
between Muslims and violence. The fact that the release of the anti-Islam 
movie ‘Fitna’ did not lead to angry responses by Muslim communities may 
indicate two things. Either the idea of intolerance and polarisation has been 
exaggerated, or that Dutch society has gradually rediscovered its traditions 
and the importance of adhering to common rules and values and showing 
a minimum level of mutual respect and understanding. Probably it is a bit 
of both. 
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6.  RADICALISATION AMONG  
MUSLIMS IN THE UK 
RACHEL BRIGGS & JONATHAN BIRDWELL 
uslim communities in the UK have come under intense scrutiny 
in recent years, but especially since 7 July 2005 (7/7). The 
emergence of a home-grown threat raised concerns not just about 
the threat of future attacks, but it also played on deeper anxieties about 
Britain’s growing diversity and apparent loss of a cohesive identity. The 
current terrorist threat and the UK’s responses to it should be viewed 
against this wider backdrop. Since 7/7, the extent of the problem has 
become clearer as new plots have been unearthed and a succession of trials 
has provided rare glimpses into the lives of the radicals. This chapter 
outlines the details of the main plots.  
Many theories have been offered about the drivers or causes of 
radicalisation, but they are rarely able to prove more than the exception, 
never the rule. In fact, it is almost impossible to say with any certainty what 
the causes are as it is so difficult to know whether a factor is instrumental, 
or merely present. It is perhaps more helpful to think about ‘radicalising 
agents’ – factors that are present (though not necessarily causal) and which 
appear frequently across different cases. This chapter highlights a number: 
key places, charismatic leaders, relationship links, experiences and stated 
and assumed grievances.  
One of the most frequent theories about radicalisation is that certain 
organisations or movements play central roles in indoctrinating individuals 
into a set of fundamental beliefs and an acceptance that violence is a 
legitimate tool for solving their problems. This collaborative research 
project divides Muslim organisations into three broad categories for the 
purposes of this study: non-political religious groups, religious and 
political groups and non-religious political groups. This chapter provides a 
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brief synopsis of the main organisations and movements under each 
heading and offers, where it exists, evidence about their links to violence. 
It should be acknowledged that this is a problematic framework. Few 
groups fit neatly into one category and often move between them over time 
or depending on their activities. It is also highly unlikely that they would 
self-categorise themselves in these terms. It also assumes that organisations 
– as corporate entities – are important players within the radicalisation 
process, rather than the individuals who pass through them. In fact, in 
many cases individuals go in and out of these organisations, often leaving 
when they do not find what they are looking for. To conclude that their 
presence confirms the organisation’s role would be misleading. Finally, 
these organisations can find themselves being used as convenient spaces 
for individuals to convene – often in the margins – where the culpability of 
the organisation is due more to its poor visibility and governance than a 
commitment to violence. 
This chapter sets out the position of Muslims in the UK, the threat to 
the UK from al-Qaeda-linked and -inspired terrorism through an account 
of the main terror plots, outlines the main radical groups and movements 
under the three-pronged categorisation outlined above and closes with an 
explanation of latest UK government policy responses. It concludes with a 
note of caution about misinterpreting the nature and intention of these 
groups and notes the role that many – with some notable exceptions – 
could play in the effort to tackle radicalisation in the UK.  
1.  Muslim communities in the UK 
There are around 2 million Muslims in the UK, the largest faith group after 
Christians.1 Most trace their roots to migration and settlement after the 
Second World War, although their presence dates back as far as the 17th 
century. Almost half (46%) were born in the UK,2 with three-quarters 
having South Asian heritage. The community is becoming more diverse: 
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there are now 56 nationalities represented and 70 languages spoken.3 
Muslims have the youngest age profile of all faith groups; in 2001, one-
third (33.8%) were under the age of 16, compared to one-fifth of the 
population overall (20.2%).The average age is 28, 13 years below the 
national average.4 This has a bearing on the extent of political activism 
within the community, with most being youth-led.  
Muslims constitute some of the most deprived communities in the 
UK. Almost one-third of Muslims of working age have no qualifications, 
the highest proportion for any faith group.5 Muslim children experience 
high levels of the risk factors associated with child poverty (national 
average figures are shown in brackets): 42% live in crowded 
accommodation (12%); 12% live in households without central heating (6%) 
and over one-third (35%) are growing up in households where there are no 
adults in employment (17%).6 Muslims are the most disadvantaged faith 
group in the British labour market; they are three times more likely to be 
unemployed than the majority Christian group. Of those that are 
employed, job prospects are poor; Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are 2.5 
times more likely than the white population to be unemployed and 3 times 
more likely to be in low-paid jobs.7 Muslims are over-represented in the 
prison system. They make up 3% of the population but 9% of the 
population of prisoners.8  
The relationship between Muslim communities and ‘mainstream’ 
British society (as if there were such a thing) has been the subject of much 
debate and analysis in recent years. A survey conducted by several Muslim 
groups found that since 9/11, 80% of Muslim respondents reported being 
                                                      
3 H. Khan, “Unite but follow me: The tragic comedy of Muslim representation”, Q 
News, March 2004, pp. 24-25; H. Khan, “Portfolio: Who speaks for British 
Muslims”, Q News, March 2004, p. 23; S. El-Hassan, “A Report on a Consultation 
with Individuals from the Muslim Community”, IQRA Trust, 2003, p. 2. 
4 A. Yunas Samad and Kasturi Sen, Islam in the European Union:Transnationalism, 
Youth and the War on Terror , Chapter 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.  
5 Bunglawala, Halstead, Malik and Spalek, op. cit., p. 14. 
6 Ibid. 
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subjected to Islamophobia; 68% felt they had been perceived and treated 
differently; and 32% reported being subjected to discrimination at UK 
airports.9 Some have argued that young Muslim men suffer 
disproportionately; Alexander suggests that they have emerged as the new 
‘folk devils’ of popular and media imagination,10 and Archer notes that in 
public discourse Muslim men are not only conceptualised as ‘dangerous 
individuals’ with a capacity for violence and/or terrorism, but also as 
‘culturally dangerous’ – as threatening ‘the British way of life’.11  
A succession of opinion polls have shown many Muslims are 
uncomfortable with life in the UK, more so than those in mainland 
Europe.12 The polling organisation, Pew, created a religious-cultural 
negativity index based on seven characteristics (selfishness, arrogance, 
immorality, violence, greediness, generosity and honesty). Britain’s score, 
based on the perception of British Muslims of Western non-Muslims with 
regards to these characteristics, was higher than other European Muslims, 
and in fact, closer to the score (opinion) of Muslims in Muslim countries. 
British Muslims are more inclined to see a conflict between Islam and 
modernity; more likely to self-identify along religious lines than national 
lines; and more deeply concerned about the future of Muslims in Britain. 
When asked, “Is there a conflict between being a devout Muslim and living 
in a Modern society?”, almost half of British Muslims (49%) felt there was.  
At the same time, there is an ongoing and concerted campaign 
against Islamism by a coalition of both left and right who criticise the UK 
government for what they call a policy of appeasement towards these 
groups. Martin Bright of the New Statesman went so far as to claim that 
these organisations were engaged in a “sophisticated strategy of 
                                                      
9 Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism, Al-Khoei Foundation and the Muslim 
College, Counter-Terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society: 
Discussion Paper – A Muslim Response,London, FAIR, 2004, p. 22, quoted in 
Bunglawala, Halstead, Malik and Spalek, op. cit., p.19. 
10 C. Alexander, The Asian Gang, ethnicity, identity, masculinity, Oxford: Berg, 2000, 
p. 6 quoted in Bunglawala, Halstead, Malik and Spalek, op. cit., p. 19. 
11 L. Archer, Race, Masculinity and Schooling: Muslim boys and education, 
Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2003, p. 157,quoted in Bunglawala, Halstead, 
Malik and Spalek, op. cit., p. 19. 
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implanting Islamist ideology among young Muslims in Western Europe”.13 
The groups to which he and others refer are, on the whole, actually pretty 
mainstream, often progressive ones, such as the FOSIS (Federation of 
Student Islamic Societies), which is the Muslim equivalent of NUS 
(National Union of Students) and Leicester’s Islamic Foundation which has 
been at the forefront of efforts to foster understanding between 
communities. Islamism is not inherently violent,14 but these nuances are 
rarely acknowledged and casual links are made between these groups and 
more specific concerns about violent extremism. This makes balanced 
debate difficult and affects the analysis of many of the groups outlined in 
later sections of this paper.  
2.  Al-Qaeda-linked and -inspired terrorism 
MI5, the British security service, has said that it believes that there are 2,000 
individuals who pose a direct threat to national security and public safety, 
and a further 2,000 who are actively plotting but not individually known to 
the authorities. It is thought that the UK faces 30 known plots, and the 
security service is monitoring 200 networks.15 The threat was described by 
MI5 chief, Jonathan Evans as “the most immediate and acute peacetime 
threat in the 98-year history of my service”. He also said that recruits are 
getting younger and that international influences are now much more 
diverse; it is no longer just links to Pakistan.16 
There have been more than 200 terrorist convictions in the UK since 
11 September 2001; the following summarises the details of the most 
notable cases and is correct as of June 2008.17 
                                                      
13 Martin Bright, “When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries”, Policy Exchange, 
2007. 
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Perspective, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. 
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7/7 Co-conspirators 
On 22 March 2007, Waheed Ali (born Shipon Ullah), 26, Sadeer Saleem, 27, 
and Mohammed Shakil, 31, all from Beeston, Leeds, were arrested on 
allegations that they were co-conspirators in the London bombings of 7 July 
2005, and are currently on trial at Kingston Crown Court.18 
It is alleged that Waheed Ali and Mohammed Shakil travelled with 
Mohammed Sidique Khan to Pakistan and it is believed that Shakil trained 
with him in a terrorist training camp there.19 All three men have admitted 
that they travelled to London in December 2004 with 7/7 bomber Hasib 
Hussain, met up with Germaine Lindsay and visited together various 
London locations. The prosecution argues that these were scouting trips for 
the eventual attacks, something the defendants deny.20 Prosecutors also 
claim that Khan and Shakil met with convicted terrorist Mohammed Junaid 
Babar and another man at Islamabad Airport on 24 July 2003. There is 
allegedly evidence on Ali’s computer of frequent visits to jihadi affiliated 
websites, and police found a piece of paper in Shakil’s possession with 
instructions for sending money to the Taliban embassy in Pakistan, and a 
long letter on his computer praising the 9/11 attackers. Similar documents 
about 9/11 were found on Saleem’s seized computer.  
On 9 May 2007, Khalid Khaliq, 34, was arrested on suspicion of 
“commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”. He pleaded 
guilty to possession of an al-Qaeda training manual and was sentenced at 
Leeds Crown Court to 16 months.21 Khaliq was apparently a single, 
unemployed father of three children. He was also a volunteer and trustee at 
Iqra Bookshop, which served as a centre for Muslim youth: 7/7 bombers 
Tanweer and Khan were also trustees of the bookshop. Khaliq is featured in 
a photograph along with Tanweer and Khan white-water rafting in 
Northern Wales.  
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20 Ibid. 
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21/7 Co-conspirators 
Muktar Ibrahim (or Ibrahim Muktar Said),22 29,  Ramzi Mohammed, 25, 
Hussain Osman, 28, and Yassin Omar, 26, were found guilty of this 
attempted attack and sentenced to life imprisonment on 11 July 2007. 
Manfo Asiedu, 35, believed to be Ghanian, is considered to be the fifth 
bomber, abandoned his bomb and went back to Ibrahim’s apartment to 
defuse a booby-trap bomb. He was convicted of conspiring to cause 
explosions and sentenced to 33 years.  
All four would-be bombers had come under the influence and 
guidance of Abu Hamza and Abdullah el-Faisal in their teens and early 
twenties.23 Ibrahim had apparently ‘trained for jihad’ in Sudan in 2003 and 
was under surveillance in May 2004. He was also stopped and questioned 
at Heathrow on his way to Islamabad in December 2004, and the 
prosecution speculated that he might have attended the same training 
camp as Sidique Khan.24 He had been involved in criminal gang activity for 
which he picked up a custodial sentence. 
Yassin Omar’s flat in New Southgate, North London, served as the 
bomb-making factory. Omar was born in Somalia, and came to London in 
1990 with his sisters where he was placed under the care of the local 
authority. He became increasingly attracted to Islam around 2000, began 
wearing a robe instead of Western clothes and started espousing support 
for the Taliban.  
The fourth would-be bomber, Ramzi Mohammed, came to the UK 
from Somalia via Kenya when his father was forced to fight in one of the 
warring militias there.25 H e  w a s  p l a c e d  i n  t h e  c a r e  o f  s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s  i n  
Slough. Until 2003, Mohammed led a Western lifestyle, but he then began 
attending the Finsbury Park Mosque and going to Hyde Park to listen to 
sermons. In January 2004, he began associating with Ibrahim and Omar. 
Police found a suicide note to his girlfriend and two children and extremist 
literature in his apartment. 
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A number of individuals have been found guilty of helping the 21/7 
plotters. Adel Yahya, 25,  from Ethiopia was sentenced to 6 years and 9 
months for collecting information that was useful to a person preparing a 
terrorist attack. He met Omar at school and they attended Finsbury Park 
Mosque together. Yahya accompanied the other bombers on the training 
trip to the Lake District in 2004 and extremist literature was found in his 
apartment.  
The following individuals were found guilty of giving assistance and 
protection to the bombers while they were in hiding. Muhedin Ali, 29, from 
Ladbroke Grove was sentenced to 7 years (Ramzi Mohammed’s suicide 
note was found in Ali’s apartment). Wahbi Mohammed, 25, from 
Stockwell, brother of Ramzi Mohammed, was sentenced to 17 years. Ismail 
Abdurahman, 25, from Lambeth was sentenced to 10 years for failing to 
disclose information about Said and assisting Osman in evading arrest. 
Siraj Yassin Addullah Ali, 33, from Enfield, was sentenced to 12 years for 
failing to disclose information about Ibrahim and Omar. Ali was fostered 
by the same family as Omar and lived in the same block of flats in 
Southgate. Abdul Sherif, 30, from Stockwell, brother of Hussain Osman, 
was sentenced to 10 years. Osman travelled to Italy with Sherif’s passport.26  
A number of other individuals have recently been found guilty of 
assisting Osman: his wife, Yeshiemebet Girma,27 31, from Stockwell was 
jailed for 15 years for failing to inform police of her husband’s plans to 
launch a terrorist attack and helping him to escape to Rome; Esayas Girma, 
22, from Stockwell (brother of Yeshi Girma) and Mulumebet Girma, 23, 
from Brighton (sister of Yeshi Girma) were both sentenced to 10 years each; 
and Mohammed Kabashi, 23, (boyfriend of Mulu Girma) was jailed for 9 
years.  
London Fertiliser Plot 
The group charged with this plot had purchased over 600 kg of ammonium 
nitrate in order to construct a bomb and had stored it in an Access Self-
Storage unit in Hanwell, West London, and surveillance revealed a number 
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of targets including the Ministry of Sound nightclub in London and 
Bluewater shopping centre in Kent.  
Omar Khayam, the ringleader, is a British citizen born and raised in 
Crawley, West Sussex in a largely secular Muslim home. He attended Al-
Muhajiroun meetings and travelled to Pakistan to train in a Mujahideen 
training camp to fight in Kashmir. After returning home to Britain, he left 
again for Afghanistan in 2001 and met with members of the Taliban. He 
was deeply affected by the war in Iraq, and after the invasion returned to 
Pakistan, met with al-Qaeda member Abdul Hadi, and began planning 
attacks in the UK.  
Jawad Akbar was born in Pakistan but moved to Crawley when he 
was eight. He attended Brunel University where he became involved in a 
radical Islamist political group. Akbar travelled with Khayam to Pakistan 
in 2003. 
Salahuddin Amin was born in London but raised in Pakistan. He 
attended Al-Muhajiroun meetings in Luton, where he met individuals who 
were attempting to set up ‘jihadi support networks’ between the UK and 
various groups abroad. Eventually Amin moved back to Pakistan, where 
UK officials claim he was a facilitator between the UK and extremists in 
Pakistan. In 2005 he was sent to Britain where he apparently gave a “full 
and frank” interview that figured prominently in the trial. He later 
retracted his story, denying any knowledge of the plot.  
Waheed Mahmood met Khayam at the local mosque in Crawley, and 
participated in meetings held in Luton. Mahmood had a family home in 
Pakistan where the plotters met and decided to attack the UK. Mahmood 
had dismantled his hard drive and thus there was only verbal evidence 
against him. He was caught on tape praising the attacks on Madrid as a 
“beautiful job”, and discussing possible attacks on Bluewater shopping 
centre in Kent.  
Anthony Garcia (born Rahman Benouis in Algeria) claimed that 
seeing videos of atrocities in Kashmir was a turning point for him. He 
travelled to Pakistan in 2003 and attended the same training camp as 
Khayam. Back in the UK, Garcia was the individual who purchased the 
fertiliser and accompanied Khayam and Nabeel Hussain to the Access 
Storage Unit.  
Mohammed Khawaja, of Pakistani origin, was born and raised in the 
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Pakistan as the other plotters and agreed to provide the detonator for the 
bombs. He is still awaiting trial in Canada.28  
Mohammed Babar acted as the key witness for the prosecution, after 
turning against the other defendants. He is an American of Pakistani 
descent who travelled to Pakistan shortly after the 9/11 attacks, reportedly 
to take part in the jihad, and while there came into contact with the other 
defendants in the case. He is serving three years in an American prison – a 
reduced sentence given in exchange for his testimony in the UK – and will 
enter the Witness Protection Program once he is released.  
Abu Hamza 
Abu Hamza (Mustafa Kamel Mustafa) emigrated to the UK from Egypt in 
1979. He came into contact with Afghan Mujahideen fighters who had 
come to the UK to seek medical attention, and eventually left the UK to 
work and fight in Afghanistan, where he suffered the loss of his hand and 
eye. He also served in Bosnia. When he returned to the UK he became a 
leading figure in the Islamist movement and began to establish himself at 
the Finsbury Park Mosque, where he eventually gained de facto control. He 
was questioned about plots, including the massacre of tourists in Luxor, 
Eygpt, and the alleged bomb plots in Yemen, for which his son was jailed 
for three years. The mosque was raided in January 2003, in connection with 
the so-called ‘ricin plot’ of 2002, after which Hamza lost control of the 
mosque, although he continued to preach outside it. In 2004, the US 
government named Hamza as a ‘terrorist facilitator with global reach’. He 
was successfully convicted on 11 counts and sentenced to seven years in 
jail.29 In February 2008, the Home Secretary approved his extradition to the 
US, an appeal against which he recently lost.30  
                                                      
28 Ian MacLeod, “Supreme Court rejects terrorism law challenge”, National Post, 3 
April 2008.  
29 Information taken from “BBC Profile: Abu Hamza”, BBC News, 8 February 2008. 
See also “Timeline: Hamza Trial”, BBC News 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4644030.stm). 
30 David Batty, “Abu Hamza loses legal fight against extradition to US”, The 
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Plot to attack the US and UK – Dhiren Barot 
Dhiren Barot was the mastermind behind a number of plans to attack 
targets in the UK and US, for which he was sentenced to life in prison. 
Seven other men also received jail sentences as co-conspirators. Their plans 
included blowing apart a London Underground tunnel and bombings 
using an explosives-packed limousine and a dirty radiation device. Barot 
allegedly showed his plans to al-Qaeda operatives who were hiding in 
Pakistan, while the other seven individuals made preparations back in the 
UK.  
Barot was born in India to a Hindu family who emigrated to 
Kingsbury, in northwest London shortly after he was born. Barot converted 
to Islam when he was 20, reportedly after a visit to Kashmir.31 In 1995, he 
allegedly went to Pakistan where he attended a terrorist training camp. 
Police found a manual with extensive notes on various weapons, chemicals 
for bomb-making and bomb-making instructions. Intended targets in the 
US included the IMF and World Bank in Washington, D.C., the Stock 
Exchange and Citigroup headquarters in New York and the Prudential 
Building in Newark, NJ.32  
The co-conspirators were: Mohammed Naveed Bhatti, 27, of Harrow, 
North London, who was sentenced to 20 years; Junada Ferozem, 31, of 
Blackburn, who was sentenced to 22 years; Mohamed ul-Haq, 28, of 
Wembley, who was sentenced to 18 years; Abdul Aziz Jalil, 24, of Luton, 
who was sentenced to 26 years; Omar Abdul Rehman, 23, of Bushey, 
Hertfordshire, sentenced to 15 years; Quaisar Shaffi, 28, of Willesdon, 
sentenced to 15 years; and Nadeem Tarmohammed, 29, of Wembley, who 
was sentenced to 20 years.33  
Transatlantic attack  
In August 2006, a number of people were arrested on suspicion of plotting 
to blow up transatlantic planes using explosives disguised as soft drinks.  
                                                      
31 Sandro Contenta, “He embraced Islam, then terrorism”, Toronto Star, 16 October 
2006.  
32 “Profile of Dhiren Barot”, BBC News, 7 November 2006.  
33 Information taken from: “Dhiren Barot’s co-conspirators”, BBC News, 15 June 
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Eight men are currently on trial in the UK,34 facing charges of 
conspiracy to murder and prepare acts of terrorism. All deny the charges. 
The prosecution’s evidence consists of jihadi-related literature and images 
found in their homes, and ‘martyrdom videos’ made by six of the eight 
defendants.35 Those on trial are: Abdula Ahmed Ali, 27, of Walthamstow; 
Tanvir Hussain, 27; and Assad Ali Sarwar, 28, who have all pleaded guilty 
to conspiracy to cause explosions and conspiring to cause public nuisance 
by distributing al-Qaeda-style videos threatening suicide bomb attacks in 
Britain.36 They stand alongside Umar Islam and Ibrahim Savant, 27 (who 
reportedly left a suicide note for his wife),37 both of whom admit conspiring 
to cause a public nuisance. Alongside them are Mohammed Yasar Gulzar; 
Wabeed Zaman, 22, of Walthamstow and reportedly follower of Tabligh 
Jamaat; and Waheed Arafat Kahn, 24, of East London.38 Khan was a student 
at London Metropolitan University, was president of the Islamic Society 
affiliated with FOSIS, and he was also reportedly a Tabligh Jamaat 
follower. Two others are charged with failing to disclose information, but 
have not yet come to trial: Cossor Ali, 25, of Walthamstow; and Mehran 
Hussain, of Chingford.39  
Rashid Rauf, a British-born citizen, was thought to be the master-
mind behind the attacks and was arrested by Pakistani authorities at the 
urging of British and American authorities in August 2006. Pakistani courts 
ruled that there was not enough evidence to convict him of terrorism-
related charges, so the charges were reduced to forgery, although Britain 
and the US continued to press for his extradition. He is alleged to have 
escaped police custody,40 although there are suspicions that the Pakistani 
authorities still have Rauf in custody but simply do not want to extradite 
him to Britain for reasons unknown.41  
                                                      
34 Taken from: http://www.dawn.com/2008/04/05/top13.htm. 
35 See http://www.bucksfreepress.co.uk/display.var.2177305.0.0.php. 
36 See “Terror Trial: Three admit parliament bomb plot”, The Guardian, 15 July 2008  
37 “Paradise plea by plotter”, The Sun, 19 April 2008.  
38 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7348936.stm. 
39 “Two Terror plot suspects freed”, BBC News, 24 August 2006. 
40 “Pakistan manhunt for escaped terror suspect”, The Guardian, 17 December 2007.  
41 “The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terrorist mastermind”, The 
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London and Glasgow airport plots (29/30 June 2007) 
The most recent high-profile terrorist plots occurred on 29 and 30 June 
2007, when two cars loaded with explosives were parked outside a 
nightclub in London’s West End and the next day an attempt was made to 
drive a truck loaded with explosives into the entrance of Glasgow airport. 
The two men who drove the truck into Glasgow airport – Dr. Kafeel 
Ahmed, 27, from Bangalore, India and Dr. Bilal Abdullah, 27, an Iraqi 
doctor registered to work in the UK – are thought also to have parked the 
‘bomb cars’ in London. Dr. Ahmed suffered 90% burns and died in 
hospital, while Dr. Abdullah was charged with conspiracy to cause 
explosions and was scheduled to stand trial in October 2008 with Dr. 
Mohammed Asha, a doctor from Jordan of Palestinian descent who is 
charged with conspiracy to cause explosions.42  
Five other individuals were arrested, including Dr. Asha’s wife, but 
three were released shortly after without charge. A fourth individual, Dr. 
Mohammed Haneef, was arrested in Australia but all charges against him 
have been dropped. Additionally, Dr. Kafeel Ahmed’s brother, Dr. Sabeel 
Ahmed, was arrested and charged with withholding information about the 
attacks. Kafeel Ahmed had emailed his brother on the morning of the 
attack to instruct him to withhold information from the police. Dr. Sabeel 
Ahmed pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 18 months in jail, 
a lesser sentence due to the fact that he received the email after the attacks 
had already occurred. It was reported in various Indian papers that the two 
Ahmed brothers had undergone a change after becoming members of 
Tabligh e-Jamaat.43 
Lessons from UK terrorism cases 
Many academics have sought to construct overarching theories about the 
causes and drivers of radicalisation, but these normally seem to prove only 
the exceptions rather than the rule. The case studies above show that few – 
if any – patterns are universal, and that it is difficult to draw causal links. 
However, these cases do highlight a number of factors that are often 
present, although it is impossible to know with any certainty how 
                                                      
42 “Bomb plot: Arrests and releases”, BBC News, 5 October 2007.  
43 See http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1109091. 
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instrumental each one is on the path to violence. Several factors illustrated 
in the table below stand out as important, namely ‘places’, ‘leaders’, 
‘relatinships’, ‘experiences’ and ‘grievances’. 
Factor Examples 
Key places  •  Finsbury Park Mosque (now known as North London 
Mosque, apparently purged of its radical elements) (21/7) 
•  Speakers Corner, Hyde Park (21/7) 
•  Iqra bookstore in Beeston (7/7)  
•  Local mosques (fertiliser plot) 
•  Trips to Pakistan (fertiliser plot; Khan reportedly met 
Khayam and others involved in the fertiliser plot at a 
training camp in Pakistan)  
•  Tablighi Jamaat meetings/events (transatlantic attack plot, 
London/Glasgow airport plot)  
•  Universities, Islamic students groups: London 
Metropolitan University (transatlantic attack plot, 21/7 
plotters); Brunel University (fertiliser plot)  
•  Websites (Numerous individuals in different plots had 
evidence of accessing jihadi websites; Al-Muhajioun – 
now known as Ahl ul-Sunnah Wa al-Jamma operates 
exclusively by invitation-only internet chat room)  
•  Al-Muhajiroun meetings – Crawley, Luton: (fertiliser plot) 
Charismatic 
leaders 
•  Abu Hamza (influenced 21/7 plotters)  
•  Sheikh el-Faisal (influenced Germaine Lindsay of 7/7, 
Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui) 
•  Omar Bakri (influenced fertiliser plotters) 
•  Dhiren Barot (influenced his co-plotters, as well as Ramzi 
Mohammed, 21/7)  
Relationship 
links 
Family Links (Britain and Pakistan, in particular):  
•  Rashid Rauf’s (transatlantic attack plot) wife is reportedly 
closely related by marriage to Maulana Masood Azhar, 
the founder of Jaish-e-Mohammed, an armed group that 
fought in Kashmir and was connected to Pakistan’s 
intelligence service, ISI* 
•  Waheed Mahmood (fertiliser plot) had a family house in 
Pakistan where the conspirators met to plan  
Friendships (Britain and Pakistan): 
•  Salahuddin Amin (fertiliser plot) was born in Britain but 
raised in Pakistan and was the facilitator between British 
extremists and al-Qaeda 
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•  7/7 plotters all grew up together in Beeston, Leeds. Khan 
referred to his friends in one of his videos as his 
daughter’s ‘uncles’ 
Experiences  Immigration and asylum systems: Yassin Omar, Ramzi 
Mohammed, Adel Yahya (21/7); Jawad Akbar, Anthony 
Garcia (fertiliser plot); Dhiren Barot (UK/US plots); Dr Kafeel 
Ahmed, Dr Bilal Abdullah (London and Glasgow airport);  
Social services: Yassin Omar, Ramzi Mohammed (21/7)  
Stated/assumed 
grievances 
British foreign policy: Mohammed Siddique Khan (7/7); 
Omar Khayam, Anthony Garcia (fertiliser plot); Abu Hamza  
* Duncan Campbell and Randeep Ramesh, “Mysterious Disappearance of an alleged 
Terrorist Mastermind”, The Guardian, 14 August 2006. 
3.  Radical Groups and Movements 
What follows is an account of organisations and networks within the three 
categories of radicalisation that form the structure for this collaborative 
research project: non-political religious, religious and political, and non-
religious political. Where there is evidence of links to violence, this is 
documented, although in many cases this is based on subjective judgments 
and fragmentary evidence. It is therefore more appropriate to view these 
groups as ‘radical’ rather than radicalised, where the latter term is assumed 
to infer an intention to use violence. Groups often cross the boundaries 
between the three categories so this should be viewed as a broad analytical 
tool rather than a precise typology.  
3.1  Non-political religious groups 
Tablighi Jamaat 
Britain is the current locus of Tablighi Jamaat in the West, with the 
Dewsbury Central Mosque in West Yorkshire serving as its European 
headquarters, although the group is highly decentralised.44 It has been 
claimed that terrorists have used membership of this apolitical group as 
cover,45 and that it has served as a first stop to violent extremism. But 
although its fundamentalist ideas are appealing, its apolitical stance means 
                                                      
44 Ibid. 
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that many move on. It has even been criticised by some Muslims for failing 
to condemn Israel or release comments in support of Muslims in Chechnya, 
Kashmir and elsewhere. 46  
Tablighi Jamaat attracts a wide range of individuals, from business 
and political leaders to those seeking to turn their lives around after going 
off the rails. Its anti-Western, isolationist and fundamental characteristics 
also draw young Muslims who are disillusioned with modern society. 
Farad Esack, a South African Islamic scholar who spent 12 years with the 
group in Pakistan, said of the group, that it “attracts angry people -- people 
who need absolutes, who can't stand the grayness of life”.'47 Convicted and 
suspected terrorists in the UK who have been or are suspected of being 
members include: Richard Reid, Kafeel and Sabeel Ahmed, Mohammed 
Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, and some of those involved in the 
transatlantic plot.  
Deobandism 
Deobandism advocates a return to traditional interpretations of Islam and 
is often associated with Tablighi Jamaat. Some have argued that it has 
connections to violent groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but its 
followers claim these groups have distorted their faith.48 Deobandism is 
now the dominant force in British Islam.49 Riyadh ul Haq – reportedly in 
line to become the spiritual leader of Britain’s Deobandi adherents – runs 
an Islamic Academy in Leicester and used to be imam at Birmingham 
Central Mosque. One of the main reservations concerns its alleged 
advocacy of separatism. It is claimed that Riyadh ul Haq has urged 
Muslims to segregate themselves from non-Muslims; he has reportedly 
stated that friendship with Christians and Jews makes a “mockery of 
Allah’s religion”, that football is “a cancer that has infected our youth”, and 
that music is the “Satanic web” Jews spread to corrupt Muslim youth.50 It 
                                                      
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Randeep Ramesh, “Indian Islamic Group attacks BBC Film for Bin Laden Link”, 
The Guardian, 29 October 2007.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Andrew Norfolk, “Hardline Takeover of British Mosques”, The Times, 7 
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has also been claimed that he has argued that Muslims ought to “shed 
blood” overseas in jihad, in defence of Islam. 51  
Salafism (Saudi-Wahhabism) (da’wa) 
Salafism in the UK is organised under the name of Markaz Jamiat Ahl-e-
Hadith and is centred at the Green Lane Masjid/Mosque in Birmingham. 
There are over 40 M.J.A.H branches throughout England and two based in 
Scotland.52 The Green Lane Mosque was brought to national attention 
when a Channel 4 Dispatches programme claimed to uncover ‘hateful’ 
sermons delivered at the Mosque;53 “speaker after speaker uttering hate 
speech against unbelievers, Jews, women and homosexuals.”54 The mosque 
complained that the programme had taken a handful of phrases out of 
context.55 A report by the right-wing think tank, Policy Exchange, went on 
to claim that UK Islamic organisations were receiving significant funding 
from Saudi government-related groups who espouse a fundamentalist 
view of Islam.  
Salafism has come under scrutiny because groups such as al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban draw their interpretation of Islam from Salafist origins. 
However, as Trevor Stanley notes, there are various groups of Salafis who 
claim to be ‘true Salafist’ and who consider others – such as al-Qaeda – as 
takfiris or ‘ex-communicators’. Moreover, while they share similar beliefs 
about the interpretation of a pure form of Islam, they disagree over the 
means of changing society either through da’wa or through violence. An 
article in the Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Journal argues that there are 
three different types of Salafists: purists, politicos and jihadists. 
                                                      
51 Ibid. 
52 See http://www.mjah.org/ContactUs/MJAHVenuesCircles/tabid/65/ 
Default.aspx.  
53  The Guardian, reporting on the Channel 4 Dispatches programme, mentions 
radical imams and sermons at the Green Lane and Sparkbrook Mosques. Jamie 
Doward, “Revealed: preacher’s messages of hate”, 7 January 2007.  
54 “The Hijacking of British Islam”, The Policy Exchange, London, p. 19.  
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3.2  Religious and political groups 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) 
Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953, in Jordanian-ruled Jerusalem by 
Taqiuddin al-Nabhani with the goal of uniting Muslims under one 
supreme Islamic state or caliphate. Officially, HT disavows violence, but 
defends the right to self-defence (by means of violence). The organisation’s 
lack of clarity on this issue leaves it open to accusations of promoting 
violence. The group is said to be at its strongest and best organised in 
Britain (although membership remains low in comparison to other groups) 
and Croydon Mosque has been considered a base for HT events and 
operations. HT first became prominent in the UK in the mid-1990s with a 
noticeable presence on university campuses. In fact, throughout its history, 
there has been a keen focus on recruiting university students. HT’s leader 
in Britain during the mid-1990s was Omar Bakri, who left the group in 1996 
to form the more radical Al-Muhajiroun.  
The group seemed to fade in the late 1990s, but has re-emerged in an 
ostensibly more respectable incarnation. Following the attacks in London 
on 7 July 2005, the British government sought to ban HT,56 but was forced 
to back down after police and intelligence agencies reported that there was 
no direct and explicit connection between HT and violent extremism. HT 
was, however, banned from UK university campuses by the National 
Union of Students, although it is thought to continue to operate covertly.57 
Controversy surrounding the group continues. In a 2007 BBC Panorama 
programme, a former member argued for the organisation to be outlawed 
in Britain, claiming that the softer image presented by HT Britain is a ploy 
to enable its continued legal functioning. He also claims that Asaf Hanif 
and Omar Sharif, the two British citizens responsible for a terrorist attack 
on a bar in Tel Aviv in 2003, were members of HT in Britain, and that Bilal 
Abdulla was also part of HT circles with Maher in Cambridge.58  
                                                      
56 “PM forced to shelve Islamist group ban”, The Independent, 18 July 2006.  
57 Steve Bloomfield, Raymond Whitaker and Sophie Goodchild, “Islamic group in 
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Al-Muhajiroun, The Saviour (or Saved) Sect and Al Ghurabaa 
Al-Muhajiroun was founded by Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed in 1996, 
and he shared leadership with Anjem Choudary. Its version of Islam is 
described as neo-Kharijite, which is a sect of Islam distinct from Sunni and 
Shia. The group gained notoriety when it held the now infamous 
‘Magnificent 19’ conference glorifying the 9/11 hijackers at Finsbury Park 
Mosque. It has been reported that three of the 9/11 hijackers were 
connected with the group in Germany, and former students from British 
universities have been discovered fighting amongst “terrorists” abroad – at 
one point leading the Russian government to ask Britain to ban the group 
when British students were found fighting in Chechnya.59 Al-Muhajiroun 
disbanded in 2004 in anticipation of a ban, and split into two separate 
groups, The Saviour Sect and Al Ghurabaa. These two groups were banned 
under the British Terrorism Act of 2006, but by the time the ban had come 
into force these groups had already created dozens of front organisations, 
many of which were located in Britain.60 
There is evidence to suggest a link to violence. Abu Izzadeen and 
Sulayman Keeler – both found guilty of inciting terrorism – were members 
of both groups.61 Other alleged members include Abdul Saleem, 32 years 
old, charged with inciting terrorism, but cleared of fundraising; Ibrahim 
Hassan, 25 years old, charged with inciting terrorism, but cleared of 
fundraising; Shah Jilal Hussein, 25 years old, found guilty of funding 
terrorism remains missing after failing to turn up to court; Abdul Muhid, 
25 years old, found guilty of funding terrorism; Hussain Rajib Khan, 29 
years old, was cleared of funding terrorism, and the jury was unable to 
reach a verdict on a charge of inciting terrorism; and Omar Zaheer, 28 years 
o l d ,  f o r  w h o m  t h e  j u r y  w e r e  u n a b l e  to reach a verdict on a charge of 
inciting terrorism.  
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Ahl ul-Sunnah Wa al-Jamma (ASWJ) 
Sulyaman (Simon) Keeler formed ASWJ in 2005 as the reunification of The 
Saved Sect and Al Ghurabaa, with Omar Bakri Mohammed, Abu Yahya, 
Abu Izzadeen, Abu Uzair, and Anjem Choudary all extensively involved. 
They have claimed it is not a jihadist group, but evidence from their invite-
only Internet forum suggests otherwise. Infiltrators to the site claim that 
Bakri preaches under a number of aliases, and has been quoted as praising 
the 7/7 attackers saying they were “in paradise”.62 It has also been 
reported that the ASWJ website has called for British Muslims to travel to 
Somalia to fight against Ethiopian troops, who they claim are supported by 
Western countries and Israel.63 The group claims to have 1,000 followers.  
Islamic Council of Britain 
This organisation was apparently formed by Abu Hamza and centred 
around the Finsbury Park Mosque. It was responsible for organising the 
infamous conference held there celebrating the 9/11 attackers. It seems it 
was disbanded with the arrest and conviction of Abu Hamza and the 
instatement of new mosque leadership (the mosque is now known as the 
North Central London Mosque).  
Alleged Jamaat-e-Islami Affiliates 
Jamaat-e-Islami is primarily an Islamist political party based in Pakistan. It 
was founded in 1941 by Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi and is the oldest political 
party within Pakistan. Jamaat-e-Islami opposes all types of Westernisation, 
including democratically structured government and seeks to establish an 
Islamic state in Pakistan. JI also supports, and is affiliated with, the Muslim 
Brotherhood. There is disagreement over whether JI supports or condones 
violent struggle. JI itself claims to work only through non-violent means of 
persuasion, but US intelligence claims to have found links between JI and 
al-Qaeda after the arrest of Khalid Sheik Mohammed and other al-Qaeda 
members in the homes of JI members.64 While Jamaat-e-Islami does not 
have an explicit party or group in Britain, some commentators have 
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64 “Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizbul Mujahideen & Al Qaeda”, South Asian Analysis Group, 
www.southasiananalysis.org, 29 May 2003.  RADICALISATION AMONG MUSLIMS IN THE UK | 129 
 
claimed that a number of British Muslim organisations – including the 
Muslim Association of Britain, the Islamic Foundation, and the United 
Kingdom Islamic Mission – have close ties to Jamaat-e-Islami.65 Ed Hussain 
has claimed that East London Mosque is controlled by the Bandladeshi JI 
and that the mosque serves as a gateway to extremism. 66  
Muslim Association of Britain  
MAB was founded in 1997 and describes itself as a “mainstream grass roots 
organisation” which “actively seeks to dispel the misconceptions about 
Muslims and helps to act as a bridge to promote better understanding 
between the UK and the Muslim World”. It has worked closely with the 
Stop the War Coalition and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. It has 
been accused of links to Hamas and other such groups. Policy Exchange 
claims it is the closest thing in Britain to the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Jamaat-e-Islami and MP Louise Ellman claims that Azzam Tamimi has 
been an adviser to Hamas and a spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood. 
She also quotes him in a number of instances making comments in defence 
of suicide bombers in Palestine as martyrs: “do not call them suicide 
bombers, call them Shuhada [martyrs”; “they [Israelis] have guns. We have 
the human bombs. We love death, they love life”; “For us Muslims, 
martyrdom is not the end of things, but the beginning of the most 
wonderful of things.”67 H e  m a d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o m m e n t  t o  t h e  B B C :  
“Sacrificing myself for Palestine is a noble cause. It is the straight way to 
pleasing God and I would do it if I had the opportunity.” Although 
individual accusations have been made, there is no evidence to suggest 
MAB has played any role in violent extremism in or towards the UK. 
3.3  Non-religious political groups 
In recent years, there has been a substantial rise in the amount of political 
activism within Muslim communities in the UK. This developed in two 
waves: first, that sparked by the build up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
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Britain, was chairman of the East London Mosque. See report by Denis MacEoin, 
“The Hijacking of British Islam”, Policy Exchange, London, 2007.  
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and second following 7/7 when communities decided to organize 
themselves helped by a massive influx of government funding for ‘capacity 
building’. This activity is, on the whole, entirely non-violent and groups 
include the Asian Youth Movement (which no longer exists); the Stop the 
War Coalition; the Respect Coalition; School Students against War 
(affiliated with Stop the War); the Socialist Workers Party; Globalise 
Resistance; Permanent Revolution (UK); and the Workers Power. Most 
groups are small-scale, tend to have regional bases rather than national 
reach, and are often allied to other issues, such as housing, foreign policy, 
deprivation, student politics, and so forth. Only the Stop the War Coalition 
is large enough to merit a detailed description, and is also important 
because it is linked to and spawned so many of the other movements and 
organisations.  
Stop the War Coalition 
The Stop the War Coalition is important for a number of reasons: it gained 
huge traction politically; it attracted a massive following, not just in the UK 
but in many other countries; it became a focal point for other protest; and 
because it brought Muslims and non-Muslims working together for a 
common goal. The key actors in the movement are the Socialist Workers 
Party and the Muslim Association of Britain (mentioned in the previous 
section); and its most notable members are George Galloway, Tony Benn, 
Tariq Ali and Salma Yaqoob. 
One of the other interesting things about the Stop the War Coalition is 
that it managed to span the generational divide that runs deep within 
many Muslim communities, where older generations have often tended to 
stay out of formal politics. While the Coalition was led by the young, it 
attracted older participants, too. As Mobeen Azhar said of the Coalition’s 
activity in Leeds, “I have grown up in a climate of disagreement and 
apathy in the mosque. My peers (and organisations like MPAC) will bear 
testament to the frustration of many in my generation with the 
depoliticised mentalities so unavoidably associated with many of our 
religious leaders. To get my parents’ generation engaging, talking and 
organising was a very personal breakthrough for me.”68  
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In most cases, these non-violent forms of political activism make a 
positive contribution to political and civic life in the UK and are 
empowering for communities which suffer high levels of deprivation (and 
are therefore in need of activism to change their circumstances). They 
might also prove to be part of the solution to violent extremism. As Salma 
Yaqoob says, ‘…the dominant character of Muslim radicalisation in Britain 
today points not towards terrorism or religious extremism, but in the 
opposite direction: towards political engagement in new, radical and 
progressive coalitions that seek to unite Muslim with non-Muslim in 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary strategies to affect change.’ She 
added, ‘…it is only by encouraging the widening of this progressive 
expression of Muslim radicalism that the political purchase of strategies 
based on either terrorism or Muslim sectarianism can be minimised.’69  
Some have sought to present these movements as dangerous and 
have described their emergence as a sign of the Muslim community’s desire 
for separatism.70 But this is not supported by polling which shows that 
young Muslims are keen to engage.71 Analysis of the 2003 Home Office 
Citizenship Survey suggests that political activity by Muslims positively 
contributes to their sense of identification with Britain. What’s more, in a 
recent survey four-fifths (81%) of Muslims said it was important to 
proactively engage in British politics,72 and in another, two-thirds of 
Muslim students said they did not see a conflict between loyalty to the 
Ummah and to the UK.73 Set alongside Pew’s data, this creates a confusing 
picture of the Muslim community in the UK. However, one must remember 
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that community attitudes are never straightforward and there is not 
necessarily anything contradictory in a community feeling unhappy about 
life in the UK and also wanting to do something about it through increased 
political activity.  
Riots in northern towns 
Although not a movement or organisation, it is worth noting in this section 
the disturbances in Northern towns which saw violence on the streets in a 
number of places which was in large part explained by the socio-economic 
circumstances of Muslim and Asian communities set out in an earlier 
section. In the summer of 2001, a number of northern towns experienced 
violent clashes predominantly caused by racial tensions, exacerbated by 
orchestrated rivalries between criminal gangs. In Oldham, the riots took 
place over three successive nights in May and left 86 police officers injured. 
Violence then erupted in Burnley, resulting in clashes between hundreds of 
white and Asian youths and widespread damage to property and 
businesses. On 7 July 2001, the worst violence broke out in the 
Manningham area of Bradford when 1000 young men took to the streets, 
leaving 120 police officers injured.74 
The causes of the riots differed in each place; in Oldham they were 
due to racial tensions between Asian and white communities caused by 
social division and poverty; in Burnley gang rivalries were blamed; and in 
Bradford, tensions flared when an Anti-Nazi League march led to a stand-
off with National Front supporters. A number of independent reviews were 
commissioned for each city, along with an overarching national report 
authored by community cohesion expert, Ted Cantle. He pointed to the fact 
that many communities lived ‘parallel lives’ and made recommendations 
around a number of underlying causes, including housing, youth, 
regeneration, politics and education.75  
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4.  Policy Responses 
The UK government’s counter-terrorism policies are brought together 
under the CONTEST strategy. It is a 4-pronged approach which covers the 
so-called ‘four p’s’: prevent, pursue, protect and prepare. The government’s 
security budget (which covers all security, not just counter-terrorism 
spending) was £2.5 billion in 2007 and will rise to £3.5 billion by 2010, 
reflecting the growing importance of security. Increased resource to the 
Security Service (MI5) gives a clue as to the importance placed specifically 
on counter-terrorism; its staffing levels were 2000 in 2001, but by 2007 they 
had risen to 3,300 and will grow until they reach 4000 in the next few years. 
The Prime Minister also announced at the end of 2007 that the government 
had established dedicated regional counter-terrorism units with more than 
2000 police and support staff.  
There have been two significant changes to government policy in the 
last year or so: increased emphasis on ‘prevent’, and the realisation of the 
importance of language and communication.  
Engagement work with Muslim communities began in earnest after 
7/7 when the Home Office set up a formal process called the Preventing 
Extremism Together (PET) working groups. The process was a step in the 
right direction, but was widely criticized for being rushed, government-led, 
and involving too narrow a group of individuals,76 but it established the 
principle of engagement and many lessons have been learned as a result. 
Since then, the government has greatly widened the range of individuals 
and organisations it engages and works with and has injected much needed 
money into creating, sustaining and developing community infrastructure 
that in many cases wasn’t there to begin with. But decisions about 
engagement are always fraught, especially when so much is at stake and 
the complexities of community politics are difficult for outsiders to 
navigate. In July 2008, there was considerable controversy surrounding the 
second bi-annual Islam Expo, whose main organizers include individuals 
involved with MAB. Some accused them of being supporters of Hamas,77 
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which led the Communities Secretary, Hazel Blears, to ban any government 
involvement in the event.78  
The Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, signaled his commitment to the 
prevent agenda by announcing several hundreds of millions of pounds of 
new funding over the next three years. This includes an additional £240 
million to the Home Office between now and 2011 towards counter-
terrorism policing; £400 million in the next 3 years invested through the 
Foreign Office, Department for International Development, and the British 
Council to tackle radicalisation and promote understanding overseas; and 
£70 million towards community projects dedicated to tackling violent 
extremism. In announcing this spending in a November 2007 speech to 
Parliament, he said: 
To deal with the challenge posed by the terrorist threat we have to 
do more, working with communities in our country, first, to 
challenge extremist propaganda and support alternative voices; 
secondly, to disrupt the promoters of violent extremism by 
strengthening our institutions and supporting individuals who 
may be being targeted; thirdly, to increase the capacity of 
communities to resist and reject violent extremism; and fourthly, 
to address issues of concern exploited by ideologues, where by 
emphasizing our shared values across communities we can both 
celebrate and act upon what unites us.  
The second and related major change has been a marked shift in 
government tone and language in recognition of the fact that the 
government was often making matters worse. The Research Information 
and Communications Unit (RICU), a unit within the newly formed Office 
for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office but with 
cross government reach, is seeking to improve government language in a 
way that avoids playing into the hands of the violent extremists and wins 
the hearts and minds of Britain’s Muslim communities. Ministers will no 
longer use the phrase ‘war on terror’; they will talk about a ‘struggle’ rather 
than a ‘battle’ and will stop talking about the ‘Muslim problem’.79 While 
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this shift in Ministerial and offical language is visible, it has yet to make 
significant inroads at the operational level. 
The policy setting for Muslims is also influenced by a wider range of 
policies, such as immigration, integration, citizenship and cohesion, and in 
these areas the rhetoric has on the whole become harder in response to 
wider public concerns about security and fairness in resource allocation. In 
terms of policies relating to ‘living together’, there has been a shift from 
multiculturalism and the celebration of difference towards integration (for 
example, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion and the Green 
Paper on Citizenship), with the emphasis on immigrants and minority 
communities fitting into life in Britain, becoming active citizens, learning 
the language and playing a role in wider society. These specific initiatives 
are happening against the backdrop of an increasingly vocal debate about 
Britishness and identity. 
Conclusions 
The threat to the UK from radicalisation will remain present for a long time 
yet; it has been described by MI5 as the most serious danger to face the UK 
for the last century. As we search for solutions, it is perhaps not surprising 
that suspicion falls on a range of groups and individuals whose behaviour 
may on the surface appear dangerous or subversive. However, if 
alienatiion of the next generation of young Muslims is to be avoided, it will 
be important to engage in greater depth with these groups, understand the 
complexities of community politics, and come to a more nuanced 
understanding of the rich mosaic of political mobilisation that is now 
flourishing across large parts of our Muslim communities. This 
mobilisation will in fact, with some notable exceptions, offer part of the 
solution to radicalisation: it gives positive alternatives for those who feel 
disillusioned and voiceless, it provides vehicles for solving the deeply 
entrenched problems associated with deprivation suffered by many 
Muslims, these organisations can challenge extremist rhetoric and build 
community resilience, and it will eventually provide a mechanism for 
political integration.  136 | 
 
 
7.  MUSLIMS IN SPAIN AND ISLAMIC 
RELIGIOUS RADICALISM 
PATRICIA BEZUNARTEA, JOSÉ MANUEL LÓPEZ & 
LAURA TEDESCO 
Introduction 
Spain has historically been considered a country of emigration, but this has 
recently changed. The year 2000 was a turning point, as since then the 
immigration issue has been on the political agenda. Indeed, the 
administrative institutions for managing immigration were created 
between 2000 and 2004. Spain’s immigration law was amended four times 
during that period and four regularisation processes were implemented. A 
further 600,000 immigrants underwent a regularisation process in 2005. 
Immigration is the most important socio-economic change that has 
taken place in Spain in recent years, putting an end to Spain’s demographic 
stagnation and energising its economy. Between the years 2001 and 2006, 
50% of GDP growth was owing to the positive effect that immigration had 
had on per capita income.1 
Immigration in Spain is thus a recent phenomenon. As a result, there 
are no clear models with which to approach this issue, nor are there well-
established social structures to deal with possible conflicts or social 
confrontations. There is still much to be done and while this is the cause of 
uncertainty, it is also the source of many opportunities to improve and 
learn from other European experiences. 
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This chapter starts from the assumption that the process of 
integration in Spain is different from that in other EU countries and that it 
is marked by two main characteristics. First, immigrants from Muslim 
countries are fewer in number than immigrants from Latin American 
countries. Second, the existence of domestic terrorism, through the Basque 
separatist group ETA, tempers the impact of tensions and conflicts from 
radical Islam.  
Recent polls indicate that immigration and terrorism are among the 
main concerns of Spaniards. According to the 2007 Opinion Barometer 
survey conducted by the Sociological Research Centre (CIS)2, immigration 
(a concern for 11.6% of the population) stands fourth behind terrorism 
(23.6%), unemployment (14.4%) and housing (14.1%) in terms of the 
problems perceived as affecting Spain most acutely. This reference to 
terrorism focuses more on that perpetrated by ETA than that of the Islamic 
terrorist cells. Of course, the 2004 Madrid attacks changed many aspects of 
Spaniards’ perception of Islamic terrorism, making it much more real and 
threatening. Nevertheless, ETA’s permanent campaign and the failed 
Basque peace processes are still much more at the forefront of people’s 
minds.  
Therefore, the tensions and conflicts having the greatest impact on 
Spain do not appear to focus on immigrants from Muslim countries. These 
groups blend together with other groups of immigrants – the majority of 
whom are South American – and the threat of Islamic terrorism is blurred 
by the ETA attacks, street violence in the Basque country, extortion of the 
Basque business community, court trials of ETA members, the capture of 
wanted terrorists and the permanent debate among the majority parties on 
the nation’s stance against ETA. 
Taking all these issues into consideration, this chapter offers an 
analysis of the situation of immigrants in Spain from predominately 
Muslim countries. A first section focuses on recent immigration into Spain 
from all sources to help put the situation of Muslim immigrants into 
perspective. The second gives a brief recent history of the Muslim 
community in Spain and a description of how its institutions have been 
formed. The third section provides a study of the tensions and conflicts 
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revolving around the 11 March 2004 attacks, their political impact, the court 
trial and judgement. A final section looks briefly at the situation of the cities 
of Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish enclaves in Morocco. The conclusions offer 
some reflections on the future of the Muslim community and its potential 
for integration.  
One of the overarching questions dealt with in this volume is how 
one can change the al-Qaeda narrative and undo the relationship 
established between Islam, al-Qaeda and international terrorism.3 We feel 
that this is genuinely possible in Spain if the government is able to help the 
first and second generations of immigrants to integrate, especially the 
Moroccans as the largest group, because it is our belief that, for the time 
being, the Muslim community in Spain has not embraced violence but 
rather integration.  
1.  Recent immigration in Spain 
As mentioned above, immigration has grown considerably over the last 
several years. A closer look at the figures helps to put the reality of Spain’s 
Muslim communities into context. 
Immigration in Spain is very recent and has progressed swiftly. In 
just a decade, the number of immigrants has skyrocketed, growing from 
half a million in the middle of the 1990s to over 5 million today. The largest 
group is from Morocco (676,405) followed by Ecuador (451,072), Colombia 
(326,459), Argentina (287,760), Bolivia (238,605), Peru (160,603), Brazil 
(140,942), Venezuela (142,709) and the Dominican Republic (113,681). There 
are in total 2,273,324 Latin American immigrants residing in Spain (the sum 
of Central and South Americans plus Mexicans) compared with 
approximately 800,000 from Arabic-speaking and Muslim countries 
(Morocco, Algeria, Senegal, Nigeria, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan).4 
These figures point to a clear difference between Spain and the other 
European countries analysed in this volume, where in most cases the 
number of Muslim immigrants is well over the 1 million mark. For 
example, in France, Muslim immigrants account for between 7 and 10% of 
the total population while in Spain that figure is barely above 1%.  
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Of the Muslim immigrants, the Moroccans are those who tend most 
to come with their families, 20% of them being under the age of 16, while 
those from Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are 
mostly men who immigrate alone in search of employment. According to 
the National Statistics Institute, on 1 January 2008 there were 676,405 
Moroccans, 55,042 Algerians, 44,898 Senegalese and 33,692 Nigerians 
legally residing in Spain. There are 944,672 total immigrants from Africa. 
Additionally, there are 47,422 immigrants from Pakistan, 28,367 from India 
and 7,565 from Bangladesh. There are 281,402 total immigrants from Asian 
countries, the majority of whom are from China, accounting for 125,301.5 
A study of the immigrant Muslim population was conducted in 2007 
by Metroscopia, funded by the Ministr i e s  o f  J u s t i c e ,  L a b o u r  a n d  S o c i a l  
Affairs and the Interior.6 The survey was conducted during June and July 
2007, involving 2,000 persons from Morocco (57% of the sample), Senegal 
(12%), Pakistan (11%), Algeria (5%) and Gambia, Mali, Bangladesh, 
Mauritania and Nigeria (all under 5%). The questions were designed to 
discover Muslim immigrants’ perception of their integration process in 
Spain, their standard of living, their work and family situations, their 
image of Spain and their expectations. The results showed a Muslim 
population that is integrated into Spanish society, Westernised and 
tolerant. This mirrors the results of the study conducted by the PEW 
Research Centre of Washington D.C., which in 2005 confirmed that Spain 
had a Muslim community that was very well integrated.  
Immigrant integration has been a concern of the Spanish government, 
and at the national, regional and local levels, it has begun to create an 
infrastructure designed to formulate and implement immigration policy. 
Over the last several years, at the national level the Comisión 
Interministerial de Extranjería [Interministerial Commission for Alien 
Affairs], the Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes [Forum for 
the Social Integration of Immigrants], the Observatorio Permanente de la 
Inmigración [Permanent Immigration Observatory], the Consejo Superior 
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de Política de Inmigración [High Council for Immigration Policy] and the 
Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia [Pluralism and Co-existence 
Foundation] have been created.  
In February 2007, at the request of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, the cabinet of the Spanish government approved the 2007–10 
Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration. This plan targets both 
immigrants and Spanish nationals in that it holds that integration is an 
issue concerning all members of the community. The plan follows the 
directives of the European Commission and seeks more suitable 
management of migratory flows and integration processes. It is considered 
the framework plan for cooperation among all stakeholders, its principles 
being equality and non-discrimination, citizenship and interculturalism. 
The plan’s main areas of action are reception, education, employment, 
housing, social services, health, children and youth, equality, women, 
participation, awareness-raising and co-development. The budget for 2007–
10 is €2,005 million, 40% of which is earmarked for education, 20% for 
reception and 11% for employment.7 
Muslim immigration in Spain is part of a recent immigration flow 
that has been diverse but largely from Latin America. As such, the 
challenges for immigration in Spain are not so much based on the 
integration of Muslim immigrants but rather on the integration of nearly 2 
million Latin Americans. In this connection, the tensions and conflicts focus 
as much on Muslim immigrants as they do on those from Latin America. 
Two recent attacks against immigrant women in Barcelona and Madrid 
involved Ecuadorians. The Latin gangs formed by young immigrants have 
caused concern in some local communities owing to a few isolated cases of 
aggression. In Barcelona, the Latin gangs turned things around and formed 
an association for immigrant youth rejecting the violence of the young gang 
members.  
Immigration was an important factor in the debates leading up to the 
March 2008 elections. In some of these debates, it was argued that 
immigrants are inundating the free health services offered in Spain. The 
most provocative references in this connection were directed at Latin 
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Americans who, given their numbers, are the most visible.8 The nearly 
simultaneous arrival of immigrants of different nationalities minimises the 
impact of Muslim immigrants, differentiating Spain from the rest of the 
cases studied in this volume.  
2.  Recent history of Islam in Spain 
To understand the social reality of Muslims in contemporary Spain, it is 
necessary to begin in the middle of the 1950s, when General Franco’s 
regime began to close the cultural gap with countries of the Near East. 
Cultural exchanges were encouraged, including the arrival of students at 
Spanish universities. These initial contacts resulted in the influx of 
hundreds of students at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s 
from countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Egypt. In 
1971, some of these students formed the Muslim Association of Spain 
( S p a n i s h  a b b r e v i a t i o n  A M E ) .  S o m e  o f  t h e m  w e r e  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  I s l a m i c  
currents rooted in their home countries that have had a degree of influence 
on the Muslim community in Europe such as the Muslim Brothers or At-
tala’i (known as Atalayas in Spanish), which evolved into associations in the 
main Spanish cities, especially in Granada and Madrid. The AME acted for 
some time as a federation of Spain’s 17 regions9 and has maintained its 
legal personality. Prior to the formation of the AME, a small Muslim 
community called the ‘Muslim Community of Melilla’ had arisen in the city 
of Melilla in 1968. No other organisation was formed in Spain until after the 
establishment of democracy and the ratification of the 1978 Constitution 
and the new Religious Freedom Act of 1980. 
This initial, minority Islamic movement changed after 1990 with the 
appearance of immigrants from the Maghreb and the rising number of 
mixed families, mostly Spanish-Moroccan, within the Islamic community. 
Owing to the settlement process during this period of economic 
immigration from countries where the majority of the population is Muslim 
(many from Morocco), Islam has become increasingly visible in Spain in the 
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form of personal symbols (e.g. the headscarf and chilaba) and community 
structures (prayer houses, mosques and halal butcher shops). 
Hence, the Muslim community’s arrival and settlement process in 
Spain has taken place in two major stages. The first started with the 
creation of the first Muslim religious organisation at the beginning of the 
1970s and went on to the signing of the Cooperation Agreements between 
Spain and the Spanish Islamic Commission (CIE) in 1992, which had been 
created to represent all Muslims in dealings with the government. The 
second stage began with the immigration of citizens from countries where 
the majority of the population is Muslim and it continues up to today. The 
turning point, however, was not the approval of the Cooperation 
Agreement between Spain and the CIE but rather the growing wave of 
immigration. Both of these events (the increase in immigration and the 
signing of the Agreement) took place around the same time in 1991–92. 
During the first stage, the Spanish Muslim community was very 
small and had two main components, a scholarly group of 
immigrants/students from Muslim countries and the first native-born 
Spaniards who converted to Islam during these two decades. 
The aim of the scholarly group, formed mainly of young, single or 
recently married men with a high level of education and from a middle or 
upper social class, was to complete their studies, collect their diplomas and 
return to their country of origin rather than settle down and form families 
in Spain. Given that their stay was temporary, most did not feel the need to 
group together into an organised community in order to protect their rights 
and places of worship. From a socio-economic perspective, being university 
students and economically well-off, in contrast to the majority of today’s 
Muslim immigrants, facilitated their integration. As for religious practices, 
the majority of this group was Sunni but there was also a minority Shiite 
component, mostly from Lebanon and Iraq. Many made their way to Spain 
as refugees fleeing from their countries for political reasons or because of 
armed conflicts plaguing the Middle East: the Palestinian conflict, the civil 
war in Lebanon and the war between Iraq and Iran. 
Regarding the Spanish who converted to Islam, two generations can 
be identified: the generation of those who converted in the 1970s and 1980s, 
almost all of whom are Sunnis (although there is also a Shiite minority), 
and the generation of converts from the 1990s. The former were mostly 
university students who yearned for cultural exposure and identified with 
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Sufism. The latter features men and especially women who married 
immigrants from predominately Muslim countries and who converted to 
Islam either before or after marriage. 
The majority of the converts who embraced Islam were originally 
Catholics who did not identify with the Catholic religion and felt attracted 
by Islam as an alternative for religious, political and social reasons. These 
reasons include the fact that Islam is a religion without clergy, in other 
words it has no ecclesiastical hierarchy. There was also a degree of 
idealisation of the Arab and Muslim world within the sphere of art and 
culture, which in some cases had to do with a certain exotic flavour related 
to the hippie movement, but was mostly the path taken by some groups 
that participated in the May 1968 movements.  
Finally, new groups of Muslim immigrants began arriving in Spain 
around 1990. These were primarily economic immigrants. Currently, the 
largest group of Muslim immigrants comes from Morocco, with Algeria a 
distant second source, mostly along the eastern Mediterranean coast. These 
two countries are followed in number by immigrants from Senegal, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Muslims from other European 
and Asian countries account for the lowest percentage: Kosovars, 
Albanians, Bosnians, Tatars, Chechens and Azerbaijanis. Generally 
speaking, there are more men than women immigrants from countries that 
are predominately Muslim, although in the case of Morocco the percentage 
of women is gradually nearing that of men. For the rest of the countries, the 
percentage of men is much higher.  
While the second stage of immigration is more significant from a 
quantitative standpoint, it was during the first that the Muslims organised 
themselves. At the end of the 1980s, the government offered minority faiths 
(Jewish, Protestant and Muslim) the possibility of signing Cooperation 
Agreements with the condition of appointing a single representative for 
each. The Muslims had already formed two federations, the Federación 
Española de Entidades Religiosas Islámicas [Spanish Federation of Islamic 
Religious Groups, FEERI] and the Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de 
España [Union of Islamic Communities in Spain, UCIDE]. The Federation 
was the first of the two organisations. Because of internal differences, a 
splinter group later formed the UCIDE. Faced with the requirement of 
having a single representative, the two federations formed the above-
mentioned CIE, although the two federations do not have a close 
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identities within the CIE. There are, therefore, two secretary generals, one 
for each federation, as well as two representatives of each of the federations 
(four in total). The two federations operate independently of one another 
and the CIE only meets when it has to communicate with the national 
government. Hence, coordination within the CIE is anything but seamless. 
In terms of the number of communities, as of 31 March 2008, 559 
Muslim communities were registered in the Ministry of Justice’s registry of 
religious organisations: 315 from UCIDE, 57 from FEERI and 187 that were 
not affiliated with either of the two federations. Registration of religious 
communities in Spain is not compulsory and thus there are unregistered 
Muslim communities. The total number of communities (both registered 
and non-registered) is estimated at 700. 
The main catalyst behind this process was the creation of the 
Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia by the Spanish government. The aim 
of the foundation is the funding of cultural, educational and social action 
projects of minority faiths that have signed a Cooperation Agreement with 
the government, i.e. Muslims, Jews and Protestants. More important than 
the very limited economic support earmarked for projects, the foundation 
has secured the recognition of these communities as social actors and this 
has sparked their own further calls for recognition. They are now on the 
political agenda and hence more open and no longer relegated to the 
private sphere. This openness has been evident at both state and local 
levels where they have begun to interact with city councils and other social 
organisations. The other important element in this recognition process has 
been the publication of the first school textbook on the Islamic religion 
entitled Descubrir Islam [Discover Islam]. The Muslims have been given the 
opportunity to teach religion in public schools in accordance with the 
Cooperation Agreements signed in 1992, but this has been done without 
any printed material and in Arabic. The publication of this book in Spanish 
by a Catholic publishing house has contributed to the mainstreaming 
process. 
This important movement has also had an impact on the 
reorganisation of the federations within the CIE and the emergence of new 
initiatives and community groups, which will eventually lead the CIE to 
rethink its structure to adapt to the political organisation of Spain (and its 
17 autonomous communities). Now there are at least four new, federal-type 
initiatives that are grouping communities together and seeking to form part 
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Regarding different groups within Islam, there is a movement 
attempting to join like-thinking groups together in the CIE restructuring 
process. This is more evident in those regions where there are a large 
number of communities (Madrid, Catalonia and Murcia) but is much less 
significant in other places where there is only one mosque per municipality 
(or even per district) attracting all of the Muslims of the area regardless of 
their branch of Islam. There are, therefore, many ‘neutral’ mosques where 
attempts to establish a particular branch of Islam are not meeting with 
success.  
Finally, the proximity of Morocco to Spain has had an effect on the 
kind of person immigrating to Spain and the influence this country 
attempts to hold over this group. Yet, this factor may be more significant 
when attempting to classify communities rather than currents or branches 
of Islam. 
3.  The 11 March 2004 attacks  
The terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 are crucial to understanding the 
process that Islam has undergone in Spain. It is even possible to speak of a 
new stage in the Muslim reality in Spain resulting from the attacks. After 
more than four years since those events, however, it remains clear that 
objectively there is hardly any connection between the Islam of the 
religious communities in Spain and the Islam of the attacks – two worlds 
whose paths have not crossed, and are still not crossing now. This specific 
idea must be at the centre of any political proposal for action. 
According to the 28 September 2005 decision of the Criminal 
Chamber of the National High Court delivered by Magistrate Juan del 
Olmo regarding the 11 March attacks, Islamic activities carried out in Spain 
prior to 2002 can be broken down into three stages: 
1)  initial organisation, which began at the start of the 1990s; 
2)  expansion and interconnection with other networks of the jihad and 
the recruiting of new members from among the immigrant 
community; and 
3)  a third stage after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, 
D.C., with growing hostility towards Spanish interests. 
During all of this time, jihad members had been using Spain to escape 
from the persecution they were subject to in their countries of origin. They 
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new members and send them to training camps, collect funds and transfer 
them to terrorist cells in other countries, falsify documents, purchase 
material and seek support for their fight against governments considered 
unfriendly in predominately Muslim countries. Their functions were 
mostly logistical, consisting of support for ‘combat’ cells. It has even been 
proven that Spain was used during the preparation of the 9/11 attacks.10 
The first attack of this sort in Spain occurred on 12 April 1985 at a 
restaurant in the vicinity of what was then the American base at Torrejon 
de Ardoz (Madrid). Eighteen people were killed and a further hundred 
were injured in this attack, and although the target was clearly the US 
military personnel who frequented this establishment, all of those killed 
were Spanish nationals. The ensuing investigation was unable to determine 
who was responsible for the attack. 
Still, the establishment of Islamic terrorist cells and networks in Spain 
is more recent. The first arrests were made in 1997, indicating that the first 
contacts and establishment of residence in Spain took place at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Fifteen Algerians linked to the GIA (Armed Islamic 
Group) were arrested in Valencia and Barcelona. This was a support cell, 
typical of the role played by these groups in Spain with varying importance 
over time. 
As early as 2003, some experts11 were already suggesting a series of 
preventive measures as part of a strategy to thwart Islamic terrorism, 
which remain valid in 2008:  
•  Assume that terrorists can carry out attacks in Spain and that their 
consequences could be extremely serious, as was borne out by the 11 
March 2004 attacks.  
•  Involve the Islamic communities settled in Spain in the prevention and fight 
against Islamic terrorism. At that time, it was already believed that 
Islamic communities were not a security problem per se and that they 
should be sheltered from terrorist penetration, because they could 
potentially contribute to terrorist objectives. 
                                                      
10 See J. Jordán, “Las redes de terrorismo islamista en España. Balance y 
perspectivas de futuro”, ARI No. 119-2003, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 13 
October 2003 (retrieved from www.realinstitutoelcano.org). 
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•  Foster the integration of immigrants from predominately Muslim countries. 
The importance of the socio-economic and cultural integration of 
immigrants and especially their descendents as an effective 
preventive measure to head off the emergence of radicalism had been 
highlighted prior to the 11 March attacks.12 
Among the reasons Madrid was chosen as the site for a new major 
attack is the prior existence of radical Islamic networks organised in Spain 
for the provision of logistical support and the alignment and active 
participation of the Spanish government in the decisions leading up to the 
occupation of Iraq, with Spain being the ‘weakest’ member of that strategic 
alliance (formed basically by the US and the UK). The reasons also include 
the far greater political priority and effort placed on the fight against 
domestic terrorism (ETA), thus drawing attention away from this new 
threat. 
On 11 March 2004, Spain suffered the greatest terrorist attacks in its 
history, an event that has marked the subsequent years of Spain’s political 
and social life. That morning, ten explosions on four commuter trains took 
place between 06:45 and 07:40. In the event, 191 persons lost their lives and 
2,057 were injured. 
The first official versions claimed that the Basque separatist terrorist 
group ETA was responsible for the attacks, but during the course of the 
day, it became increasingly clear that the attacks had been perpetrated by 
radical Islamic groups. The proximity of the date of the attacks to the 
general elections (scheduled for 14 March) led to insistence on the part of 
the government (People’s Party, PP) that ETA was responsible. The PP was 
accused by different media of manipulating information, for example by 
sending a note to Spanish embassies abroad urging them to blame ETA and 
its efforts to force through a UN resolution condemning ETA for the attack. 
The general media confusion caused a political and social rift that set the 
tone for the whole of the legislative period that followed, and which 
remained apparent in 2008. 
On 12 March, nearly 11 million people marched through the streets of 
Spain condemning the attacks. On 14 March, the PP-led government lost 
the general elections. An endless round of political debates ensued, which 
                                                      
12 Subsequent events point to the partial failure of these policies throughout the 
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mostly claimed that the perpetrators of the attacks had won given that they 
had managed to alter the results of the elections. Although it is true that the 
polls prior to 11 March indicated that the PP would win the election by an 
absolute majority, the reasons for the Socialist Party’s (PSOE) victory are 
complex. In the aftermath of the attack, the Spanish electorate decided to 
punish the ruling PP party. Spain’s participation in the war in Iraq was 
repudiated by nearly 90% of the population. The Spanish people viewed 
the 11 March attacks as a consequence of Spain’s participation in the 
invasion. The PP government’s manipulation of information in the initial 
hours following the attacks, doing everything in its power to link them to 
Basque terrorism, was what triggered the population to take a stand 
against the government. These events prompted a much higher-than-
expected voter turnout and that is what led to the PSOE’s victory in the 
elections. In his electoral campaign, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero had 
announced that if elected, he would bring Spanish troops home unless the 
UN took charge of the situation in Iraq. This measure was one of the first he 
implemented after he won the elections. The Madrid attacks and the search 
for those responsible monopolised the political arena for quite some time. 
On 3 April 2004, as a result of a police siege, eight members of the 
Islamic cell responsible for the attacks blew themselves up in Leganes (a 
neighbourhood in Madrid). An assistant police inspector belonging to the 
National Police Corp’s Special Operations Group also lost his life in that 
explosion. 
For its part, the Spanish parliament called for the creation of an 
investigation commission (enquiry) charged with analysing the political 
consequences of the attacks and with tabling proposals to address similar 
situations in the future. The report was approved with the votes of all 
members of parliament with the exception of the PP. In addition to 
recommendations and proposals, the report censured the media 
manipulation and the actions taken by the government at the time of the 
attacks and proposed five overarching principles on which the fight against 
international terrorism should be based: 
•  solidarity with the victims of terrorism; 
•  unity among all democratic political forces; 
•  cooperation at different levels, i.e. international and European, 
collaboration among the national, regional and local governments and 
coordination among the state police and security forces and 
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•  international initiatives to eradicate the underlying causes conducive 
to or aiding the criminal actions of terrorists; and 
•  protection of civil liberties and citizens’ rights.13 
Court proceedings and the judgement concerning the 11 March attacks14 
After several years of investigation and numerous arrests, the legal order 
that brought the investigative stage of the terrorist attacks to a close put 29 
individuals on trial (9 of whom were Spanish nationals). This same court 
decision affirmed that the attacks had been inspired but not executed by al-
Qaeda and identified the Islamic Moroccan Combatant Group, the most 
representative group of the jihad Salafist movement in Spain, as being 
responsible for the attacks. 
The judgement convicted those directly responsible for the attacks 
but failed to find sufficient evidence to convict those accused of being the 
intellectual planners. Of the 29 accused, 7 were acquitted by the judgement 
and another was exonerated during the trial. The participation of ETA was 
also ruled out. Among those accountable for the massacre (aside from those 
convicted and those who died in Leganes), 4 remain at large and 7 genetic 
profiles have yet to be identified. Appendix A reports those who were 
convicted.  
The trial of the leaders of the attacks concluded with the certainty 
that al-Qaeda inspired the attacks but did not order or organise them. The 
group that carried out the attacks was formed by young immigrants, some 
of whom were childhood friends from Tetuán (Morocco), who had ended 
up taking part in a network selling hashish. The genesis of this group was 
around phone centres and not mosques. In fact, one of the group’s most 
violent members was expelled from Madrid’s main mosque because of his 
violent opinions. It was the community itself that had expelled him.  
These Islamic terrorist groups are composed of very young persons 
whose community of reference is not visible but rather virtual and who see 
themselves as ‘heroes’. They do not have direct contact with al-Qaeda 
leaders but nonetheless form part of a virtual space that nourishes them 
                                                      
13 See the opinion containing the conclusions of the investigation debated at Spain’s 
Cortes Generales at the 22 June 2005 session. 
14 The judgement was delivered by Section Two of the National High Court’s 
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with ideology. Within this space is a jihad composed of cells that 
individually decide on their objectives. It was within this framework that 
the 11 March attacks were perpetrated. 
Today, it is the communities themselves that have the greatest vested 
interest in preventing violent movements within their ranks and swiftly 
expelling those who upset the community. A close look at the arrests made 
through anti-terrorist operations in the last three years that have targeted 
Islamic violence in Spain shows that only one focused on a mosque-based 
group. All of the arrests, with the exception of those made in January 2008 
in Barcelona at a mosque frequented mostly by Pakistanis, were of persons 
who recruited at the community level (appendix B). 
4.  The situation in Ceuta and Melilla 
An analysis of the situation in Spain requires special mention of Ceuta and 
Melilla, which, owing to their geo-strategic location, play a major role 
concerning the Arab–Muslim world in Spain. Approximately 50% of the 
population of these two autonomous cities professes the Muslim religion, 
which makes them an ideal observatory to study potential conflicts and the 
possibility of the co-existence and cohesion of a multi-faith society.  
A close look at the local press indicates that these issues appear much 
more frequently than in other regional or national media. The basic 
problems of inter-religious relations are much more evident and the 
political discourse of Spain’s major parties makes exceptions when 
referring to the populations of Ceuta and Melilla. 
Political discourse opposed to Muslim women wearing the hijab, 
claiming that this poses a threat to Spain’s alleged national ‘Christian 
essence’ (some right-wing and extreme right-wing groups), or a threat to 
the separation of church and state (some left-wing parties), is toned down 
in references to Ceuta and Melilla. Women’s right to wear the Islamic veil 
freely is defended because ‘they are Spanish’, or comment is simply 
withheld.  
Owing to their geographical and geo-strategic position, these two 
cities are also key to some of the most important issues on the political 
agenda in Spain. These two small enclaves are consistently at the heart of 
matters such as immigration, foreign relations with the Moroccan 
government and Islamic religious radicalism. The issue of radicalism and 
terrorism is crucial not only because these cities have been or could be 
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centres for radical Moroccan groups, but also – over and above the pride 
felt for the harmonious mix of cultures – there is a growing concern about 
the tension between Catholics and Muslims caused by fear of terrorism. 
Yet, of the 32 persons arrested up to August 2008 for their alleged ties 
with Islamic terrorism, only 2 were arrested in Melilla and that was the 
fruit of police cooperation with Morocco, where they had been wanted by 
the judicial authorities.  
Conclusions 
When addressing the issue of Islam it is fair to say that we have two very 
different groups operating in two very different contexts but which are 
perceived by Spanish society as a single group, and this could have 
negative consequences if an active policy is not implemented. 
F i r s t ,  w e  h a v e  a  g r o u p  t h a t  i n c l u d e s  t h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  S p a n i s h  
Muslims, whose numbers in 2008 reached 800,000. This group is composed 
of immigrants practicing their faith who are from predominately Muslim 
countries and who have permanently settled in Spain. The second 
generation (their descendents) is becoming Spanish citizens, and is in the 
process of finding their place in society. In other words, even if they are not 
yet all Spanish citizens they are destined to be in the near future.  
Not all are Muslims. According to recent studies15 nearly 20% of the 
immigrants from predominately Muslim countries consider themselves 
‘non-believers’. It is therefore erroneous to confuse ‘Moroccan’ with 
‘Muslim’ or ‘Muslim’ with ‘immigrant’. The second generation is caught up 
in the same processes as the rest of the Spanish youth. A strong 
secularisation process is giving rise to a fall in the number of believers. 
Before the 11 March attacks, what the public saw were ‘immigrants’ 
rather than ‘Muslims’. After that date, the religious factor was used to refer 
to this group of immigrants. In other words, the collective mindset viewed 
this as more of a ‘cultural’ than a ‘religious’ phenomenon. 
Second, there are the international terrorist groups operating in 
Spain. These groups are ideologically aligned with al-Qaeda, especially the 
Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and more recently the 
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Moroccan al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. While there are other factions16 
motivated through Islamic websites, these groups do not have strategic 
interests in Spain17 but rather use Spanish territory as a base for fundraising 
and the recruitment of persons willing to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Their operations revolve around phone centres but they have no roots or 
relationships with the religious communities. Nearly all authors agree that 
these groups have no real intention of ‘recovering the ancient al-Andalus’, 
the latter only forming part of a narrative to attract young persons willing 
to fight for an intangible cause. Their real objective is to radicalise their 
societies of origin by attacking Western societies as a tactical ploy.  
Although what we have here are two different worlds, we must also 
be aware that under certain circumstances they may intersect and therefore 
feed off one another. Such a situation would be more liable to arise if a 
deep sense of belonging is not developed among young Spanish Muslims 
and a generation of socially maladjusted youth emerges. Here we run the 
risk that if a person does not have a clear identity associated with the 
society in which s/he lives and is compatible with the latter, this identity 
may be sought in ‘virtual Islam’. 18 This situation is especially prevalent in a 
context of economic crisis linked to economic cycles and processes 
involving the dismantling of the welfare state. To keep situations such as 
these from emerging, sufficiently specific, active policies must be 
implemented so that society is capable of clearly distinguishing between 
these two phenomena. Spain could be at a crucial crossroads in the 
prevention of radicalism of second- and third-generation immigrants by 
                                                      
16 See J. Jordán, “El terrorismo yihadista en España”, JihadMonitor.org,  2005 
(retrieved from http://www.Jihad.monitor.org) and also Jordán (2003), op. cit. 
17 See J. Halliday, “Tendencias internacionales: seguridad y conflictos” in M. Mesa 
and M. Gonzalez (eds), Poder y Democracia. Los retos del multiculturalismo, Barcelona: 
Icaria Editorial, 2008 and J. Avilés, “Una amenaza compartida: la Yihad Global en 
Europa y el Magreb”, ARI No. 15/2005, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2005 
(retrieved from http://www.realinstitutoelcan.org). 
18 See M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004 and also M. Sageman, “La nueva generación de 
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promoting their integration and drawing a clear distinction between their 
identity and that of Islamic terrorists.19 
We identify two differentiated lines of political action based on the 
situation described. One involves police intervention at both national and 
international levels fighting against terrorist networks. The other focuses 
on integration processes and generating a sense of belonging with an 
irrefutable national and even European component. The latter action is the 
most complex but requires the greatest attention in Spain. 
These politico-religious radical groups operate outside the network of 
mosques and places of worship in Spain and largely have logistical 
functions of recruiting individuals willing to fight in Iraq or fundraising. 
The political objectives of these groups are in Iraq or Afghanistan, and the 
use of Spain as a base for their terrorist actions is a strategic decision (a 
means but not an end in itself); still, owing to the seriousness of the acts 
perpetrated, this is extraordinarily serious all the same. 
We have also observed growing unease on the part of Spanish society 
stemming from co-existence with different cultural or religious groups, 
including immigrants from Latin America and Muslim countries. Despite 
the high opinion held by immigrants from predominately Muslim 
countries of Spain, of Spanish society and of opportunities gained and 
freedoms enjoyed, these groups are not highly regarded by Spanish society. 
Nevertheless, social conflict and rejection on the part of society has more to 
do with the very rapid growth of immigration in Spain than with issues 
relating exclusively to the religious factor. Not only is Spain’s immigration 
model not exhausted but it is also safe to say that it is still under 
construction, thus providing an opportunity to make co-existence and 
social cohesion a constructive and enriching reality for all. 
Hence, Spain could create a different narrative, moving away from 
radical Islam towards integration and an identity rooted in a different 
starting point, since the Muslim immigrants are part of a larger and diverse 
group of immigrants and the threat from ETA seems to be more real than 
that from radical Islam.  
 
                                                      
19 See F. Fukuyama, “Identity, Inmigration and Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, 
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Appendix  A. Individuals convicted in the judgement on the 11 
March 2004 attacks 
José Emilio Suárez Trashorras, Spanish 
Essential collaborator; sold explosives used in the attacks that he stole from 
the mine where he worked; contacted by Jamal Ahmidan through Rafá 
Zouier to supply the explosives subsequently used in the attacks. 
Jamal Zougam, Moroccan  
Member of the terrorist cell that perpetrated the attacks; directly 
responsible for planting the explosives; owner of the mobile telephone shop 
and phone centre that supplied the telephones used as detonators. 
Othman El Gnaoui, Moroccan 
Member of the terrorist cell that perpetrated the attacks; responsible for 
handling and falsifying documents; delivered his ID documentation to 
Jamal Ahmidan knowing that they would be falsified. 
Hassan El Haski, Moroccan 
Member and leader of an armed terrorist organisation; leader of the 
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group wanted by the Belgian authorities; 
arrested on 17 December 2004. 
Basel Ghalyoun, Syrian 
Member of an armed terrorist group; had numerous contacts with 
Mohamed Larbi Ben Sellam; recruited and indoctrinated future terrorists 
and provided support and assistance to seasoned terrorists; closely linked 
to the leaders of the cell that committed suicide in Leganes. 
Fouad El Morabit Anghar, Moroccan 
Member of an armed terrorist group; recruited and indoctrinated future 
terrorists and provided support and assistance to seasoned terrorists; 
closely linked to the leaders of the cell that committed suicide in Leganes 
and with Rabei Osman El Sayed Ahmed (convicted in Italy in 2006 for 
forming part of a terrorist organisation). 
Mouhannad Almallah Dabas, Syrian 
Member of an armed terrorist group; recruited and indoctrinated future 
terrorists and provided support and assistance to seasoned terrorists; in 
charge of one of the premises where the activities were carried out; closely 
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Appendix A. cont’d 
Sael El Harrak, Moroccan 
Member of an armed terrorist group; member of the cell that committed 
suicide in Leganes; had close personal and telephone contacts with the 
other members of the group. 
Mohamed Bouharrat, Moroccan 
Member of an armed terrorist group; a recruiter who compiled information 
on possible targets for violent attacks, which he then delivered to the cell. 
Youssef Beljadt, Moroccan 
Member of an armed terrorist group; a member of one of the groups of the 
al-Qaeda network and a proselytiser who was involved in fundraising 
activities to finance international jihad activities. He lived in Brussels where 
he undertook his operations and housed radicals and jihadists. He was in 
Spain from the middle of February until 3 March 2004, and was arrested in 
Brussels on 1 February 2005. 
Mohamed Larbi Ben Sellam, Moroccan 
Member of an armed terrorist group; his mission was to indoctrinate, 
recruit and support individuals in the formation of a jihad; had close 
relations with Jamal Ahmidan, Mohamed Oulad Akcha and Said Berraj. 
Rachid Aglif, Moroccan 
Member of an armed terrorist group and keeper of explosives; in charge of 
buying and handling explosives; had contact with Jamal Zougam. 
Abdelmajid Bouchar, Moroccan 
Member of an armed terrorist group and keeper of explosives; in the 
Leganes flat with the suicide terrorists, but had left to take out the rubbish 
when the police raid took place and consequently escaped. 
Hamid Ahmidan, Moroccan 
Member of an armed terrorist group and drugs trafficker; drugs, cash and 
false documentation bearing the name of Jamal Ahmidan were found in his 
home; personal effects belonging to the user of the stolen van used to 
transport the terrorists responsible for the attacks were found in his car. 
Rafá Zouhier, Moroccan 
Trafficker and supplier of explosives in collaboration with a terrorist 
organisation; police confidant; the contact person between José Emilio 
Suárez Trashorras and Jamal Ahmidan for the sale of explosives. 156 | BEZUNARTEA, LÓPEZ & TEDESCO 
 
 
 
Appendix A. cont’d 
Agdelilah El Fadoual El Akil, Moroccan 
Collaborator with an armed organisation and a friend of Jamal Ahmidan’s; 
in Holland in the 1990s, he and Ahmidan contacted Imad Eddin Brakat 
Yarkas, the person responsible for recruiting jihad terrorists at that time; he 
shipped a car used to transport the explosives to Ceuta. 
Nasreddine Bousbaa, Algerian 
Falsifier of official documents; forged two passports and driving licenses 
that he then gave to Jamal Ahmidan; these were delivered before 6 March 
2004 to the Lavapies neighbourhood of Madrid. 
Mahmoud Sleiman Aouin, Lebanese 
Falsifier of official documents; carrying false documentation when arrested. 
Raúl González Peláez, Spanish 
Supplier of explosives; collaborated in the organisation of the transport of 
explosives. 
Antonio Iván Reis Palicio, Spanish 
Transporter of explosives; transported explosives from Asturias to Madrid 
on 9 January 2004 for a fee of €300. 
Sergio Álvarez Sánchez, Spanish 
Transporter of explosives; transported a 40kg bag of explosives from 
Asturias to Madrid on 5 January 2004 for a fee of €600; these were delivered 
to Jamal Ahmidan and used in the attacks. 
Gabriel Montoya Vidal, Spanish 
Transporter of explosives; convicted by Juvenile Court given that he was a 
minor at the time the crime was committed; transported explosives from 
Asturias to Madrid at the end of January or beginning of February. 
 
Source: Derived from the judgement delivered by Section Two of the National High 
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Appendix  B. Arrests of alleged Islamic terrorist cells in Spain, 
during the period 2005–08 – Dates, places (numbers 
arrested) and description 
January 2005, Bilbao (1) 
One Algerian individual in relation to the 11 March court case 
February 2005, Leganés, Madrid and Melilla (6) 
Individuals related to the 11 March court case 
March 2005, Fuenlabrada (1)  
Individuals related to the 11 March court case 
April 2005, Madrid (14); Operation ‘Saeta’ 
Individuals related to the 11 March court case 
May 2005, Madrid and Granada (3)  
Individuals related to the 11 March court case; arms traffickers and those 
involved in financing their business 
July 2005, Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia and Cadiz (18); Operation ‘Tigris’  
Individuals from the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda involved in fundraising 
activities 
July 2005, Madrid (5); Operation ‘Sello’  
Individuals related to the 11 March court case 
November 2005, Alicante (8), Granada (2) and Murcia (1)  
Algerian members of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat who 
stole cars and other property, printed counterfeit cards and were involved 
in drug trafficking to finance their activities in Algeria 
December 2005, Malaga (7)  
Algerian members of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat who 
harboured Algerian terrorists on their way to Iraq 
December 2005, Malaga (9), Lleida (3), Seville (1) and Palma (1)  
Individuals who recruited others to send to Iraq 
January 2006, Vilanova i la Geltrú (16), Madrid (3) and Lasarte (1) 
Individuals who frequented phone centres with the aim of recruiting others 
to carry out terrorist attacks in Iraq 
December 2006, Ceuta (11)  
Individuals who formed part of a Moroccan Salafist cell under surveillance 
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June 2007, Barcelona (2)  
Individuals who formed part of a group known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, composed of Moroccans recruiting followers for operations in 
North Africa 
January 2008, Barcelona (14)  
Arrest at a mosque of Pakistanis who met in one of the mosques in the El 
Raval neighbourhood; material intended for the manufacture of explosives 
was confiscated 
February 2008, Vitoria (3)  
Arrest of persons at a phone centre, who had a police record for petty crime 
April 2008, Melilla (2)  
Arrest of individuals wanted by the Moroccan police force for alleged 
involvement in Islamic terrorism networks and arms trafficking; one of 
those arrested was linked to the ‘Maghreb Mujahideen Movement’ and to 
the Casablanca attacks of 16 May 2003. The other was linked to a terrorist 
network dismantled by the Moroccan authorities in February 2008. 
June 2008, Barcelona, Castellón and Pamplona (8)  
Eight Algerians were arrested, accused of indoctrination and economic and 
logistical support of terrorists forming part of the al-Qaeda structure in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQMI). Most of those arrested belonged to the Salafist 
Group for Preaching and Combat. 
July 2008, Huelva and Guipúzcoa (4)  
Algerian Salafist group accused of funding al-Qaeda activities in the 
Maghreb by falsifying documents and brand-name clothing. Those arrested 
were allegedly linked to an investigation conducted in the UK in 2001. 
August 2008, Alicante (1)  
One person was arrested in Alicante in relation to the June 2008 arrests, 
having escaped to Algeria on that occasion. He was accused of recruiting 
mujahideen and sending funds to the Maghreb to finance the AQMI. 
October 2008, Burgos (6)  
Algerian group accused of fundraising for terrorists imprisoned for the 
Casablanca attacks and of recruiting and indoctrinating mujahideen 
through the Internet; according to those leading the investigation, the cell 
was based in Spain but formed part of a more complex structure operating 
internationally. Its leader had a record for petty crime. 
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8.  RADICALISATION OF RUSSIA’S 
MUSLIM COMMUNITY 
ALEKSEI MALASHENKO & AKHMET YARLYKAPOV 
he phenomenon of ‘Islamic radicalism’ is an extremely significant 
one for Russia because of at least two circumstances: a) there are 
about 20 million Muslims living in Russia (including 3.5 to 4 million 
migrant Muslims), and b) in the 15 years since the collapse of the USSR, 
Russia has been shaken by ethno-political conflicts with an apparent 
confessional component. 
Islamic radicalism has become an integral feature of the internal 
situation in Russian society, exerting an influence on the country’s public 
policy. It includes two closely intertwined components – a purely religious 
and a political one. To ensure a correct assessment of radicalism, however, 
it is advisable not to combine these two trends into one. In addition, as 
noted further on, religious radicals may be loyal to the authorities in 
respect of specific issues. 
Not infrequently, information about Islamic radicals’ activities is 
inaccurate. Its source is law enforcement bodies, which for various reasons 
present it in a distorted form, and therefore this type of information needs 
to be verified.1 Information coming from their opponents, who aim at 
presenting themselves solely as fighters for social justice and for purity of 
                                                      
1 This tendency is explained by the fact that religious radicalism (and extremism) 
in Russia is used as a political tool of the ruling establishment. In certain periods, 
the role of extremism was exaggerated, so that the authorities had a sufficient 
pretext for a general tightening of the screws, curtailing the freedom of the press, 
etc. Since approximately 2003, however, the ruling circles have been trying in every 
way to demonstrate their successes in the struggle against radicals, and therefore 
restricting information about their activities. 
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religion, also needs verification. Nor are the mass media always objective in 
covering issues relating to Islamic radicalism either. 
Russia’s Muslim community is not uniform. Singled out in it may be 
two socio-cultural realms, the Northern Caucasian and the Tatar-Bashkir 
(for simplicity we call it Tatar), which, as a consequence of increased 
migrations, have recently been in active contact with each other alongside 
the direct participation of a third force – Central Asian Muslims. Without 
touching upon the differences between them, we note one characteristic: in 
the Northern Caucasus, radical tendencies and sentiments are stronger 
than in the rest of Russia. This characteristic sometimes makes it necessary 
separately to describe processes and situations related to Islamic 
radicalism. 
1.  The spread of radicalism 
The eastern and central parts of the Northern Caucasus – Dagestan, 
Chechnya and Ingushetia, and also the adjoining districts of the Stavropol 
territory with its substantial Muslim population – are the most radicalised 
regions. While it is true that radical elements in Chechnya are being 
squeezed out of the republic, they are settling down in the neighbouring 
territories. As a result, Dagestan’s Islamic jamaats [Muslim communities] 
are growing stronger, indicative of which is the increasing activity of the 
republic’s law enforcement bodies, which are compelled regularly to carry 
out special operations against militants. Radical sentiments are quite 
widespread in Kabarda, Balkaria and Karachai, although the situation there 
is somewhat quieter than in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia. The level 
of Islamic radicalism is lowest in the Republic of Adygeya and the 
Krasnodar territory in which it is located, among other things because 
ethno-nationalism has not yet been superseded there by religious 
radicalism. Nevertheless, Islamic radicals have been stepping up their 
activity in the Republic of Adygeya. 
In the rest of Russia, there is less activity by radicals and it is not 
structured. Their small groups are scattered across the Volga area, the 
southern Urals and southern Siberia. Manifestations of radicalism have 
been noted in Tatarstan (Naberezhniye Chelny, Almetyevsk, Nizhnekamsk 
and Kukmor), in Bashkiria (Agidel, Baimak, Oktyabrsky, Sibai and Ufa), in 
Mordovia (Belozerye), in the Samara region (Togliatti), and in the Kurgan, 
Orenburg, Penza, Perm, Ulyanovsk, Chelyabinsk and Tyumen regions. 
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permanent basis have been observed there on their part. Small, 
unconnected groups of radicals exist even in cities remote from Islamic 
hotbeds such as in Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea and Vladivostok on the 
Pacific. If you were to mark ‘areas of Islamic radicalism’ on the map of 
Russia, the resulting picture would be quite impressive. 
Opposition forces advocating radical Islamic ideology are called 
fundamentalists and Islamists; the term ‘Wahhabites’ has become 
particularly widespread in Russia. It would be more correct to call them 
Salafists, since their ideology goes back to the 8th–9th centuries AD, when 
those who urged believers to adhere to the norms of religious and 
everyday life followed by the ‘righteous ancestors’ (as-Salaf as-Salihun) 
called themselves Salafists. Today’s radicals act as preservers of that 
tradition, referring to the medieval ideologists of Salafism; adjusted for 
time, they may be regarded as neo-Salafists. 
On the other hand, there exist various schools of thought within the 
framework of Islamic radicalism. In particular there are differences 
between Salafists proper and Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya (HTI – the Islamic 
Liberation Party),2 which has come to Russia from Central Asia. The main 
goal of HTI is a political one – the establishment in the territory of Central 
Asia (and its subsequent expansion) of an Islamic state, the caliphate, 
whereas the Salafists are focused on a gradual (re-)Islamisation of society 
and the establishment of sharia. In addition, the ideology of Salafism places 
emphasis not only and not so much on struggle against the regime as on its 
transformation from within. The Salafists, acting very diplomatically, are 
gradually penetrating administrative bodies, avoiding making outspoken 
statements that contradict the official precepts. But they remain radicals, 
even though their radicalism is of a more subtle character. 
In Russia, the authorities turn out to be somewhat disoriented, for in 
confronting Islamic opposition groups, whose members they call ‘bandits’, 
they are in fact fighting against one of the movements in Islam that enjoys 
wide popularity and claims to possess the ‘final truth’ in both religion and 
the socio-political sphere. 
                                                      
2 H i z b  u t - T a h r i r ,  f o u n d e d  i n  1 9 5 3  i n  E a s t  J e r u s a l e m ,  h a s  m a n a g e d  t o  r e t a i n  i t s  
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2.  Radical movement participants and their activities 
In the Northern Caucasus, the basic cell of radicalism is the jamaat. The 
Arabic word jama’ah means ‘society’ or ‘community’. Jamaats are an 
elementary, grass root form of organisation of Muslim society. It is an 
association of Muslims performing congregational prayer; ideally, a jamaat 
is a group of Muslims attending the same mosque. The spiritual leader of a 
jamaat is an imam – the prayer leader in a mosque who delivers a sermon 
on Fridays, a person who plays a great role in the life of the community 
because of his authority and knowledge. Underlying an imam’s authority is 
the fact that as a rule, he is elected by the entire community from among 
the worthiest Muslims on a whole number of criteria: he should not only 
have the best knowledge of the Koran, the Sunna and the cult, but also be a 
model of morality and a fulfilment of the precepts of the Muslim religion. 
Normally, a jamaat and an imam are closely bound to each other with a 
hundred cords; they meet together not only on Fridays for a communal 
prayer but also on many other varied occasions. Naturally, it is very 
difficult for the imams of large jamaats to maintain strong ties with their 
congregations, particularly so in major cities. 
In Russia, the very notion of a ‘jamaat’ implicitly suggests the 
definition of ‘radical’. Every time the word ‘jamaat’ is mentioned in the 
Russian scholarly press or mass media, it implies precisely a collective of 
radically-minded Muslims, which more often than not corresponds to the 
actual state of affairs. 
Characterised by the young age of their participants, these may be 
called ‘youth jamaats’. Organisationally, they took shape in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. What contributed to their separation into distinct bodies 
was the sharply oppositional attitude of a substantial share of the young 
persons who formed their backbone. They were in opposition, on the one 
hand, towards the official Islamic bodies – the Muslim religious boards – 
and on the other towards so-called ‘traditional Islam’, whose proponents 
are mainly members of the older generation advocating the observance of 
all the popular traditions. In the opinion of youth leaders, these popular 
traditions are often contrary to Islam. In Dagestan, Chechnya and 
Ingushetia, Muslim youth leaders have often spoken out against the local 
form of Sufism, which they consider full of ‘pagan remnants’. (Most often, 
funeral and commemorative rituals have acted as irritants.) 
Initially, local youth jamaats were headed by young imams. In most 
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leaders and other mullahs was approximately the same, and polemics were 
conducted in a rather half-hearted fashion, only occasionally reaching fierce 
proportions. The leaders of youth jamaats m a d e  u s e  o f  t h a t  t i m e  f o r  
strengthening themselves organisationally. Perfecting their ideology was 
the task of the next generation of leaders, who entered the scene in the early 
1990s. At that time, young men who had obtained an education abroad, 
mostly in the countries of the Middle East, began to return home. They 
gradually became urban and rural leaders and united jamaats into a kind of 
network of associations of Islamic youth. 
The ‘breeding ground’ of youth jamaats is the Republic of Dagestan, 
where these associations (circles) began to be formed among the disciples 
of local Sufi sheikhs as far back as the 1970s. It is precisely these circles that 
the Soviet security services dubbed ‘Wahhabite’ for the first time (following 
the example of the sheikhs, who had lost control over their disciples). At 
the time, however, the State Security Committee (KGB) quite soon got a 
handle on them. 
Wahhabism in Dagestan reached its heyday in the 1990s. It was then 
that the Wahhabite communities in Kizilyurt, Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, 
Gubden and other Dagestani populated areas began to gain in strength. 
Despite the bitter opposition of the Sufis, they succeeded in establishing 
their rule in a number of districts. In particular, Wahhabites managed to 
establish an independent territory in the so-called ‘Kadar zone’, which 
included three villages in the Buinaksk District of Dagestan–Karamakhi, 
Chabanmakhi and Kadar. Even though up to half the residents of the 
enclave did not support the Wahhabites’ ideology or practice, the latter 
were able to keep their rule and their power for three years (1997–99). 
During that period, the secular authorities were in fact non-existent in 
the enclave. And yet the enclave had all the attributes of a self-governing 
territory: it had a shura [council] – a body of government of an ‘Islamic 
territory’, its own militia (police) and even its own court of sharia law 
(Mahkama Shariyya). Throughout the three years of its actual independence, 
the extremist jamaat flourished thanks to its members’ entrepreneurial 
activities, and the surrounding mountains were a convenient place for the 
training of future mujahideen. In the enclave itself, especially in the villages 
of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi, extremists entrenched themselves in 
quite a professional manner militarily, which proved true in the course of a 
military operation against them conducted in 1999. Notwithstanding 
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managed to leave the fighting zone and get across into Chechnya. It is from 
that time that extremists in Dagestan began step-by-step searches for 
possibilities to preserve their movement. Gradually they adopted the 
network principle, which thereafter formed the basis of their activity. 
In the mid-2000s, after the end of the war in Chechnya and the 
suppression of a number of major Wahhabite centres in Dagestan, the 
Kabardino-Balkarian Jamaat became the best-known and best-organised 
network association. Other networks of youth jamaats known to exist today 
are those in Dagestan, Chechnya, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and the Stavropol 
territory. Today, youth jamaats are being formed before our eyes in the 
Republic of Adygeya. 
Back in the 1990s and early 2000s, these networks were already 
connected to one another and exchanged information about themselves and 
their activities. Their leaders were personally well acquainted with one 
another and were thoroughly familiar with the state of affairs in the 
neighbouring jamaats. Nevertheless, jamaats have always preserved broad 
internal autonomy. 
Ideologically, youth jamaats are unstable. Their members represent 
highly varied views, spanning the ideological spectrum from extremism to 
moderate radicalism. The activities and form of organisation of youth 
jamaats have been patterned after the forms and experience of Muslim 
organisations in the Middle East, which are distinguished by the unity of 
ranks, internal mutual assistance and charity. 
In the Caucasus, youth jamaats turned out to be quite an easy catch 
for destructive forces, including separatists, which gradually infiltrated the 
youth setting, exerting an ever-greater effect on it. As a result, in the 1990s a 
substantial proportion of youth jamaats turned into a base of the separatist 
movement, whose ethnic character (war for the liberation of Chechnya) 
was replaced by a religious one – the proclamation of a Northern 
Caucasian emirate as a first step towards building a worldwide Islamic 
state. 
The second half of the 1990s saw a slow but steady change in the 
qualitative composition of the leadership of the radical Islamic movement 
in the Caucasus. Its first semi-literate leaders, who at best had received a 
local education in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet years, were replaced 
by young imams, who had obtained a fundamental Islamic education 
abroad, mainly in the Middle East. A few examples of such leaders are 
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Kurman Ismailov (the jamaat of Russia’ famous health resort of Mineralniye 
Vody) among others. 
Anzor Astemirov, calling himself Amir Sayfullah [Sword of Allah], a 
descendant of a family of Kabardin princes, was born in 1976. In the early 
1990s, the Muslim religious board of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic sent 
him to study at Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Saudi Arabia to 
obtain a theological education. Having graduated from the university, he 
returned home, where he preached at one of the mosques in Nalchik, the 
capital of Kabardino-Balkaria. 
In 1993, with the active participation of Astemirov and his associates, 
the Islamic Centre of Kabardino-Balkaria (ICKB) was founded. Soon a 
Kabardino-Balkarian Jamaat emerged on the basis of the ICKB, and then 
later became the most serious force in opposition to the official Muslim 
religious board of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic. Anzor Astemirov was 
a close friend and deputy to Artur (Musa) Mukozhev, the amir [head] of 
the jamaat. The numerical strength of the jamaat kept growing and reached, 
according to its leaders, 10,000 persons (in all, there are about 650,000 so-
called ‘ethnic Muslims’ living in the republic). 
In 1999–2001, Anzor Astemirov was more than once suspected of 
committing wrongful acts. Attempts were mainly made to charge him with 
participation in preparations for terrorist acts; however, the law 
enforcement authorities failed to prove his guilt. The persecution of the 
Kabardino-Balkarian Jamaat members increased, and Anzor Astemirov 
drifted towards more radical positions. 
On 14 December 2004, there was an attack on the Department of the 
Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation for the Kabardino-
Balkarian Republic in Nalchik. The law enforcement authorities accused 
Anzor Astemirov and Ilyas Gorchkhanov, a resident of Ingushetia (leader 
of the ‘Taliban Jamaat’), of mounting the attack. 
On 13 October 2005, more than 200 militants attacked all the 
buildings in Nalchik associated with the security forces of the Kabardino-
Balkarian Republic. In the two days of fighting, 80 militants, 33 law 
enforcement officers and 12 civilians were killed in the city. Subsequently, 
about 70 persons who (in the opinion of the security services) had been 
involved in the raid were arrested and more than 20 others were put on the 
wanted list. 
On 17 October 2005, in a statement posted on the Chechen-separatist 
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the attack on Nalchik was carried out by combatants of the Kabardino-
Balkarian segment of the ‘Caucasian Front’ under the command of Amir 
Sayfullah – that is, Anzor Astemirov. In a video recording attached to the 
statement, the latter was shown beside Basayev during a sitting of the 
majlis [council] of Kabardino-Balkarian mujahideen in a forest outside 
Nalchik on the eve of the 13 October events. The law enforcement agencies 
of the Russian Federation put Astemirov on the wanted list. 
On an ever-greater scale, young intellectuals are joining the Islamist 
movement. One example is the Dagestani Abuzagir Mantayev, who 
defended his candidate’s degree in Political Science on the topic of 
Wahhabism in Moscow and then turned up in the ranks of the extremists. 
Mantayev was killed together with other extremists by security forces in 
Makhachkala on 9 October 2005. Another example is Makhach (better 
known as Yasin) Rasulov, born in 1975. This graduate of Dagestan State 
University worked for some time as a religious columnist for the 
newspaper  Novoye delo and anchored a religious show on Dagestani 
television. Over the course of a year, he secretly cooperated with extremists 
and even earned the title ‘Amir of Makhachkala’, having participated in 
several audacious attacks on Dagestani police officers. On 10 April 2006, 
the authorities announced that he had been killed in the course of a special 
operation in Makhachkala. 
Since the late 1990s, a major restructuring of the separatist 
underground has been taking place in the Northern Caucasus. This 
restructuring includes the distribution of forces across the widest possible 
territory and the creation of a network structure, in which the nodes are 
formally autonomous yet closely communicate with each other to 
coordinate their actions using communication agents and electronic means 
of telecommunication. In setting up this network, use is also made of 
‘influence agents’, particularly disgruntled local residents and especially 
those who have been abused by the local law enforcement agencies. 
The organisational structure of the separatist communities – jamaats – 
does not coincide with that of traditional Muslim communities in the 
region, which are also called jamaats. The traditional jamaats incorporate the 
population of a single village or one or several city districts grouped 
around a mosque. That is, the traditional jamaats are organised according to 
a territorial principle, whereas the separatist jamaats are extra-territorial 
and dispersed. One jamaat may encompass many small groups, united into 
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jamaats ‘Shariat’ and ‘Dzhennet’. They were created on the basis of loyalty 
to the ideology and practice of the separatist movement. Organisationally, 
these  jamaats do not represent any kind of united association. Their 
structure includes de facto autonomous groups, made up of a small 
number of members who frequently are not acquainted with the members 
of the other cells. It is particularly difficult to unravel such a network since 
finding one cell usually does not lead to uncovering others. While making 
it difficult to manage such a network, this kind of organisation helps the 
entire network to survive confrontations with the security forces. 
The jamaats are international in composition; usually their members 
are from the different ethnic groups of the Northern Caucasus, but there 
are also representatives of other countries, including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Pakistan and the countries of the Middle East. Official Russian statements 
typically describe them as mercenaries, yet many of them have come to the 
region for ideological reasons, as participants in a ‘world jihad against kafirs 
[non-Muslims], Jews and Crusaders’. Those who have extensive battlefield 
experience work as instructors. Foreigners, however, do not always become 
instructors: sometimes they are just rank-and-file fighters, which 
particularly applies to those coming from Central Asia. Through the 
foreigners, the groups often establish ties with donors from Islamic 
countries. Delivery of financial aid to the separatists is frequently 
criminalised: for example, through these channels counterfeit hard 
currency is laundered. Other types of fundraising are also employed such 
as donations from various supporters and ransoms collected from the 
relatives of hostages. 
Sometimes the separatists form special units – ‘battalions’ organised 
along ethnic lines. Thus have come into existence the ‘Nogai’, the 
‘Karachai’ and other ethnic battalions. In reality, no such battalions exist as 
permanent military units. Armed forays and terrorist acts ascribed to one 
ethnic battalion or another are carried out by the members of separatist 
jamaats of the corresponding nationality (even though the jamaat itself is 
international). In particular, the Nogai battalion typically includes members 
of the Shelkovskoi Jamaat, which is based in the Shelkovskoi District of 
Chechnya and the Neftekumsky District of the Stavropol territory. The 
Shelkovskoi Jamaat has become notorious for large-scale actions against the 
federal troops, including the recent clashes in the village of Tukui-Mekteb 
of the Neftekumsky District. Its activities receive wide attention because 
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republics, angering the federal government. And yet the Shelkovskoi 
Jamaat is not the largest network structure of the separatist forces. 
With respect to the rest of the Muslim space in Russia, the concept of 
jamaat is practically never used. What is found in its place is simply a small 
community or even just a circle composed of a few persons or two to three 
dozen. 
The communities exist in towns or they are formed around mosques. 
The latter is less and less frequently the case, since an overwhelming 
majority of mosques are controlled by Muslim religious boards loyal to the 
authorities and are constantly monitored by the security services. In 1999, 
Islamist communities were formed in Kumkor (200 persons), Vyatskiye 
Polyany (in the Kirov region – 100–150 persons), and Neftekamsk (in the 
Perm region – up to 50 persons). In the Republic of Tatarstan, in an 
abandoned village located in the Ogryz District, 30 Islamists attempted to 
reproduce the experience of the Dagestan village of Karamakhi and formed 
a so-called ‘Islamic territory’. Quite soon, however, the community was 
dispersed by the local administration and law enforcement bodies. 
A mosque may also turn out to be a centre of religious radicalism. 
Similarly, a madrasah or Islamic institute functioning at a mosque may turn 
out to be such a centre. It should be noted that the title of institute rarely 
corresponds to the level of education provided by an Islamic educational 
institution positioning itself in this way. An overwhelming majority of 
Russia’s Islamic institutes may be ranked with certain reservations as 
secondary educational institutions. 
In the Northern Caucasus, where the jamaat is the organisational 
basis, the mosque may be regarded rather as its adjunct, whereas in the 
Tatar-Bashkir area a mosque and an Islamic educational institution act as 
an independent or even the main centre of attraction. 
In nearly each region with a sizable Muslim community, there is one 
or sometimes several radically-oriented mosques (with a madrasah or 
institute it runs). They include, for example, the White (Gilyan) Mosque in 
the Astrakhan region, the so-called ‘Historical Mosque’ in the Samara 
region, the Rahman and al-Bukhari mosques in the territory of the Ural 
Federal District, the mosque at the Imam Fakhretdinov Institute in 
Almetyevsk (Bashkortostan) and the mosques in Nizhnekamsk (Tatarstan). 
In Moscow, the authorities have brought charges of supporting radicals 
against the Historical Mosque and the recently built mosque on 
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A stressful situation developed around a mosque and madrasah in 
the city of Buguruslan in the Orenburg region (bordering on Kazakhstan). 
According to the law enforcement agencies, the training of militants was 
conducted at that madrasah: six men who took part in terrorist acts in 
Moscow (the seizure of hostages at the theatre on Dubrovka street) and 
Beslan (the hostage-taking and murder of schoolchildren) had been trained 
at that madrasah.3 
In 1999–2002, the most prominent hotbed of Islamism was the Yodyz 
Mosque and madrasah in Naberezhniye Chelny, where ‘Arabian Islam’ 
was taught and where, according to the security services, militants were 
also trained. Later on, some of them were detained on suspicion of 
connections with al-Qaeda. 
In addition to jamaats, mosques and Islamic educational institutions, 
several radical Islamic organisations have been active in Russia. At one 
time, the most prominent of them was the Islamic Revival Party established 
in Astrakhan in 1990, which gave an impetus to the politisation of Islam 
back in Soviet times. It had a branch in Dagestan, which adopted the name 
of the ‘Islamic Party of Dagestan’. Despite the relatively hard phraseology 
of its leaders, the Islamic Revival Party can hardly be fully identified with 
Islamic radicalism. It may be described as a moderately radical 
organisation. Ahmed Qadi Akhtayev, the leader of the party, was rather in 
favour of dialogue with both Islamic traditionalists and the secular 
authorities. Yet after his death in 1998, radical and even extremist 
sentiments grew stronger in the Islamic Revival Party; it was true, however, 
that by that time the party was close to disintegration and soon it ceased to 
exist. 
In Tatarstan, the Iman Youth Islamic Cultural Centre, formed in 1990, 
characteristic of which were separatist sentiments, adhered to radical 
positions. (In 1991, the Iman Centre even applied to the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) with a request to accept Tatarstan as a member.) 
That same year, the radical nationalist party Ittifaq was founded in the 
republic, with the Islamic component very prominent in its ideology. The 
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programme of Ittifaq stated that the party “fights for purity of religion, for 
faithfulness to the precepts of the Koran”.4 
On the whole, in contrast to the Northern Caucasian jamaats, radical 
groups in the rest of Muslim Russia do not pose any serious threat to 
stability. They are supported by an insignificant number of Muslims. On 
the other hand, it should not be ignored that 15 years ago there were no 
such groups in Russia except in Tatarstan and three or four Russian cities. 
Therefore, while recognising their insignificance in the overall religious and 
political palette, one cannot but notice the presence, even if slowly 
growing, of Islamic radicalism in the Russian Federation. 
3.  The absence of charismatic Muslim leadership 
In Muslim Russia today there are no charismatic figures whose influence 
would encompass the entire Islamic community. For example, Talgat 
Tadzhutdin, Chairman of the Central Religious Board of Muslims of 
Russia, claims the status of an all-Russia Muslim authority, yet even in the 
Republic of Bashkortostan where his residence is located, he has been 
recognised as a spiritual leader by only 18.5% of Muslims.5 Ravil 
Gainutdin, Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, Chief Imam of the 
Moscow Cathedral Mosque, enjoys countrywide popularity in Russia, but 
he also lacks strong influence. It should be noted that neither Tadzhutdin 
nor Gainutdin can be classed among the radicals. 
Perhaps Mukaddas Bibarsov, Chairman of the Muslim Religious 
Board for the Volga area, who, despite his general loyalty to the authorities, 
sometimes ventures risky statements and acts, has some elements of 
regional-level influence. 
Certain features of charismatic leadership, albeit ‘inert’, are displayed 
by Nafigulla Ashirov, Chairman of the Religious Board of Muslims of 
Asian Russia. While not directly participating in the activities of radical 
organisations, Ashirov has won renown for his numerous statements in 
support of Hamas, the Taliban and even al-Qaeda, as well as his criticisms 
of the Russian Orthodox Church, his call to remove the cross from the coat 
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of arms of the Russian Federation, etc. He occupies an intermediate 
position between ‘classical’ radicalism and the clergy loyal to the 
authorities. Still, it is true that in the last few years his popularity has 
waned. 
In the mid-1990s, Geydar Dzhemal, one of the founders of the Islamic 
Revival Party, who later on became chairman of the ‘Islamic Committee of 
Russia’, claimed the role of a charismatic figure in Russia’s Muslim 
community. He failed to reach this goal, however. Coming from the Soviet 
and subsequently post-Soviet intellectual underground, he was perceived 
as an Islamic ideologist mainly by Russian non-Muslims, scaring them with 
his radicalism and even with his formidable appearance, and he actually 
turned into a sophisticated showman. 
Finally, we mention Tatar poet Fauziya Bairamova, an ideologist of 
local nationalism, who is also not averse to Islamic rhetoric. Even so, her 
appeal is limited to the narrow circle of admirers of her literary talent. 
The authority and popularity of the radicals proper do not go beyond 
the boundaries of their milieu. The political conditions for the emergence of 
charismatic figures existed in the Northern Caucasus. It was there that 
politicians and ideologists with leadership ambitions emerged in the 1990s. 
They included the above-mentioned Ahmed Qadi Akhtayev, Sheikh 
Bagauddin (Bagauddin Kebedov), a leading ideologist of the Salafists in the 
1990s, and Nadirshah Khachilayev, head of the Union of Muslims of Russia 
(killed in 1999). But none of them ever succeeded in becoming a full-
fledged popular leader. 
Perhaps Shamil Basayev, one of the leaders of Chechen separatism 
(killed by the federal security services in 2004), approached closest to it; 
however, his charisma was mainly of a political nature, while Islam served 
above all as an instrument for preserving his political prestige. 
It seems highly unlikely that charismatic figures will emerge in 
Russia’s Muslim community in the near future. First, there are no 
appropriate political conditions for this; second, the security services, ready 
at any time to isolate an exceptional personality, are keeping a close watch 
on Muslims; third, a majority of Russia’s Muslims are not very susceptible 
to radical ideas and slogans tinged with a revolutionist hue. Today, only 
one Muslim politician, Ramzan Kadyrov, the young president of Chechnya, 
boasts charisma. There is a growing Islamic motivation in Ramzan’s 
politics, but he cannot be classed with Islamic radicals and therefore his 
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4.  Texts propagating the ideas of radicalism and their impact 
Texts propagating the ideas of radicalism in Muslim Russia – not only in 
the Caucasus but also in other regions – are quite varied. In the Northern 
Caucasus, they have a broader audience; in the 2000s, however, materials 
of this kind have become relatively widespread in Tatarstan, the southern 
Urals, western Siberia and the Volga area. In the 1990s, at a number of 
bookstores in Russia one could buy fundamentalist literature – Russian 
translations of works by Ibn Taimi and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founders 
and ideologists of fundamentalism, Hassan al-Banna, the first head of the 
Muslim Brotherhood organisation, and Sayyid and Muhammad Qutb. 
Works by contemporary Islamic radicals, such as Abd as-Salam Farag, 
Ayman az-Zawahiri, Abbud az-Zumr and natives of Russia Magomed 
Tagayev (The Army of the Imam) and Nadir Khachilayev (Our Road to 
Gazavat), are being published. 
The most traditional forms of presenting the material are leaflets, 
brochures and sermons. In the early 1990s, publications of texts in religious 
newspapers and magazines played a crucial role. Their impact can hardly 
be overestimated; for example, a whole generation of young Islamic 
radicals in the region has been brought up reading the Dagestani 
newspaper Al-Qaf. In the Urals, western Siberia and the Volga area, Islamic 
radicals read al-Wa’i, a printed organ of HTI. 
Sermons were video-recorded, and their dissemination was one of 
the leading methods of propagandising radical ideas among the peoples of 
the Caucasus in the 1990s. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, video began to 
be ousted by the Internet, which today has become one of the main 
resources for spreading radical views and an efficient lever for influencing 
young Muslims in Russia. 
In addition, mention should be made of lectures delivered by 
ideologists of radicalism at educational institutions and militant training 
camps that operated in the Caucasus throughout the 1990s. Sometimes 
texts of the lectures were disseminated in other regions of Russia as well, 
including Moscow. Records of the lectures that have come down to us are 
amazing for the scale of ideological brainwashing of young students, who 
were offered a systematic, integral view of the world through a radical 
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quotations from the Koran and the Sunna, along with examples from 
history and the present-day world political situation.6 
Still another method of propagandising radical ideas was the use of 
possibilities offered by seemingly innocuous Arabic language textbooks. 
Sheikh Bagauddin, a major, radical ideologist of the Caucasus, widely used 
the principles of the Wahhabite doctrine in an Arabic language textbook 
that he had written. In his textbook for the first year of study, a great deal 
of interesting thoughts are to be found in texts for translation into Arabic, 
such as the following: “We are fighting with gyaurs (i.e. infidels), and 
gyaurs are constantly fighting with us. Today they are possessors of power 
and possessors of numerous weapons, but we are possessors of iman 
[faith], that is why we will definitely win, for we have Allah and they have 
Satan.”7 Here are a few more characteristic quotations from the textbook: “I 
have understood the lesson well. We must be soldiers of Islam. We must 
learn at schools and at institutes and at universities. And we must defend 
our religion and our homeland. We must defend our Muslim brothers. 
Long live our state, a state of Islam!”8 Next, “This article has been written 
about spreading Islam among the peoples of the world, especially among 
young people. Why among young people? Because they [young people] are 
quick in understanding everything, and as for old people, they never 
understand.”9 And, finally, “Big and small states all over the world should 
unite and create a Great Islamic Power.”10 
By way of an illustration of Sheikh Bagauddin’s methods, we draw 
from records made by one of his ‘students’, which can be unequivocally 
described by the title, the Wahhabite Student’s Summary Notes. 11 
                                                      
6 Similar texts are familiar to the authors from materials obtained in Central Asia. 
7 See B. Muhammad, Uchebnik arabskogo yazyka. Perviy god obuchenya [Arabic 
Language Textbook, for the First Year of Study], Moscow: Santlanda Publishing 
House, 1992, pp. 173-174. 
8 Ibid., p. 97. 
9 Ibid., p. 124. 
10 Ibid., p. 161. 
11 Here and further below, the text cited (with minor punctuation corrections) is 
from lecture summary notes kept in one of the author’s personal archives. Some of 
these summary notes have been published; however, since their unpublished parts 
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The basis of the Wahhabite doctrine is the requirement for 
comprehensive implementation of the principle of tawhid [monotheism]. 
This requirement proceeds from a literal understanding of this principle 
with very strict limitations. The Wahhabite Student’s Summary Notes read, 
“Most Muslims, who very often repeat, ‘There is no god but Allah,’ know 
no sincerity or meaning or do this out of tradition or custom. Most of their 
deeds are emulation or following the example, and they best correspond to 
the Word of Supreme Allah in His Koran: ‘We follow what we found our 
fathers upon.’” In other words, it is recognised here that most Muslims are 
not sincere believers and their Islam is mainly ‘inherited’, and they regard 
themselves as Muslims by force of habit. 
The ideology of the Caucasus Wahhabites is based on recognition of 
only the Koran and the authentic – as they emphasise – Sunna as the source 
of the doctrine. The Wahhabite Student’s Summary Notes add that 
“Muslims must wholeheartedly embrace the teaching of Islam embodied in 
the Holy Koran – the Word of Allah, and the Sunna – sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad”. Hence, there is the Wahhabites’ call for cleansing 
Islam of ‘impermissible innovations’ (bid’ah) with which, in their opinion, 
Islam has become fouled in the Northern Caucasus. They come out sharply 
against many of the local Muslims’ customs and rituals such as the cycle of 
commemorative rites including Koran reading for the deceased, the ritual 
for redeeming the sins of the deceased (deur), distribution of alms at the 
graveyard and the celebration of Mawlid (the birthday of the Prophet 
Muhammad). Moreover, the Wahhabites are particularly irreconcilable 
towards local Sufism and the related cult of saints. The Wahhabites regard 
the veneration of sheikhs, zikrs [religious remembrances], pilgrimages to 
the graves of holy sheikhs (ziyarat) and many other things from the 
practices of the followers of local tarikats [Islamic religious orders] as an 
indication of their most profound and conscious fallacy, polytheism (shirk) 
and disbelief (kufr). Not only are the followers of tarikats accused of 
disbelief: the Wahhabites also declare as infidels all the Muslims who do 
not share their point of view. There is only one way out for them: they must 
repent and “embrace Islam once again”: “A Muslim who has committed at 
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[repentance], and embracing Islam once again, since all the above is the 
abandonment of Islam or the gravest sin.”12 
The ideologists of Wahhabism allot one of the leading places to jihad, 
understood as an armed struggle for the faith. The Wahhabite Student’s 
Summary Notes state that “Islam is a religion of jihad and life. Islam 
prescribes to every Muslim to spare neither his property nor his energies 
for the sake of the victory of Islam.”13 In other words, the Wahhabites 
regard the conducting of jihad as an obligation of every Muslim. For 
example, in 1999, in declaring the “revival of the Islamic state of Dagestan”, 
the ‘Islamic Shura of Dagestan’ expressly pointed out that “jihad in 
Dagestan is farz‘ain [i.e. personal religious obligation] for every Muslim”.14 
They believe that today jihad invariably takes the form of an armed 
struggle against the enemies of Islam. In one of the leaflets disseminated in 
Dagestan by the so-called ‘Badr Islamic Call Centre’, jihad (again, naturally 
understood as an armed struggle) is named under number four among the 
ten pillars of an Islamic jamaat. Sheikh Bagauddin pursued this idea 
consistently and methodically: he called for conducting an armed struggle 
against “infidels” not only in his sermons and writings but also in such 
literature, seemingly remote from ideological disputes, as Arabic language 
textbooks. 
Another accusation advanced by the Wahhabites against the rest of 
Muslims is an accusation of departure from monotheism (shirk). In the 
Wahhabites’ opinion, they are becoming mushriks, i.e. polytheists, or kafirs, 
i.e. infidels. This applies in the first place to the Northern Caucasian 
followers of Sufism and near-Sufi cults. Here is what we find in the 
Wahhabite Student’s Summary Notes:  
Mushriks venerating their sheikhs or their graves utter the 
testimony La-ilaha-illallah [there is no god but Allah] with their 
tongues and contradict its meaning with their deeds. They utter the 
testimony and then deify someone else besides Allah, turning their 
worship to him, be it love, praise, fear of him, hope, recumbence, 
                                                      
12 Derived from the author’s (A.Ya.) personal archives, the Wahhabite Student’s 
Summary Notes. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See R.G. Gadzhiyev, Vakhkhabitskii factor v kavkazskoi geopolitike [The Wahhabite 
Factor in Caucasian Geopolitics], Grozny, 2004, p. 262. 176 | MALASHENKO & YARLYKAPOV 
 
prayer, and its other varieties, for all of these are worship, but 
Allah, the Exalted and Mighty, is the only one who deserves to be 
worshipped.15 
This last statement, which is quite correct from the point of view of 
any Muslim believer, is treated out of proportion by the Wahhabites. 
Basing themselves on this postulate, the Wahhabites flatly refuse to 
recognise any religious authority whatsoever and emphatically express 
defiance against the traditions of respecting elders, widespread in the 
Northern Caucasus (which they interpret as veneration of feeble old men). 
In a Wahhabite community, an emphasised equality of all of its members 
reigns supreme. No one, not even the amir is given any special deference. 
Interestingly, it is precisely their lack of deference to elders that opponents 
of the Wahhabites from among ordinary Muslims have often mentioned as 
the Wahhabites’ negative trait. 
Naturally, the ideology of a Great Islamic Power or of the caliphate 
has always had (and still has) limited popularity in Russia. In the late 
1990s, it spread in the Northern Caucasus, when Shamil Basayev spoke of a 
“Dagestani-Chechen Caliphate”, which was subsequently to incorporate 
the rest of the Northern Caucasus. Incidentally, most of the Dagestanis and 
the peoples of the Northern Caucasus in general held a cautious, negative 
attitude towards the idea of a caliphate, viewing it above all as an 
embodiment of the ambitions of the Chechen separatist leadership. 
At approximately that time, there appeared leaflets and other texts 
mentioning a ‘Volga Caliphate’, which was to incorporate the Ulyanovsk, 
Saratov, Samara, Volgograd and Astrakhan regions, and also Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan. Interestingly, the leaflets were anonymous (or signed by 
fictitious names, which gave rise to talk that they were a provocation of the 
security services). None of the Islamic authorities of any significance 
admitted to being their author. 
At the same time, the talk about the possibility of creating a caliphate 
in the territory of the Russian Federation attests to the existence among 
Muslims of radical sentiments, which of course reflect certain utopias but 
which, on the other hand, stay on in the mind, awakening in it feelings of 
religious solidarity with radicals in the rest of the world – in the Middle 
                                                      
15 Derived from the author’s (A.Ya.) personal archives, The Wahhabite Student’s 
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East, Iraq, Afghanistan and Europe. This also promotes the emergence of 
hope for a future Islamisation of Russia. 
It should be noted that the Russian authorities are keeping a close 
watch on religious literature, imposing a strict censorship on publications 
that, in their opinion, preach religious intolerance. Books by Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab and a number of other classics of Islamic radicalism have been 
banned in Russia. In 2008, still another list of banned literature was drawn 
up. It was stressed that the banned books that are already in libraries 
(mainly at Islamic educational institutions and mosques) are subject to 
destruction. 
This censorship sparked strong protests, including public ones, on the 
part of the Muslim community. Curiously, certain Russian liberals sided 
with this view, believing that in this case works by Vladimir Lenin (the 
founder of the Soviet state, who openly preached hatred among various 
groups of society and hatred for religion) should also be destroyed.  
5.  A ‘portrait’ of adherents of radicalism and converts 
Recently, the qualitative composition of radically-minded Muslims as a 
group has changed substantially. Now they are by no means poor, 
uneducated, jobless persons having a low social status. Today, the young 
and the intelligentsia are perhaps the main sources for replenishing the 
ranks of radically-minded Muslims. The young respond very keenly to the 
problems of a society thoroughly penetrated with corruption, clannishness 
and economic problems. The intelligentsia also respond to the problems of 
society, for they are by definition prone to reflecting on the subject. 
Contributing to the broad spread of radicalism is also the de facto 
absence of civil society and actual public discussion, alongside a growth in 
nationalism – both Russian nationalism and the nationalism of ethnic 
minorities. In the Northern Caucasus as well as among natives of that 
region living in the centre of Russia, negative emotions are nourished by a 
feeling of their ‘second-ratedness’ compared with the non-Muslim majority. 
Today’s Muslim radical is, as a rule, a young man engaged in some 
business such as trade or the transit of goods. He is an active, energetic and 
sociable individual. The last trait is of particular significance, for the ability 
to establish contact with another person and convince him of one’s 
rightfulness constitutes half the success of propaganda. It is hard to single 
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designed for everyone, including drunkards, drug addicts and ‘life 
wasters’, as well as intellectuals who are indifferent to Islam. 
It should be added that many, if not a majority, of Muslim radicals 
avoid public expression of their views. In this respect, they may be likened 
to Soviet dissidents, who expressed their true convictions, in the phrase of 
the day, ‘while sitting in the kitchen’. This line of conduct is widespread, in 
particular among students. The short period of existence of post-Soviet 
Russia does not make it possible draw a conclusion about the stability of 
Islam’s impact on the minds of the young. World experience tells us that as 
an individual grows older, s/he becomes more pragmatic and backs away 
from radical attitudes. And yet the same experience attests to the possibility 
of a permanent reproduction of radicalism in the youth milieu. Somehow 
or other, a stable niche of Islamic radicalism has been formed among the 
young, which is expanding, albeit slowly. Contributing to the above-
mentioned causes is the growing level of Islamophobia in society. 
Therefore, Islamic radicalism is to a certain extent a reaction to the negative 
view of Islam. 
Finally, a growing number of neophytes of Slavic origin are to be 
found among Islamic radicals. It is known that in the late 1980s, the 
conversion of Slavs (Russians and Ukrainians) to Islam had to do with the 
shock that Soviet servicemen went through in Afghanistan. Psychologists 
explained their conversion to the enemy’s religion by a feeling of guilt 
before the people against whom they had been fighting and by the 
recognition of the strength of Islam. Later on, the conversion of some 
individuals to Islam was their response to and a kind of resentment against 
the attitude towards them by Russian society and the state. It was also 
because of their disenchantment with ‘their own’ Orthodox faith. It may be 
said that the change of religion was, in a sense, a result of a crisis of Russian 
(on a broader scale, Slavic) identity, which began back in the days of 
perestroika.16 
Today, for some the conversion to Islam (the number of neophytes 
runs into hundreds and probably already thousands) is a continuation of 
                                                      
16 In 1995, Vladimir Khotinenko, the noted Russian film director, made the film The 
Muslim, telling the story of a Russian soldier who had embraced Islam. The 
Council of Muftis of Russia awarded the film director a special Golden Minbar 
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their search for identity, an attempt to find a radical, even extreme, form of 
self-expression, for Islam is perceived as a religion of resolute action. Anti-
Americanism, which is widespread in Russian society, also leads one to 
embrace Islam. Islamic radicals of Slavic origin have been noticed in the 
Rostov, Samara and Saratov regions, in the Stavropol territory, in the Urals 
and in Tyumen. Russian Muslim Viktor Senchenko participated in the 
attack on Nalchik on the militants’ side.17 Another Russian Muslim, 
Vyacheslav Panin, distributed HTI leaflets.18 Certainly, the role of Slavic 
Islamists should not be overestimated; however, Muslim ideologists and 
propagandists consider their presence valuable, for it offers proof of the 
supranational nature of Islam and neophytes’ readiness to take a direct part 
in jihad, as well as still another confirmation of the point that the 
Islamisation of Russia has gotten underway. 
6.  Methods of violence or manifestations of tension 
Violence inevitably follows from the ideology of radicalism. In the 
Caucasus, practical violence substantiated by religious ideology may be 
divided into two types with respect to its object: violence in relation to non-
Muslims, including that against the state and its structures, and violence in 
relation to Muslims. A list of the numerous major terrorist acts in Russia 
from 1994 to 2006 is given in appendix A.  
Radicals represent the modern secular state to be devoid of divine 
blessing and therefore deserving destruction. It should be replaced with a 
state founded on ‘divine’ laws, which will be built by an appropriate 
society. From this follows, first, participation by ‘true Muslims’ in militant 
jamaats and the conduct of military actions against power structures – the 
army, the security services, the militia, etc. Second, acts of terrorism are 
called for to spread panic among peaceful populations and to stir anti-
Russian sentiments in its midst. Quite often, acts of terrorism are directed 
against carriers of Russian cultural influence – Russians and Russian-
speaking people, as well as teachers, public servants, etc. 
                                                      
17 See R.F. Pateyev, Islam v Rostovskoi oblasti [Islam in the Rostov Region], Moscow: 
Logos, 2008, pp. 38-39. 
18 See V.V. Semyonov, Islam v Saratovskoi oblasti [Islam in the Saratov Region], 
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The concept of charging fellow Muslims with unbelief (takfir) gives 
the radicals grounds to state that many Muslim politicians have actually 
renounced Islam. Hence, there is the active use of violence against ethnic 
Muslims serving in state power structures – and not against them alone. 
Militia officers who are members of the local ethnic groups in Dagestan, 
Chechnya, Ingushetia and the eastern districts of the Stavropol territory are 
among the terrorists’ main targets. Islamists believe that the family 
members of militia officers and other representatives of the authorities may 
be killed because they voluntarily stay with apostates and therefore 
support their position. A true Muslim must disown such relatives. Those 
who accidentally die in acts of terrorism will become shahids [martyrs] and 
go directly to paradise. 
With the exception of the Northern Caucasus, calls to violence on the 
part of Islamic radicals in the other regions practically have not been 
noticed. Quite the contrary, even HTI followers stress in every way possible 
that they do not view confrontation with the authorities as their main 
objective, laying the key emphasis on propaganda. An interesting fact is 
that, in detaining HTI members in the territory of Russia, none of them 
could be charged with violent methods of struggle. The detention, 
however, was done not without grounds by the authorities of the Central 
Asian states of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, to which the detainees were 
extradited. 
In the mid-1990s, the question began to be debated among some of 
the young Tatars, especially those who had been in contact with the 
Chechen separatists, about possible direct support of the separatist fighting 
in Chechnya and about rendering it assistance with concrete actions in the 
rest of the territory of the Russian Federation. Yet, things never came to 
practical action: only a few Tatars took part in the first Chechen war on the 
separatists’ side. (No accurate data on the subject are available.) 
In 1995, one of the authors of this chapter had a chance to talk in 
Kazan with a radically-minded member of the All-Tatar Public Centre, who 
literally said the following: “We, the Tatars, are weaker in character than 
the Chechens and we have no mountains or we would have also shown to 
Moscow” [sic]. It should be noted that shortly before the meeting, the 
author’s collocutor had spent 15 days in custody on a charge of organising 
an unauthorised rally. We repeat once again, however, that even in that 
period, which was quite tense for Moscow, calls for violence voiced by 
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It is quite clear that today calls for violence are even less likely to find 
any substantial support among the Tatars or among Muslim migrants from 
Central Asia who come to Russia to earn money and not at all to participate 
in jihad. Quite the contrary, Muslim migrants themselves are under 
constant pressure not only by the Russian militia but also by Russian 
nationalists. (It is known that in the last two years attacks on and even 
killings of immigrants from Central Asia have become a kind of routine, 
and their number has grown so much that the federal authorities have been 
compelled to pay attention to this.) 
7.  Response of the state and society to Islamic radicalism 
The response of the state to the activities of Islamic radicals is by far not 
always adequate and quite often may provoke conflicts between the 
authorities and the Muslim community at large. 
At both the federal and local levels, the state takes a very rigid 
position in respect of ‘Islamic dissidents’. In the Northern Caucasus, they 
are outlawed and an unceasing warfare is carried on against them. The 
authorities, however, are ignoring the fact that nearly the entire Muslim 
community in the region is, in varied form and degree, drawn into this 
warfare. A substantial share of it sides or at least sympathises with radicals 
and is embittered by extremely rigorous and not always justified measures 
against them and especially against their relatives on the part of the militia 
and other power structures. 
In particular, an exceptionally repressive policy has led to 
radicalisation of the Kabardino-Balkarian jamaat. From the middle of 2004, 
militarised extremist cells began to step up their activities in the Northern 
Caucasus, including in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic. The acme of the 
destructive activity of the local Wahhabite Yarmuk Jamaat was the 
previously mentioned attack on the Department of the Federal Drug 
Control Service in Nalchik in December 2004. The federal and republican 
power bodies scored a success when they liquidated the leading nucleus of 
the jamaat with its amir, Muslim Atayev, in the course of a special operation 
in Nalchik at the end of January 2005. This move, however, turned out to be 
a Pyrrhic victory. It was quite clear that the jamaat itself was not eliminated. 
As a result, the situation became even more exacerbated: Kabardino-
Balkaria turned into still another explosive territory and its Islamic youth 
structures began de facto actively to cooperate with the Chechen radicals. 182 | MALASHENKO & YARLYKAPOV 
 
The Muslim religious boards have turned into bureaucratic structures 
having no control over the religious situation at the local level and enjoying 
no authority among believers. Moreover, they may stir conflicts within 
Muslim communities with their incompetent actions. It is not to be ruled 
out that the authorities will be compelled to switch from unqualified 
support of the Muslim religious boards, which are failing to cope with their 
tasks to engage in dialogue with and even to draw to their side informal 
Islamic structures, having legitimised them. These latter structures are 
communities of ‘new Muslims’, which, while not being Wahhabites, refuse 
to recognise the authority of the religious boards. In addition, such 
communities have levers of influence for radicalising young persons whom 
the authorities could use in their own interests. Naturally, the state will not 
undertake a compromise with extremist groups, yet at the same time it 
should clearly determine whom it regards as extremists and who, their 
radicalism notwithstanding, have not yet overstepped this boundary. What 
presents an additional complexity for the state is the non-uniformity of 
youth communities in the Northern Caucasus – which, because of lack of 
registration, find themselves outside the legal framework, thus fostering 
the preservation and growth of radicals’ and extremists’ influence on them. 
Although the state policy in respect of Islamic radicalism remains 
mainly repressive, some of the public officials speak up from time to time 
for the need for a more balanced approach to the opponents and sometimes 
even admit errors (although very rarely) committed by the authorities. In 
this connection one may note the views of Yevgeny Primakov, former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister of Russia, who does not 
consider Islamic fundamentalism an indubitable evil, and also ex-premier 
Sergei Stepashin, who said during his visit to the Dagestani territory 
controlled by radicals in August 1998 that the inhabitants of that enclave 
were quite “nice” people and “by no means Wahhabites”.19 
Arsen Kanokov, who became president of Kabardino-Balkaria in 
2005, publicly admitted that ill-considered actions by the local Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, which systematically refused dialogue with young 
Muslims, had been one of the causes of the Nalchik tragedy. 
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It is also known that in the Astrakhan region (Southern Federal 
District) the local administration took a relatively reserved attitude towards 
local radicals and their head, Ayub Astrakhansky, which was instrumental 
in avoiding an exacerbation of the situation. Still, such examples remain 
exceptions. 
The relatively brief history of the existence in the Northern Caucasus 
of Islamic radicalism has shown that its emergence was brought about by a 
profound crisis that had swept the region and its society. To neutralise 
protest sentiments, the federal authorities are attempting partially to 
replace the elites in the republics and show resolve to combat total 
corruption and the inefficiency of the local economies. The replacement of 
the republics’ leaders in Dagestan, Adygeya and Kabardino-Balkaria, 
demonstrative actions against corrupt officials, and the implementation of 
economic projects, including those for the development of tourism, are well 
received by the local population. Given the scale of the problems the region 
is facing, however, cosmetic measures alone (such as those taken in the past 
years) are clearly insufficient. The Northern Caucasus needs systemic 
reform, which the Kremlin is having a hard time deciding to conduct. No 
less important is the shaping of a common national identity: this is 
impeded by the growth in Russia of anti-Caucasus sentiments, which is 
understandably very painfully perceived by Muslim youth. The integration 
of the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus into civil society is moving 
forward with insufficient decisiveness and speed, and is thus fraught with 
serious consequences. 
In the Muslim Volga area, the Urals and Siberia, the situation is more 
tranquil. Terrorist acts that took place in the second half of the 1990s and 
early 2000s were linked to events in the Northern Caucasus. The authorities 
systematically carry out ‘preventive’ measures, keeping a close watch on 
radicals’ activities and detaining Muslims who, from their point of view, 
pose the most danger. Every year, court trials of members of radical groups 
are held in Russia. The main conclusions drawn after the trials are that 
religious radicals’ activities are directed from abroad. 
In addition, one cannot fail to notice that struggle against extremism 
serves the Russian authorities as a pretext for tightening the screws, for 
imposing even more harsh control on the mass media and for persecution 
of the opposition. Quite often, measures taken by the authorities are 
absolutely unrelated to the struggle against extremism. Thus, for example, 
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abolished – allegedly to promote security. Sometimes the authorities 
deliberately exaggerate the factor of extremism and the struggle against it. 
Certain cities and even regions of Russia are nearly declared hotbeds of 
Wahhabism.20 Yet even in 1999, when the aggravation of the situation in the 
Northern Caucasus reached its height, it was quite clear that Wahhabism 
was by no means the main problem for Tatarstan or for the Muslim Volga 
area in general.21 
8.  Influence of the international situation and current world events 
Radicalisation of the Muslim community in Russia has mainly internal 
causes, and therefore it may be positively stated that world events have a 
secondary, even though marked, influence on this process. Nevertheless, 
radically-minded Islamic ideologists are making wide use of the world 
situation in their reasoning and propaganda. 
Of much significance is the playing on anti-Western feelings. The 
Wahhabite Student’s Summary Notes read, “If one takes a look at the 
history of the West’s relations with the Muslim peoples, one may find that 
the Europeans’ souls were so much filled with spite and animosity that 
these things have driven them to the brink of insanity. Spite, animosity and 
fear is what they feel towards Islam.”22 The Summary Notes also describe 
in detail problems that are painful for Muslims and which they tie in with 
the politics of the West. Zionism and Israel’s politics are one of the most 
irritating factors. The Summary Notes mention Eritrea, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and Lebanon, whose difficulties are regarded as consequences of 
the Western forces’ inimical activities. The Summary Notes end with an 
eloquent appeal: “We Muslims are slaves of All-Mighty and Great Allah. 
We must break our fetters and restore our strength and our power! And 
deliver the world from the tyranny of the Western kafirs!”23 
                                                      
20 See V.M. Viktorin, Islam v Astrakhanskom regione [Islam in the Astrakhan Region], 
Moscow: Logos, 2008, p. 61. 
21 See R. Mukhametshin, Islam v obshchestvennoi i politicheskoi zhizni tatar I Tatarstana 
v XX veke [Islam in the Public and Political life of the Tatars and Tatarstan in the 
20th Century], Kazan: United Humanitarian Publishing House, 2005, p. 150. 
22 Ibid. 
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The above example reflects broader sentiments widespread among 
Russia’s Muslim community. Muslims’ overall and in a sense, formal 
loyalty does not imply their total solidarity with Moscow’s stand on Islam 
and the Islamic world. On the one hand, Russia’s Muslims support 
Moscow’s official policy on the Middle East and its stand on Iran and 
Afghanistan. From 2004, a parliamentary association named “Russia and 
the Islamic World: Strategic Dialogue” has been functioning at Russia’s 
State Duma (parliament). According to State Duma Deputy Shamil 
Sultanov, its aims are as follows:  
Providing legislative support for the development of Russia’s 
relations with Muslim countries and international Islamic 
organisations, above all the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC)…putting forward initiatives for participation in integration 
processes in the Islamic world; …creating conditions for 
constructive dialogue between the political and economic elites of 
Russia and the Islamic world, [etc.]24 
Veniamin Popov, former special envoy of the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, has repeated more than once that “Russia can and must 
come out in favour of maintaining Christian-Muslim dialogue”. Islam, 
according to Popov, is the only religion that has established its own inter-
state structure – the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.25 
Conducive to the establishment of special relations with Islamic 
countries is the admission of Russia as an observer – a country with a 
Muslim minority – in the OIC. (The OIC, established in 1969, has today 57 
countries as members, including two European and two Latin American 
countries, and also six member countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.) There were sporadic contacts with the OIC back in the 
Soviet times. In particular, the OIC was instrumental in liberating prisoners 
of war from Afghanistan. In 1994 and 1997, the organisation’s secretaries 
general visited Russia. 
Islamic radicals are – publicly or unofficially – in agreement with the 
intensity of Russia’s policy in the Muslim area. Visits by Hamas delegations 
                                                      
24 Derived from “Rossia i Islam” [Russia and Islam], an interview with Russia’s 
State Duma Deputy Sh. Sultanov, Literaturnaya Gazeta, 13-19 October 2004. 
25 See “Islamskii mir i vneshnyaya politika Rossii” [The Islamic World and Russia’s 
Foreign Policy], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 5, 2005, pp. 77-79. 186 | MALASHENKO & YARLYKAPOV 
 
to Moscow, which began in March 2006, and active support of Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are regarded by the radicals (and by the 
rest of Muslims) as evidence that Moscow seeks to play an intermediary 
role in relations between the Muslim world and the West, which are 
anything but simple. Sometimes Moscow’s position de facto comes out on 
the side of the anti-Western segment of the Muslim community, thus 
encouraging Islamic radicals and convincing them of their rightfulness. 
It should be noted that Moscow’s contacts with Hamas are regarded 
with approval by the moderate part of Russia’s Muslim community as well. 
For example, in 2006 Jafar Bikmayev, Mufti of the Rostov region, said 
during his meeting with Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation that “if there is hope for alleviation of that 
organisation’s position, meetings should be held with it”.26 
At the same time, there is awareness in the Russian establishment 
that ‘external’ Islamic radicalism is an ally of internal radicalism, which has 
developed as a response to the complexities that have arisen in Russia’s 
public and political life. The barrier between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ 
radicalism is, in a sense, conventional and the ties among Russia’s Muslims 
– whether in the Northern Caucasus or to a lesser degree, in the Volga area 
and the southern Urals – are regular and versatile. On the territory of the 
Russian Federation, a whole variety of charity organisations with an 
ideological and political bias, such as the International Islamic Relief 
Organisation, Jamiat Ihia Al-Turath Al-Islamiya [Revival of Islamic 
Heritage Society], Al-Harameyn [The Two Holy Places], El-Hairiya 
[Charity], the Benevolence International Foundation, ‘Qatar’ and also such 
groups as Hizb ut-Tahrir, al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brothers, have been 
and are active even though today on a reduced scale. 
What could Islamists’ practical – tangible, so to say – goals be in 
Russia? 
Certainly, today only through a flight of fancy can one imagine the 
creation of a caliphate in the territories of the eastern Caucasus. It is also 
hard to imagine the formation under radical slogans of an all-Russia 
Muslim separatist movement. Yet, the spreading of Islamist sentiments 
among believers, principally among young believers, and the infiltration of 
                                                      
26 See the Regnum News Agency website (http://www.regnum.ru/news/ 
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Islamist preachers into mosques have turned out to be quite practicable. 
The lack of centralised structures at the Islamic radicals’ disposal and the 
passivity of the followers of Islamism do not signify its disappearance. 
Rather, it is biding its time. Islamist ideology easily gets through state 
borders. A symbiosis is taking place between internal and external Islamic 
radicalism. 
9.  A new trend 
In the last few years, a new, previously unknown trend has been noted in 
Russia – namely, the radicalisation of traditional Islam, whose major 
figures have always been conformist-minded towards the state and have 
sharply criticised their opponents, the Salafists. This trend may be 
conventionally described as ‘neo-traditionalist’. It is present in Russia on a 
nationwide scale; however, it is in the Northern Caucasus that this trend is 
seen most clearly. 
In Dagestan, the radicalisation of traditional Islam is directly related 
to the activity of the Sufi Nakshbandiya, Kadiriya and Shaziliya tarikats. 
The spiritual guides of the Nakshbandiya tarikat, who have open support 
from the authorities, enjoy the greatest influence, just as they always have. 
Today, it is from sheikhs and their loyal murids [disciples] – many of whom 
hold responsible posts in local administration – that the impetus towards 
shariatisation of society originates. Dagestani sheikhs, under slogans of 
struggle against Wahhabism, have created, not without assistance from the 
authorities, their own system of education operating under their patronage. 
Formally, the Sufis, just as before, come out flatly against Wahhabites; 
at the same time, they are ready to side with them concerning certain 
general Muslim issues such as support of the Palestinians and criticism of 
the US policy in the Middle East, in Iran and in Afghanistan. Moreover, in 
2000 there were cases in which followers of traditional Islam became 
members of Wahhabite jamaats, while preserving the specific features of 
their understanding of Islam. 
Traditionalists and Wahhabites are united by a call for shariatisation 
of society, which both regard as quite a feasible goal. Furthermore, present-
day Sufi communities in Dagestan, led by sheikhs, are establishing a sharia 
governance framework in their midst without the preliminary consent of 
the authorities. Practically all litigations in their midst are decided by a 
sheikh and persons assigned by him – naturally, on the basis of sharia law 
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criminal and state administrative spheres is just a matter of time, for the 
creeping spread of influence through a network of murids is a time-tested 
and reliable tactic known since the Middle Ages. 
The position taken by the clergy in areas of compact residence of 
Muslims, for example, in Tatarstan, combines “loyalty” to the state with a 
call to “adhere to the idea of the expediency of gradual Islamisation of 
Tatar society” and allows for “combining [s]haria law with secular laws”.27 
One gets the impression that some of the spiritual leaders see the present 
stage as transitional to a situation in which the influence of Islam on society 
will increase immeasurably. Under this logic, concessions to the state 
appear temporary and forced, for, as Valiulla Yakubov, Deputy Mufti of 
Tatarstan, believes, “so far, you cannot come to power on the basis of a 
religious idea”.28 This statement coincides with the opinion of popular 
Dagestani politician Surakat Asiyatilov, former chairman of the Islamic 
Party of Dagestan, who, while admitting that “today one should not harp 
on the issue of establishing an Islamic republic in Dagestan”, dreams of the 
day when “Islamic order will be established in his country and he will be 
tried by a sharia court and not by the double-headed eagle”.29 The idea of a 
gradual yet inevitable Islamisation is evolving into a final concept. It 
certainly cannot be regarded as a guide to action, yet it is gradually sticking 
in the minds of Muslims, prompting them to more vigorous action on the 
religious path, intensifying their conviction and asserting the primacy of 
their religious identity. 
It should be noted that today neo-traditionalism looks increasingly 
impressive in the religious domain proper. The niche of Islamic 
modernisation in Russia is amorphous and unpersuasive. As Dagestani 
Islam scholar and sociologist Enver Kisriyev believes, the number of 
Muslims of “modernist” and traditional type “may be approximately 
                                                      
27 See R.M. Mukhametshin, ”Bogoslovsko-pravovoi aspekt islamskogo 
vozrozhdeniya v postsovetskom Tatarstane” [The Theological and Legal Aspect of 
Islamic Revival in Post-Soviet Tatarstan], Islam i Pravo v Rossii, No. 2, Moscow, 
2004, p. 93. 
28 See Iman, No. 5, March 1998. 
29 See S.Kh. Asiyatilov, Islam spasyot budushcheye Dagestana [Islam Will Save the 
Future of Dagestan], Makhachkala, 1999, pp. 77, 27. RADICALISATION OF RUSSIA’S MUSLIM COMMUNITY | 189 
 
estimated as being in equilibrium”,30 with modernists prevailing in towns 
and conservators in the countryside. One should think that there is no 
contradiction in this, since modernism is determined by the urban way of 
life and by the character of labour activity, in the course of which direct 
religious consciousness is little demanded. It should be noted, however, 
that when things concern the topic of Islam, the very same modernists quite 
often take a protective stand. In other words, people try to make up for 
their urbanite manner of conduct with affective adherence to Islam. 
It is worthy of note that, for example, in Tatarstan (and not only 
there) neo-traditionalist positions are strong especially among the well-
educated segment of the urban population. 
Conclusions 
Islamic radicalism in Russia will not disappear; it will remain a factor of the 
political and religious life of its Muslim community and of relations 
between Muslims and the rest of the country’s citizens. 
It may grow stronger under the influence of the internal situation, 
acting as a form of protest ideology. The radicals’ activity also depends, 
among other things, on the international situation – especially on relations 
between the Muslim world and the West. 
Considering the fragility of stability in the Northern Caucasus, this 
region in particular is most likely to become a field of activity for Islamic 
radicals. 
Competition between Islamic radicals (Salafists and Wahhabites) and 
traditionalists – both Muslim orders and followers of Hanafism and 
Shafiism (in the Caucasus) will continue. This process is a particular case of 
general competition between universalist and regional, ethnic Islam. 
On the other hand, in the Northern Caucasus there have appeared 
indications of a ‘truce’ and even rapprochement on a number of issues 
between universalist radicals and traditionalists. This concerns, in the first 
place, the need for a shariatisation of Islamic society and a unity of views 
on relations between Islam and the West. 
                                                      
30 See E.F. Kisriyev, Islam i vlast v Dagestane [Islam and Power in Dagestan], 
Moscow: United Humanitarian Publishing House, 2004, p. 77. 190 | MALASHENKO & YARLYKAPOV 
 
The state and society are faced with the need to work out a more 
flexible and selective approach towards Islamic radicalism, singling out in 
it a relatively moderate and an extremist wing and combining contacts with 
the former with suppression of the latter. 
Today, a repetition of terrorist acts similar to those that took place in 
the late 1990s and the first half of the 2000s is hardly possible in Russia. 
Even if terrorist acts were to be committed, they would most probably be 
limited to the Northern Caucasus and would be a response to the 
antiterrorist struggle being waged by the power structures. 
The question of links between Russia’s Muslim radicals with their 
kindred spirits in Europe remains open. Most likely, however, these links 
will be gradually developing, the more so as a number of instances of 
mutual contacts between Russian and European Islamist network 
structures have already been taking place. 
Appendix A. Major terrorist acts in Russia from 1994 to 2006 
Date Event 
28.07.1994  Capture of the Pyatigorsk–Stavropol–Krasnogvardeisk coach – 
5 killed 
29.07.1994  Mineralnye Vody, hijacking of a helicopter at the airport –   
4 killed, 15 wounded 
14.06.1995  Budennovsk, Stavropol region, hostage-taking in a hospital 
(more than 1,600 persons, including children and pregnant 
women) – 166 killed, more than 400 wounded; a terrorist gang 
was headed by Shamil Basaev 
09.01.1996  Kizlyar, Dagestan, assault and capture of 3,000 hostages, kept 
in a hospital – 78 killed, hundreds wounded; Salman Raduev 
headed about 500 terrorists  
28.06.1996  Nalchik, explosion of a bus at a bus terminal – 8 killed, 23 
wounded 
04.09.1998  Makhachkala, explosion on Parkhomenko street – 18 killed, 160 
wounded 
19.03.1999  Vladikavkaz, explosion in the central market – 62 killed, 118 
wounded 
04.09.1999  Buinaksk, Dagestan, explosion in an apartment building – 
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Date Event 
08.09.1999  Moscow, explosion in an apartment building on Guryanova 
street – 94 killed, 164 wounded 
13.09.1999  Moscow, explosion in an apartment building on Kashirskoe 
street – 124 killed, 9 wounded 
16.09.1999  Volgodonsk, Rostov region, explosion near an apartment 
building – 18 killed, 130 wounded; this series of September 
explosions is considered one case by intelligence services, 
masterminded by Arab mercenaries Khattab and Abu Umar; 
most of the executors were later killed in Chechnya 
24.03.2001  Explosions of cars in Mineralnye Vody, Essentuki and 
Cherkessk – 21 killed, 140 wounded 
09.05.2002  Kaspiisk, Dagestan, a terrorist act on the Victory Day 
celebrations – 42 killed, over 100 wounded 
23.10.2002  Moscow, hostage-taking at the theatre on Dubrovka street – 
129 killed; 41 militants, headed by Movsar Baraev, nephew of 
terrorist Arbi Baraev, killed by federal forces in Chechnya 
05.07.2003  Moscow, explosion at a rock festival in Tushino – 16 killed, 69 
wounded; carried out by two female suicide-bombers, 
Zalikhan Elikhadgieva, a 20-year old from a Chechen village, 
and Zarema Mugikhoeva, who was arrested five days later in 
Moscow. They had been trained by Khamzat Tazabeav, who 
was close to Shamil Basaev and who was killed during the 
special operation in Ingushetia.  
03.09.2003  Stavropol region, explosion on a Kislovodsk-Mineralnye Vody 
train – 5 killed, about 40 wounded 
05.12.2003  Stavropol region, explosion on a Kislovodsk-Mineralnye Vody 
train – 47 killed, 180 wounded; blamed on members of the 
‘Nogai battalion’ 
05.12.2003  Stavropol region, explosion on a Kislovodsk-Mineralnye Vody 
train – 47 killed, 180 wounded; blamed on members of the 
‘Nogai battalion’ 
06.02.2004  Moscow, explosion on the metro between the Avtozavodskaya 
and Paveletskaya stations – 40 killed, 134 wounded; attributed 
to an Arab from Chechnya, Abu al-Valid, the successor of the 
eliminated Khattab  
09.05.2004  Grozny, the explosion at Dinamo stadium – 6 killed, over 40 
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Date Event 
22.06.2004  Several terrorist attacks on buildings of the Ingush interior 
ministry and the 137th frontier detachment in Nazran, 
Karabulak and Sleptsovskaya – 100 killed 
24.08.2004  Bomb attacks on two airline flights, Moscow–Volgograd and 
Moscow–Sochi – 89 killed; carried out by female suicide-
bombers 
31.08.2004  Moscow, explosion outside the Rizhskaya metro station – 11 
killed, 41 wounded; Shamil Basaev claimed responsibility, the 
‘Karachai battalion’ were accused 
01.09.2004  Beslan, North Ossetia, the school hostage siege (over 1,200 
children and adults) – 330 killed, several hundreds wounded; 
Shamil Basaev claimed responsibility, declaring that the attack 
was carried out by 12 Chechen men and 2 Chechen women, 9 
Ingush men, 3 Russian men, 2 Arab men and 2 Ossetian men, 1 
Tatar, 1 Kabardinian and 1 from the Zabaikal region  
1st half of 2005  Dagestan,  over  60  terrorist attacks; responsibility was 
attributed to the ‘Jenet’ and ‘Sharia’ Dagestan jamaats 
13.10.2005   Attack on Nalchik – 33 law enforcement officers and 12 civil 
servants were killed; a large majority of the over 100 wounded 
were secret service officers; 80 militants were killed and 27 
captured; responsibility claimed by the Kabardino-Balkaria 
Jamaat 
09.02.2006  Battle in the village of Tukui-Mekteb (Stavropol region) – 4 law 
enforcement officers were killed; 12 militants of the ‘Nogai 
battalion’ (which is part of the Chechnya Shelkov jamaat) were 
killed  
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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